This highly interesting decision claims to be in line with our jurisdictions, but it appears to carve out additional liability, even in situations where the party seeking summary judgment is not the proximate cause of the subject accident. 

Dickson and his employer sought summary judgment after Dickson was presumably negligent in striking a median which resulted in his vehicle blocking two southbound lanes of the Florida turnpike. Additional traffic, including a semi-truck, was able to safely stop before colliding with Dickson’s stopped vehicle. After all the vehicles were stopped for a substantial period of time, a tractor-trailer crashed into the semi-truck, resulting in the tractor-trailer’s backload falling on another vehicle and causing injury to the plaintiff (Serrano). 

The trial court, citing that Dickson’s vehicle was stopped for a long period of time and that other vehicles had safely stopped behind it, concluded that Dickson and his employer were entitled to summary judgment because the tractor-trailer’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 

The Appeals Court distinguished the precedent the trial court relied upon, instead noting that vehicles will behave and react differently while driving on an interstate highway, as opposed to less busy or rural streets, and that the tractor-trailer striking the stopped traffic was a “foreseeable byproduct” of Dickson causing his vehicle to be disabled in two lanes of traffic.