Today, in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, the Supreme Court unanimously held that in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group does not need to show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
The Facts
Plaintiff Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services. In 2004, Ames was hired as an executive secretary, and was eventually promoted to program administrator. In 2019, the Department interviewed her for a newly created management position, but ultimately hired a different candidate, a lesbian woman. The Department later demoted Ames from her role as a program administrator and hired a gay man for the position.
The Lawsuit
Ames sued the Department under Title VII, arguing that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation when it denied her the management promotion and later demoted her.
The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, finding that Ames needed, but had failed, to show that the Department acted with a discriminatory motive because she had not presented evidence of “background circumstances.” The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Ames had not shown “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” The court reasoned that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make the showing “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima facie case.”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuit courts over whether a member of a majority group must meet the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances rule” in order to satisfy the prima facie burden of their Title VII claim.
The Decision
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, held that the additional “background circumstances requirement” is not consistent with Title VII’s text or the case law construing the statute.
The Court analyzed the text of Title VII, which makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” (Emphasis added.) The Court explained that “by establishing the same protections for every ‘individual’ — without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority ground — Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority group plaintiffs alone.”
The Court also relied on its precedent to reinforce that understanding of the statute, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., and Bostock v. Clayton County. The Court explained: “our case law thus makes clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group.”
The Court went on to find Ames’s evidence would have ordinarily satisfied her prima facie burden to show that the Department acted with a discriminatory motive (“how [she] was qualified, had been denied a promotion in favor of a gay candidate, and was later demoted in favor of another gay candidate”), and the Sixth Circuit had “expressly based its holding . . . on Ames’s failure to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard.”
The Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for further proceedings.
What Employers Should Know
So-called “reverse discrimination” claims are becoming more common. And as Ames has now held, those claims will be analyzed the same way as traditional discrimination claims. Employers need to be cognizant of their EEO obligations with respect to all employees, not just employees in minority groups.
*A special thank you to Summer Associate Alice Liu for her assistance on this client alert.
