A recent decision in the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings for Chrysler has reinforced the authority of a bankruptcy court to interpret its own sale orders, and where appropriate, to enforce such an order by preventing creditors from asserting successor liability and other claims against the purchaser. This decision sends a highly reassuring message to strategic and financial investors who are considering the acquisition of a financially troubled company through a bankruptcy sale process.
Background
On April 30, 2009, Chrysler LLC and several affiliates (“Old Chrysler”) filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code [1] in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. [2] A month later, the bankruptcy court approved the sale of substantially all of Old Chrysler’s assets to NewCarco LLC (“New Chrysler”) free and clear of claims and interests. [3] Despite clear language in the bankruptcy court’s sale order authorizing the sale of Chrysler’s assets free and clear of all “interests,” and further enjoining the pursuit of successor liability claims by Chrysler’s creditors, the States of Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan assessed unemployment taxes against the New Chrysler using pre-bankruptcy unemployment experience ratings for Old Chrysler. In effect, these state agencies treated New Chrysler as a mere successor of Old Chrysler. As a result, New Chrysler was forced to pay an additional $50 million to state unemployment funds between 2009 and 2013.
Upon a motion by New Chrysler seeking relief from its unemployment tax burden, the bankruptcy court decided that the federal Tax Injunction Act [4] deprived it of jurisdiction to enforce the sale order against the States. On appeal, however, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in New Chrysler’s favor, holding that the States had fair notice of the automaker’s bankruptcy proceedings in 2009 and that they could not now challenge the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enforce its own sale order. Although this decision remains subject to further appeal, it is highly significant for strategic and financial investors that may purchase a troubled company or its assets out of bankruptcy.
The Power of a “Free and Clear” Sale Order
Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to use, sell, or lease its property outside the ordinary course of business. With proper notice, Section 363(f) allows a debtor to sell its property “free and clear of any interest in such property” provided that certain conditions are met. [5] The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not define the term “interest.” As a result, it has been left to the courts to decide what rights and obligations are expunged by a sale “free and clear” of “any interest.” Historically, “interest” was understood to mean a property interest in the asset itself, such as a lien. As Section 363 sales became the preferred method of selling distressed businesses, the judicial interpretation of this term expanded. Several courts have ruled that Section 363(f) permits a sale free and clear of obligations connected to, or arising from, the use or operation of the property being sold. [6] This view has been accepted in several jurisdictions including the influential Second and Third Circuits. Accordingly, Section 363 sales have gained marketplace acceptance as a powerful tool that protects purchasers of distressed businesses from a wide variety of debts and obligations, including successor and product liability claims. [7] Indeed, sales under “Section 363” have become an increasingly popular vehicle for reorganizing a distressed business through a court approved auction. Debtors, creditors, and purchasers of distressed businesses tend to prefer Section 363 sales over chapter 11 plan transactions because of the speed, efficiency, and certainty they offer. Perhaps more importantly, purchasers are willing to pay market value for distressed assets because of the strength of a Section 363 sale order, deeming the acquired assets “free and clear” of any pre-existing interest in such property [8]—virtually perfect title.
Debtor Experience Rating and Successor Tax Liability
Employing an expansive notion of the “interests” that may be discharged in a Section 363 sale, bankruptcy courts have even ordered sales free and clear of criteria that governmental agencies use to assess a purchaser’s post-sale tax liability, finding that such criteria are inexorably connected to the property sold. [9] In the context of unemployment insurance, for example, states commonly set an employer’s unemployment tax rate to match the anticipated benefits to be paid in the coming year. States do this by looking at the employer’s historical claims experience (commonly known as the “Experience Rating”). An employer’s future unemployment tax obligation is, therefore, influenced by the unemployment insurance benefits historically paid to former employees during a statutory look-back period.
In 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts enforced one of its prior Section 363 sale orders to prevent the Massachusetts Division of Unemployment Assistance (“DUA”) from using the debtor’s Experience Rating to calculate the purchaser’s contribution rate to the state’s unemployment contribution fund. [10] The bankruptcy court concluded that the DUA’s right to apply the debtor’s Experience Rating to the purchaser was an “interest” in the purchased property within the meaning of Section 363(f), finding that the right arose “because, and only because, the buyer purchased assets of the bankruptcy estate.” [11] The statute imputing the Experience Rating to the purchaser created a direct link between the contribution rate and the assets purchased. [12] The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit affirmed the decision in Mass. Dep’t of Unemployment Assistance v. OPK Biotech, LLC (In re PBBPC, Inc.) [13], concluding that “[s]ince the motivation and underlying rationale for the successor rate structure is to recover money from the purchaser of the Debtor’s assets for the benefit of the state and other employers, it is an interest in the property sold.” [14]
Section 363 Sale Order Not Subject to Collateral Attack
Section 363 sales, and the orders approving them, were a central feature of the reorganization of the American automobile industry in 2009, when both Old Chrysler and General Motors Corporation sold their assets to newly formed companies. Five years later, 2014 saw several significant challenges to the scope of both the Chrysler and General Motors’ Section 363 sale orders. [15] In both cases, adequate notice has proved critical to whether an order issued under Section 363 shields the purchaser from liabilities of the debtor. In its recent decision in the Chrysler case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York fortified the strength of a Section 363 sale order where the challenging parties had adequate notice of the sale process. [16]
In the Chrysler case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether governmental agencies could challenge a Section 363 sale order enjoining the application of Old Chrysler’s pre-bankruptcy Experience Rating to the purchaser when those agencies had notice of the sale. The sale order defined “claims and interests” to include “all claims or rights based on any successor or transferee liability.” [17] In addition, the sale order enjoined the assertion of any claims against New Chrysler arising from, related to, or in any connection with the ownership, sale, or operation of Old Chrysler’s assets, including “liabilities on account of any taxes arising, accruing or payable under, out of, in connection with, or in any way relating to the operation of the Purchased Assets prior to the Closing of the Sale Transaction.” [18]
Following the sale, several state agencies established New Chrysler’s unemployment insurance tax rate using Old Chrysler’s Experience Rating. [19] As a result, between June 2009 and June 2013, New Chrysler paid over $50 million in taxes more than it would have paid if it had been treated as a new employer rather than the successor to Old Chrysler. [20] On October 18, 2013, New Chrysler filed a motion asking the bankruptcy court to enforce the sale order against these state agencies and to relieve it from Old Chrysler’s Experience Rating. [21] New Chrysler argued that the Experience Rating was an “interest” that was cut off by the “free and clear” provision in the sale order, and that the order enjoined the state unemployment agencies from treating it as the successor to Old Chrysler under state law. [22] The bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding that the Tax Injunction Act, which prohibits federal courts from enjoining the collection of taxes under state law, deprived it of jurisdiction to decide the motion. [23]
On appeal to the district court, New Chrysler argued that the bankruptcy court failed to account for the fact that each state agency in question had adequate notice of Chrysler’s sale motion and declined to challenge the court’s jurisdiction at that time. [24] The district court agreed, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey [25] for the proposition that subject matter jurisdiction may not be collaterally attacked or questioned after the fact by a party that had adequate notice of the prior proceeding. The district court noted that the sale order was a final order, which precluded subsequent challenge to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the matter. [26] Furthermore, the bankruptcy court expressly retained jurisdiction to clarify and enforce the terms of the sale order. [27] Invoking the Tax Injunction Act to prevent the bankruptcy court from enforcing its sale order was “plainly” an attack on the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to clarify its sale order and to enter that order in the first place. [28]
In this case, the state agencies involved were creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding and received actual notice of Chrysler’s sale motion. [29] Accordingly, the district court held that having had a fair opportunity to challenge the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, and having failed to do so, the state unemployment agencies were estopped from resisting enforcement of the sale order. [30] It is important to note that the district court’s decision was limited to the question of bankruptcy court jurisdiction to decide whether New Chrysler acquired the business free and clear of Old Chrysler’s Experience Rating. The dispute will now return to the bankruptcy court for resolution of this issue.
The district court’s decision in Old Carco reinforces the power of the Section 363 sale process where proper notice is given—particularly to creditors and governmental units that have ongoing dealings with or oversight of the “reorganized” business.
Notes:
[1] 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
[2] See In re Old Carco LLC (f/k/a Chrysler LLC) et al. (“Old Carco I”), 505 B.R. 151, 153 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
[3] See id.
[4] 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
[5] See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). The conditions are (1) applicable non-bankruptcy law permits the sale of such property free and clear of such interest; (2) the holder of the interest consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or (5) the holder of the interest could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.
[6] See In re Chrysler, LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., (“TWA”), 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3rd Cir. 2003).
[7] See United Mine Workers of America Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573, 582 (4th Cir. 1996) (sale of coal mine free and clear of obligation to fund retiree benefit plans); TWA, 322 F.3d at 289-90 (sale of airline free and clear of employment-based litigation); Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 126 (sale of automobile business free and clear of product liability and asbestos-related claims).
[8] See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
[9] See In re USA United Fleet Inc., 496 B.R. 79 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013).
[10] See In re PBBPC, Inc., 467 B.R. 1, 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012).
[11] See id. at 9.
[12] See id.
[13] 484 B.R. 860 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2013).
[14] See id. at 870.
[15] In the spring of 2014, plaintiffs filed a series of class action lawsuits against the newly reorganized General Motors (“New GM”) after it announced a series of product recalls for vehicles manufactured by old General Motors. Plaintiffs include those who suffered personal injury prior to the bankruptcy sale and those who suffered diminution in value, loss of use, lost wages, etc. as a result of the product defects. New GM has moved to enforce the bankruptcy sale order, pursuant to which it acquired the assets of Old GM free and clear of all non-assumed claims. The plaintiffs argue that the bankruptcy sale order does not relieve New GM of liability as to their claims because they did not receive adequate notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. See generally, In re Motors Liquidation Company, et al., Case No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).
[16] See In re Old Carco LLC (f/k/a Chrysler LLC) (“Old Carco II”), 2014 WL 6790781 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).
[17] See Old Carco I, 505 B.R. at 153.
[18] See id. at 154.
[19] See id. at 155.
[20] See id.
[21] See id. at 158.
[22] See id.
[23] See Old Carco I, 505 B.R. at 159. Moreover, the bankruptcy court held that the Act deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to decide New Chrysler’s motion. See id. at 162 (“If the States are procedurally barred from arguing their positions because they failed to raise their jurisdictional arguments at the time of the Sale Motion or object to the proposed order, Chrysler can raise this argument in the state administrative or judicial process to the extent Chrysler is not procedurally barred from doing so. But the merit of Chrysler’s argument does not affect the Court’s conclusion that it lacks Jurisdiction to entertain it.”).
[24] See Old Carco II, 2014 WL 6790781, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).
[25] 557 U.S. 137 (2009).
[26] See Old Carco II, 2014 WL 6790781, at *3.
[27] See id.
[28] See id.
[29] See id.
[30] See id. at *4.
