In October of last year, I wrote in this space about how the firing of Steve Sarkisian as head football coach by the University of Southern California (“USC”) may raise legal issues related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because Sarkisian’s firing appeared to be in response to alcohol-related incidents.
Late last year, on December 7, 2015, Sarkisian indeed filed a lawsuit against USC seeking over $30 million in damages. Specifically, Sarkisian alleges that the university fired him in violation of multiple areas of law, including state laws protecting employees from disability-related discrimination. Sarkisian claims that: (i) he has alcohol dependency, which is considered a disability under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), a law similar to the ADA; (ii) USC knew about his alcohol dependency; and (iii) USC terminated him because of his alcohol dependency without providing him with reasonable accommodations to which he is entitled under FEHA.
Specifically, the complaint states that FEHA required USC to reasonably accommodate Sarkisian’s alleged alcohol dependency by giving him “time off to get help for his disability and then return to his job” and that USC “ignored . . . its obligations under California law” by terminating Sarkisian. The complaint also provides that Sarkisian is now sober and ready to return to coaching in an effort to establish that, had USC offered Sarkisian the accommodation of time off to seek treatment for his alleged alcohol dependency, he could perform the essential functions of his job.
In January 2016, USC responded to Sarkisian’s lawsuit, raising multiple defenses. The first defense claims that Sarkisian’s lawsuit violates an existing arbitration agreement in Sarkisian’s employment contract that requires the parties to resolve any termination-related claims through arbitration. The second defense disputes Sarkisian’s allegations that his alcohol dependency was known to USC, citing that Sarkisian “denied ever having a drinking problem” and “blamed his inability to perform the essential functions of his job on marital stress, lack of sleep, and anxiety for which he was taking medication.”
The third defense alleges that Sarkisian, “despite multiple opportunities . . . could not perform basic job responsibilities, including showing up for practice or speaking events.” Because FEHA protects employees with alcohol dependency from discrimination if they are able to perform the essential functions of their job, USC appears to be claiming that Sarkisian’s purported failure to perform basic job responsibilities made his termination lawful, even if the university was aware of his alcohol dependency.
USC’s first defense, that the lawsuit violates an arbitration agreement, may serve as a complete bar to Sarkisian’s claims and force Sarkisian to seek resolution of his claims against the university before an arbitrator. USC’s second and third defenses, that it was unaware of Sarkisian’s alleged disability and that Sarkisian was unable to perform the essential functions of the head football coach position at USC, though, are disputed by the claims set forth in Sarkisian’s initial complaint such that it is likely the case proceeds to discovery.
Still, it is unclear as to how far this case will proceed as both Sarkisian and USC may want to avoid the costs and disclosures associated with discovery and, ultimately, trial. Moreover, now that USC has formally responded to Sarkisian’s complaint and that Sarkisian reportedly has been pursuing jobs in the National Football League over the past month, he may have more incentive to resolve the matter out of court. If the case does not settle, it may be beneficial to continue to follow its development for guidance on the extent of employers’ obligations to employees with alcohol dependencies.
Opinions and conclusions in this post are solely those of the author unless otherwise indicated. The information contained in this blog is general in nature and is not offered and cannot be considered as legal advice for any particular situation. The author has provided the links referenced above for information purposes only and by doing so, does not adopt or incorporate the contents. Any federal tax advice provided in this communication is not intended or written by the author to be used, and cannot be used by the recipient, for the purpose of avoiding penalties which may be imposed on the recipient by the IRS. Please contact the author if you would like to receive written advice in a format which complies with IRS rules and may be relied upon to avoid penalties.
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