A Durham County class action asks whether “My Chart,” a widely used portal that medical providers use to communicate with patients about test results, conditions, and treatments should more aptly be labeled “Our Chart.”
In Rodriguez v. FastMed Urgent Care, Inc., 2025 NCBC 15, a patient of FastMed sued over the portal’s use of information gathering tools from Meta Platforms that allegedly collected her personal information without consent and allowed Meta to link with her Facebook account and sell her data to advertisers. Id. ¶¶ 3-6.
Plaintiff first attempted a class action in the Eastern District of North Carolina but that court dismissed the only federal claim and declined supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over the rest. This renewed effort in state court first focused on the North Carolina Electronic Surveillance Act (“NCESA”), N.C.G.S. § 15A-286, et seq., and a variety of associated claims, but ultimately boiled down to a common law negligence action. Id. ¶¶ 18-20, 28-29).
Judge Davis rejected FastMed’s claim that it owed no duty to protect the privacy of plaintiff’s health information. The Court considered that threshold issue settled by its ruling in Weddle v. WakeMed Health & Hosps., 2023 WL 8369786, 2023 NCBC 82 (N.C. Super Ct. Dec. 4, 2023) that North Carolina recognizes a “general duty of reasonable care in proper circumstances to the maintenance and dissemination of patient records.” Id. ¶ 36 (quoting Weddle, at *3). The Court observed that Weddle rested on the Court of Appeals having “unambiguously recognized” that providers “owe a general duty of care to patients regarding the maintenance of their confidential information.” Id. ¶ 38 (citing Demarco v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 268 N.C. App. 334, 338-39 (2019); Acosta v. Byrum, 180 N.C. App. 562, 568 (2006)).
The Court also rejected FastMed’s contention that the complaint failed to adequately plead the emotional distress and economic damages which were advanced. It held that the complaint’s allegation of “embarrassment, humiliation, emotional harm, and distress” was sufficient under North Carolina’s “notice pleading.” Id. ¶¶ 44-46 (citing Iadanza v. Harper, 169 N.C. App. 776, 780 (2005), finding that “emotional suffering” tied to a common law negligence claim need not meet “heightened standard” of “severe emotional distress” claim)).
Moreover, the Court declined defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s economic damages were barred by the “economic loss rule” – that recovery of tort damages is barred when arising from a breach of contract. FastMed contended that its relationship with plaintiff was contractual, and that without a breach of contract claim she could not recover. Id. ¶¶ 49-50.
Judge Davis noted that the Business Court, and the Middle District of North Carolina, have each recognized tort claims can lie “where an independent duty exists under the law that is not premised on an existing contract between the parties.” Id. ¶ 51 (citing Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc v. Rogers, 2011 WL 5316772, * 17, 2011 NCBC 41 (N.C. Super Ct. Nov. 3, 2011) (“plaintiff must allege a duty owed to him by the defendant [that is] separate and distinct from any duty owed under a contract”); Williams v. DukeHealth, 2024 WL 898051 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2024)).
Worth Noting
- The parties did not brief, and the Court left for another day, consideration of whether application of the economic loss rule could bar some – but not all – categories of damages even where the doctrine could not bar an action in full.
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