The California Supreme Court’s decision this week in Downey v. City of Riverside, et al. ruled that such a claim did exist, expanding the contemporaneous zone of awareness for a Plaintiff to successfully recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). Plaintiff Jayde Downey alleged she was speaking with her daughter by cell phone when she heard her daughter explain “Oh!” in fear or shock, followed by sounds of an explosive metal-on-metal vehicular crash, shattering glass, and rubber tires screeching.
Plaintiff Jayde Downey, in addition to her daughter who sued for on her own negligence claim, sued the City of Riverside and the owners of a private property adjacent to the intersection where the accident occurred for causing the incident and the emotional distress that she allegedly suffered as a result of having to hear her daughter’s car crash. The Defendants succeeded in dismissing the mother’s claim on a Demurrer, the trial court denied leave to amend, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.
The California Supreme Court’s opinion began with a detailed overview of the development of NIED tort claims, which changed drastically with the Court’s seminal decision in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728. Dillon “broke new ground by permitting a plaintiff to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by witnessing an accident that fatally injured her child, even though the plaintiff herself was not within the ‘zone of physical impact’ or ‘zone of danger.’” Later, in Thing v. La Chusa, (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 668, the Court set out three essential limits on a bystander’s recovery for NIED to circumstances in which the Plaintiff “(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.” (Thing, 48 Cal.3d at 667-68.)
Downey concerned an issue with the second Thing prong, mainly “whether, to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must understand not only that a close relative is suffering injury, but also that the defendant’s negligent conduct or omissions have caused the injury.” The Court answered that question, stating that a Plaintiff need not know of the Defendants’ role in causing the injury in order to successfully make an NIED claim.
In reaching their decision, the California Supreme Court relied on past decisions arising out of catastrophic events such as an explosion, a traffic accident, or an electrocution. Those cases allowed recovery for plaintiffs who witnessed injurious explosions, fires, and other similar accidents, even if they could not have been aware at the time of the accident that the defendant’s conduct was connected to the accident. In addition, prior cases decided that a person need not be in a line of sight to their close relative when the injury occurred. However, other cases did not allow recovery when the Plaintiff later came upon the injury and thus was found not to have been present at the scene contemporaneous to the injury. The Defendants in Downey did not dispute that Jayde Downey was “present” when she heard the accident over the phone which her daughter was involved in. Defendants’ arguments were thus limited to the concept that Plaintiff had to know of the causal link between the incident and his or her emotional distress.
The Downey opinion offers guidance regarding the burden of a plaintiff seeking NIED damages stemming from traumatic events such as a traffic accident. In particular, the opinion holds that to meet the second prong of the Thing v. La Chusa test, a plaintiff is not required to show that they were aware of the defendant’s role in causing the accident. Whether hearing an accident over the phone qualifies as being present is not an issue on which the California Supreme Court expressed an opinion.
This document is intended to provide you with information about trending law related developments. The contents of this document are not intended to provide specific legal advice. If you have questions about the contents of this alert, please contact the authors. This communication may be considered advertising in some jurisdictions.
