On October 21st, the Second District Court of Appeal published a decision in Santa Clarita Organization etc. v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1143 that addresses the question of whether a CEQA challenge to an approval of a vesting tentative tract map for a subdivision is subject to the summons requirement under the Subdivision Map Act (“SMA”). The Second District found that Government Code section 66499.37 of SMA did not bar causes of action raised by petitioners Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, “SCOPE”) to the extent that SCOPE alleged procedural violations and a failure to analyze and disclose the Project’s environmental impacts, which were unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under SMA. However, the Court determined that one of SCOPE’s CEQA causes of action was sufficiently related to SMA to be subject to the SMA statute of limitations.
Background
SCOPE’s lawsuit concerned a proposed subdivision (“Project”) in the Santa Clarita Valley for which Pico Canyon LLC (and later Williams Homes, Inc.) sought approval from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (“Board”) of a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map (“map”). The County approved the permits and map and adopted a mitigated negative declaration (“MND”). In 2022 SCOPE filed a petition for writ of mandate against the County alleging violations of CEQA, the state planning and zoning law, and SMA. SCOPE alleged various CEQA procedural violations, including that the County failed to provide notice of its intent to adopt a revised MND, and argued that the County failed to analyze and mitigate many of the Project’s significant environmental impacts.
Williams subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings because SCOPE failed to serve Williams or the County within 90 days of the County’s approval of the map. Government Code section 66499.37 of SMA requires that any challenge to a condition attached to an approval of a subdivision be brought within 90 days of the approval. The trial court granted the motion as to all causes of action without leave to amend, and SCOPE appealed the dismissal of its CEQA causes of action.
Analysis
The court first held that Section 66499.37 only applies to claims that arise from or overlap with SMA and then determined that the alleged procedural violations were unique to CEQA and were therefore not time barred. The court observed that the legislative history of the 1980 amendment to Section 66499.37 reflected an intent that the provision apply only to actions brought under SMA. It also found that the substance, and not the form, of the challenged action controls. In doing so, the court aligned itself with the Fourth District, which previously held in Friends of Riverside’s Hills v. City of Riverside (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th that a CEQA claim is barred if it overlaps with SMA.
The court next turned to SCOPE’s CEQA challenge based on a failure to analyze and disclose environmental impacts. The court rejected the County and Williams’ argument that the Board’s approval of the map was “inextricably linked” to the Project’s CEQA review. While the findings in the MND, the court observed, were made concerning the vesting tentative tract map, they were made to comply with CEQA because the County’s approval of the vesting tentative tract map was required to comply with CEQA. The court further noted that it was based on these findings that the Board certified the MND. Therefore, Section 66499.37 applied to neither the procedural violations nor the MND’s analysis of environmental impacts.
By contrast, the court noted that SCOPE’s CEQA challenge to the adequacy of mitigation measures in the mitigation program fell within Section 66499.37’s scope because Petitioners challenged conditions of the approval of the map under SMA. Specifically, the court emphasized the County’s express incorporation of all mitigation measures identified in the mitigation program into the County’s approval of the map. Instead of just considering the mitigation measures in order to comply with CEQA, they were adopted to ensure compliance with SMA. Because Section 66499.37 applies to “any condition” attached to the approval of the map, these conditions, while falling under CEQA, also arose from SMA. This portion of SCOPE’s CEQA cause of action was therefore barred for lack of compliance with the limitations period under Section 66499.37 for service of the summons.
Conclusion
This case has important implications for CEQA litigants hoping to keep track of the applicable statutes of limitations. While the court provides no bright-line rule to distinguish when Section 66499.37 applies, the specific theories underlying a cause of action will provide important clues.
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