Creating a Compelling Argument in the BP Trial: Government Plaintiffs’ Closing

John Tredennick, Dr. William Webber
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Creating a Compelling Argument in the BP Trial: Government Plaintiffs’ Closing - Merlin, by John Tredennick and Dr. William Webber
Image: John Tredennick, Merlin Search Technologies with AI.

Our exploration of generative AI in trial preparation has demonstrated how Large Language Models can analyze complex materials to generate sophisticated closing arguments. We began by showing how to overcome traditional LLM length limitations, then demonstrated these techniques by creating closing arguments for both TransOcean and Halliburton in the BP Deepwater Horizon trial. Now we take on perhaps the most challenging perspective: the government’s case against all three defendants.

The Context

The government’s position in the Deepwater Horizon trial presented unique challenges for our AI system. Unlike individual defendants who focused on minimizing their own liability, the Department of Justice needed to present a comprehensive case demonstrating how the collective actions of BP, TransOcean, and Halliburton led to disaster. This required synthesizing evidence of both individual culpability and systematic failures across multiple organizations.

The DOJ’s case characterized the Gulf oil spill as an example of “gross negligence and willful misconduct,” citing a “culture of corporate recklessness” supported by internal communications showing BP officials were aware of risks but proceeded recklessly. The government also accused TransOcean, the rig’s owner and operator, of gross negligence.

The government’s strategy proved effective. U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier ultimately ruled that BP was guilty of gross negligence and willful misconduct, describing their actions as “reckless,” while finding TransOcean’s and Halliburton’s actions “negligent.” His ruling apportioned 67% of blame to BP, 30% to TransOcean, and 3% to Halliburton. This exposed BP to potential Clean Water Act fines of up to $18 billion, while TransOcean and Halliburton faced lesser penalties due to their lower degree of negligence.

Leveraging GenAI for the Government’s Case

Using our DiscoveryPartner platform, we processed the same trial materials used for the defense arguments but modified our approach to support the government’s position. This required our AI to:

  1. Identify evidence of negligence across all defendants
  2. Find interconnections between different parties’ actions
  3. Build a narrative showing how individual failures combined to create disaster
  4. Support arguments for joint and several liability

This broader analytical scope demonstrates another key advantage of GenAI in trial preparation: the ability to quickly analyze vast amounts of evidence from different strategic angles while maintaining a coherent narrative thread.

We did all of this work in less than two hours (closer to an hour really).

John Tredennick and Dr. William Webber, Merlin Search Technologies.

This broader analytical scope demonstrates another key advantage of GenAI in trial preparation: the ability to quickly analyze vast amounts of evidence from different strategic angles while maintaining a coherent narrative thread.

We did all of this work in less than two hours (closer to an hour really). Imagine the time it might take for a team of associates to create a first draft like this. Weeks at a minimum. Here is how we did it.

Building the Government’s Closing Argument

Our first step was creating an outline focused on systemic failures and collective responsibility. The AI-generated outline provided a framework for demonstrating how multiple parties’ negligent actions combined to cause the catastrophe:

I. INTRODUCTION

  1. Opening Statement
    • State that the catastrophic Deepwater drilling incident was not the result of a single mistake but the cumulative outcome of multiple, interconnected failures.
    • Emphasize that every defendant’s conduct contributed to a chain of negligence that caused the blowout and its devastating consequences.
      • (e.g., BP_00000001 §17¶169–¶170; BP_00000042 §24¶1220–¶1223)
  2. Legal Framework for Joint and Several Liability
    • Explain that when various parties each add a negligent act that contributes in substance to the disaster, the law mandates that they be held jointly and severally liable.
    • Stress that no one defendant’s error can be isolated from the overall failure of the system.
      • (e.g., BP_00000042 §25¶1231–¶1240)

II. DEFICIENT CEMENTING PROCEDURES AND TECHNICAL FAILURES

  1. Cement Slurry Design and Testing
    1. Use of Improper Materials and Additives
      • Argue that BP repurposed a “leftover cement blend” and added D-Air 3000 despite internal warnings that such additives were incompatible with stable foam cement.
        • (e.g., BP_00000014 §19¶185; BP_00000014 §22¶216)
    2. Inadequate Testing Protocols
      • Present evidence that critical cement tests—including free fluid, rheology, and foam stability tests—were omitted or performed inconsistently.
        • (e.g., BP_00000014 §36¶355–¶356; BP_00000015 §15¶725–¶727)
    3. Laboratory Documentation Failures
      • Highlight inconsistencies in lab records and a breakdown in evidence preservation, which further limited the ability to confirm that the cement slurry would have formed an effective barrier.
        • (e.g., BP_00000028 §28¶293; BP_00000019 §24¶217–¶220)
  2. Failures in Centralizer Placement and Float Collar Conversion
    1. Centralizer Failures
      • Demonstrate that industry recommendations called for a higher number of centralizers (e.g., 21) yet BP approved a configuration using only six, undermining proper cement distribution.
        • (e.g., BP_00000037 §4¶84; BP_00000015 §27¶269–¶273)
    2. Float Collar and Equipment Deficiencies
      • Argue that despite repeated warnings and indications that the float collar did not meet operating pressures, BP declared it “converted” under rushed, cost-driven decisions.
        • (e.g., BP_00000042 §22¶106–¶107; BP_00000014 §17¶170–¶176)

III. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION, OVERSIGHT, AND OPERATIONAL FAILURES

  1. Communication Breakdowns
    1. Failure to Relay Critical Test Results
      • Present evidence that key internal test results—such as those indicating instability in the foam cement—were not fully or promptly communicated to decision-makers at BP.
        • (e.g., BP_00000015 §27¶1348–¶1357; BP_00000040 §15¶740–¶743)
    2. Informal Channels and Dismissive Attitudes
      • Cite internal emails and testimony reflecting a “cavalier” attitude (“who cares, it’s done, end of story”) that dismissed critical safety warnings.
        • (e.g., BP_00000009 §14¶658–¶666)
  2. Inadequate Oversight and Decision-Making
    1. Lack of Formal Review Processes
      • Show how critical decisions—such as altering retarder and additive concentrations—were made unilaterally by BP without robust internal technical review.
        • (e.g., BP_00000039 §25¶251–¶261; BP_00000037 §9¶87–¶89)
    2. Insufficient Operational Controls
      • Provide testimony indicating that BP and Transocean failed to adhere to best practices in bottoms‐up circulation and negative pressure testing, exposing the well to catastrophic failure.
        • (e.g., BP_00000009 §28¶1415–¶1422; BP_00000014 §44¶442–¶444)
  3. Evidence Preservation and Documentation Gaps
    • Explain that mishandling of cement samples and gaps in laboratory evidence further illustrate a systemic breakdown in quality control and risk management.
      • (e.g., BP_00000028 §27¶278–¶279; BP_00000019 §24¶217)

IV. OPERATIONAL SHORTCUTS AND COST-CUTTING MEASURES

  1. Rushed and Economically Driven Decisions
    1. Use of Repurposed Materials
      • Argue that BP’s decision to use leftover cement instead of acquiring properly designed materials led to compromised cement quality.
        • (e.g., BP_00000014 §38¶381–¶384; BP_00000039 §14¶285–¶290)
    2. Overriding Safety Protocols for Cost Savings
      • Show that BP disregarded expert recommendations and safety margin requirements in favor of meeting budgetary and schedule constraints, further heightening the risk of failure.
        • (e.g., BP_00000042 §25¶1129–¶1132; BP_00000009 §32¶1665–¶1668)
  2. Inadequate Testing and Misinterpretation of Well Integrity Data
    • Stress that the failure to properly conduct or interpret critical pressure tests—coupled with mismanaged displacement procedures—directly contributed to the blowout.
      • (e.g., BP_00000046 §11¶117–¶122; BP_00000008 §3¶33–¶36)

V. THE CHAIN-OF-CAUSATION AND THE CASE FOR JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

  1. Integration of All Failures
    • Argue that the technical deficiencies in cementing, combined with the operational shortcuts and communication failures, form an inseparable chain of events leading from each defendant’s actions to the catastrophic blowout.
      • (e.g., BP_00000014 §17¶166–¶171; BP_00000036 §26¶261–¶262)
  2. Mutual Contribution to Negligence
    • Emphasize that no single defendant acted in isolation; rather, BP, Transocean, Halliburton, and even equipment manufacturers (such as those responsible for the blowout preventer) all contributed to a systemic culture of negligence.
      • (e.g., BP_00000042 §3¶70–¶74; BP_00000009 §28¶1427–¶1433)
  3. Legal Rationale for Joint and Several Liability
    • Explain that because every defendant’s negligent actions were necessary and contributory to the overall failure, the court must hold them jointly and severally liable to ensure full compensation for the extensive damages.
      • (e.g., BP_00000042 §25¶1231–¶1240; BP_00000046 §28¶290–¶292)

VI. DAMAGES AND THE NEED FOR COMPENSATION

  1. Magnitude of Environmental and Economic Harm
    • Describe the extensive environmental damage, economic losses, and human suffering that have resulted from the blowout.
      • (e.g., BP_00000053 §7¶71–¶77)
  2. Justification for Punitive and Compensatory Damages
    • Argue that the magnitude of the damages, combined with the egregious, systemic failures exhibited by each defendant, warrants full punitive measures and the imposition of joint and several liability.
      • (e.g., BP_00000001 §21¶212–¶213; BP_00001391¶19–¶23)

VII. CONCLUSION: FINAL CALL FOR JUSTICE

  1. Recap of the Key Points
    • Summarize how inadequate cement design and testing, poor communication, delayed or ignored warnings, and rushed, cost-cutting operational decisions created an inseparable chain of negligence.
      • (e.g., BP_00000015 §16¶785–¶786; BP_00000028 §22¶141–¶146)
  2. Demand for a Verdict of Joint and Several Liability
    • Urge the jury that, in order to deter future corporate negligence and ensure those harmed receive full compensation, the court must hold every defendant jointly and severally liable.
      • (e.g., BP_00000028 §22¶141–¶146; BP_00000053 §12¶125–¶126)

This initial outline demonstrates how AI can help organize complex arguments involving multiple parties. While individual defendants could focus on minimizing their own liability, the government needed to show how each party’s actions contributed to an interconnected chain of failures.

The outline’s emphasis on technical failures, communication breakdowns, and operational shortcuts reflects the government’s strategy of demonstrating that no single error caused the disaster. Rather, it resulted from a systemic failure of corporate responsibility across multiple organizations.

Building the Argument Section by Section

After establishing our outline, we systematically built each section of the closing argument using DiscoveryPartner’s AI capabilities. Three complementary AI approaches were used to analyze the trial record:

  1. Semantic search to identify conceptually related content
  2. AI-enhanced keyword analysis to find specific technical details
  3. Machine learning classification to recognize patterns of evidence

For each section of the outline, these combined approaches identified approximately 700 relevant document sections. The AI then evaluated these materials for both factual support and strategic value to the government’s position.

What makes this approach particularly powerful for complex multi-defendant cases is how it synthesizes information across multiple sources. The AI identifies patterns and connections that support the government’s theory of collective responsibility while maintaining precise links to the underlying evidence.

The Government’s Argument

To demonstrate how this works in practice, here are the opening sections of the government’s closing argument. While this represents only an initial draft, it shows how AI can synthesize evidence from multiple sources into a coherent narrative about collective responsibility.

To demonstrate how this works in practice, here are the opening sections of the government’s closing argument. While this represents only an initial draft, it shows how AI can synthesize evidence from multiple sources into a coherent narrative about collective responsibility.

John Tredennick and Dr. William Webber, Merlin Search Technologies.

Your Honor, distinguished members of the court, we now submit our comprehensive closing argument—a narrative that integrates every critical detail and point from our two revised versions. This unified argument demonstrates beyond any doubt that the Deepwater Horizon disaster was not the product of one isolated error but the inevitable result of a cascading chain of interrelated failures. I will present our argument in four sections.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Opening Statement

From the earliest stages of the project, it was evident that the operation’s integrity was compromised. The catastrophic blowout at Deepwater Horizon was not an unforeseen accident—it was the culmination of persistent, systemic failures. Internal investigations and testimony, such as that set forth in Document BP_00000001 §17¶169–¶170, reveal that BP’s management was well aware of numerous operational deficiencies. Despite clear evidence of cost-driven shortcuts and a pervasive disregard for safety measures, decision-makers pressed forward without the requisite safeguards. Document BP_00000042 §24¶1220–¶1223 confirms that these failures were not isolated oversights but part of a recurring pattern that eroded the essential safety margins needed for deepwater drilling.

B. Legal Framework for Joint and Several Liability

The legal doctrine guiding this case is unequivocal: when multiple parties contribute negligent acts that collectively cause a catastrophic event, no single error can be isolated. As clearly articulated in Document BP_00000042 §25¶1231–¶1240, each negligent act—whether it be a technical misstep, a managerial lapse, or an operational error—is inextricably linked to the overall chain of negligence. This doctrine mandates that all defendants who contributed in any way to this disaster must be held jointly and severally liable for the full extent of the damages suffered by the states and the federal government.

II. DEFICIENT CEMENTING PROCEDURES AND TECHNICAL FAILURES

A. Cement Slurry Design and Testing

At the heart of the well’s compromised integrity was BP’s decision regarding the cement slurry. Instead of developing a formulation specifically suited for the extreme conditions of the Macondo well, BP chose to repurpose a “leftover cement blend.” Internal experts warned against its use, as clearly shown in Document BP_00000014 §19¶185, yet those warnings were disregarded. BP further compounded this error by adding the chemical additive D-Air 3000—despite its known incompatibility with stable foam cement, as confirmed in Document BP_00000014 §22¶216.

Moreover, essential quality-control tests were either omitted or performed inconsistently. Critical assessments such as free fluid loss tests, rheological evaluations, and foam stability tests were never reliably conducted. Documents BP_00000014 §36¶355–¶356 and BP_00000015 §15¶725–¶727 provide unambiguous evidence of these testing failures. Even when tests were performed, significant gaps and inconsistencies in the laboratory records—documented in Document BP_00000028 §28¶293 and Document BP_00000019 §24¶217–¶220—undercut the validity of any assurances that the cement would form an effective barrier.

B. Failures in Centralizer Placement and Float Collar Conversion

The technical deficiencies extended beyond the cement formulation itself. Industry standards require the use of approximately 21 centralizers to ensure proper cement distribution. However, BP, driven by cost-cutting measures, approved a configuration using only six centralizers, as shown in Document BP_00000037 §4¶84 and Document BP_00000015 §27¶269–¶273. This drastic reduction weakened the cement job and facilitated the creation of channels for hydrocarbons to escape.

Similarly, the float collar—a critical component designed to serve as a final barrier before the blowout preventer—is revealed as another point of failure. Despite repeated warnings that the float collar did not meet necessary operating pressures, BP rushed its conversion. As detailed in Document BP_00000042 §22¶106–¶107 and supported by Document BP_00000014 §17¶170–¶176, this hasty decision, motivated by cost and expediency rather than sound engineering judgment, removed a vital line of defense and left the well acutely vulnerable.

III. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION, OVERSIGHT, AND OPERATIONAL FAILURES

A. Communication Breakdowns

The technical failures would have been less catastrophic had there been an effective internal system to catch and correct them. However, the evidence demonstrates a profound breakdown in internal communication. Vital safety test results—such as those indicating instability in the foam cement—were either not fully relayed or were significantly delayed. Document BP_00000015 §27¶1348–¶1357 shows that critical data failed to reach key decision-makers in a timely fashion, while Document BP_00000040 §15¶740–¶743 confirms that urgent warnings were not escalated appropriately. Moreover, internal emails captured in Document BP_00000009 §14¶658–¶666 reveal a dismissive “who cares, it’s done, end of story” attitude. Such a cavalier approach ensured that when red flags were raised, they were not heeded, and no corrective measures were implemented.

B. Inadequate Oversight and Decision-Making

Compounding these communication failures was a striking lack of oversight. Critical operational decisions—such as the unilateral adjustments of retarder and additive concentrations—were made without the benefit of a robust, multidisciplinary review process. As documented in Document BP_00000039 §25¶251–¶261 and Document BP_00000037 §9¶87–¶89, these rushed decisions were symptomatic of a broader managerial disregard for established safety protocols. Additionally, both BP and Transocean failed to adhere to fundamental operational controls such as proper bottoms-up circulation and thorough negative pressure testing. Documents BP_00000009 §28¶1415–¶1422 and BP_00000014 §44¶442–¶444 illustrate how these lapses directly exposed the well to catastrophic failure.

C. Evidence Preservation and Documentation Gaps

Finally, BP’s internal failures are underscored by significant evidence preservation and documentation gaps. In an operation where every test and sample is critical, the mishandling of cement samples and inconsistencies in laboratory records—as evidenced in Document BP_00000028 §27¶278–¶279 and Document BP_00000019 §24¶217—reveal a systemic failure in quality control. Without a complete and reliable chain of evidence, no independent review could have verified that safety measures were in place, further reinforcing the conclusion that internal risk management was utterly deficient.

Your Honor, when we examine the evidence as a whole, the picture is unambiguous. The Deepwater Horizon disaster was not a random, isolated incident—it was the inevitable result of a cascading series of negligent decisions that spanned technical missteps, deficient internal processes, and a profound breakdown in oversight.

In Section I, we established that BP’s management was aware of persistent safety deficiencies and yet chose to proceed, eroding the very foundation of safe deepwater drilling. Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, every negligent act—no matter how seemingly isolated—is part of a larger, inseparable chain of negligence that demands full accountability.

In Section II, we detailed how BP’s decision to use an unsuitable cement blend, compounded by the addition of an incompatible additive and the omission of essential quality-control tests, directly compromised the well’s integrity. Cost-cutting decisions regarding centralizer placement and the rushed conversion of the float collar further dismantled critical safeguards.

In Section III, we showed that even when technical red flags were raised, a breakdown in internal communication, inadequate oversight, and severe documentation gaps allowed these errors to persist unchecked, ensuring that no corrective action could be taken.

Together, these interconnected failures created the perfect storm that led to the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe—an event that resulted in immeasurable loss of life, unprecedented environmental damage, and significant economic harm to the states and the federal government.

You can read and download the entire closing argument here.

This approach differs significantly from our previous defense-oriented arguments. Rather than focusing on a single party’s limited role or another’s primary responsibility, the government’s closing needed to weave together evidence of multiple failures while maintaining a clear narrative about collective responsibility.

Rather than focusing on a single party’s limited role or another’s primary responsibility, the government’s closing needed to weave together evidence of multiple failures while maintaining a clear narrative about collective responsibility.

John Tredennick and Dr. William Webber, Merlin Search Technologies.

Key Features of the AI-Generated Argument

Several aspects of this AI-generated argument deserve attention:

  1. Systematic Integration of Evidence
    • Each major point is supported by specific document references
    • Evidence from multiple defendants is woven together to show systematic failures
    • Technical details are presented clearly without losing their complexity
  2. Narrative Structure
    • Opens with broad context about systemic failures
    • Progresses logically through specific technical and operational issues
    • Maintains focus on collective responsibility while detailing individual failures
  3. Strategic Elements
    • Emphasizes interconnections between different parties’ actions
    • Builds case for joint and several liability through factual presentation
    • Addresses both specific incidents and broader patterns of negligence

Creating the Complete Argument

The final step involved combining all sections into a complete closing argument. This process is straightforward using standard document tools, but requires attention to:

  1. Maintaining consistent formatting across sections
  2. Ensuring smooth transitions between major points
  3. Preserving all evidence citations
  4. Checking narrative flow and argument progression

The complete argument demonstrates how AI can help construct a comprehensive case involving multiple defendants while maintaining precise connections to the underlying evidence.

The Benefits of an AI Approach

This example highlights several key advantages of using AI for complex trial preparation:

  1. Comprehensive Analysis
    • Processes thousands of pages of trial materials in minutes
    • Identifies relevant evidence across multiple parties and issues
    • Maintains precise tracking of supporting documentation
  2. Strategic Flexibility
    • Generates arguments from different strategic perspectives
    • Adapts analysis to support different legal theories
    • Helps identify connections that might be missed in manual review
  3. Efficiency Gains
    • Produces sophisticated first drafts quickly
    • Allows legal teams to focus on strategy and refinement
    • Reduces time spent on initial document review and organization
  4. Quality Control
    • Every point is linked to specific evidence
    • Arguments are built on comprehensive document analysis
    • Helps ensure no key evidence is overlooked

Ultimately, the fact that one person, who has no basic knowledge of the case other than from the news years ago, could use a GenAI-enabled discovery platform to create what is essentially a good first draft leaves me speechless. The power of these GenAI tools to analyze, synthesize and report is something we have never even imagined until now.

The Path Forward

Our success in generating closing arguments from multiple perspectives in the BP trial demonstrates the practical value of AI in complex litigation. This technology is ready for deployment in real-world cases, offering legal teams powerful tools for:

  1. Exploring alternative theories of liability
  2. Testing arguments from different perspectives
  3. Ensuring comprehensive use of available evidence
  4. Accelerating trial preparation while maintaining quality

The key lies in combining AI’s analytical capabilities with human legal expertise. The technology doesn’t replace professional judgment – it enhances it by allowing lawyers to work more efficiently with complex evidence while maintaining rigorous analytical standards.

The future of legal practice increasingly depends on thoughtful integration of artificial and human intelligence. Tools like those demonstrated here show how technology can amplify legal expertise rather than replace it, leading to better outcomes for clients and the justice system.

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