The Florida Supreme Court recently confirmed that claimants may only submit evidence of past medical bills actually paid by Medicare as opposed to the unadjusted amount. See Elaine Dial vs. Calusa Palms Master Association, Inc., No. SC21-43, 2022 WL 1261150 (Fla. April 28, 2022). By its ruling, the Court clarified any uncertainty created by Joerg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 176 So.3D 1247 (Fla. 2015), regarding whether the introduction of evidence of Medicare benefits for the purposes of a jury’s consideration of future medical expenses also applied to past medical expenses.
In Joerg, the Court considered the plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of any collateral source benefits to which he was entitled, including discounted benefits under Medicare and Medicaid. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the trial court “properly excluded evidence of [Joerg’s] eligibility for future benefits from Medicare, Medicaid, and other social legislation as collateral sources.” Id. at 1257.
In the interim years between Joerg and Dial, Florida district courts of appeal repeatedly held that the ruling in Joerg was confined to the admissibility of evidence concerning a plaintiff’s future medical expenses covered by Medicare. See Parsons v. Culp, 328 So.3d 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded on appeal); Ellison v. Willoughby, 326 So.3d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (affirmed on appeal); Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc. v. Volin, 326 So.3d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (reversed and remanded on appeal); Go v. Normil, 184 So.3d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversed and remanded on appeal). Nevertheless, the following question was certified by the Second District in 2020: Does the holding in Joerg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 176 So.3d 1247 (Fla. 2015), prohibiting the introduction of evidence of Medicare benefits in a personal injury case for purposes of a jury’s consideration of future medical expenses also apply to past medical expenses? See Dial vs. Calusa Palms Master Association, Inc., 308 So.3d 690, 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and approved the Second District’s decision in Dial, 308 So.3d 690.Dial sought to recover past medical expenses due to injuries she sustained when she tripped and fell on property owned by the defendant. The trial court granted a motion in limine that precluded Dial from introducing evidence of the gross amount of her past medical expenses and limited her to introducing only the discounted amounts paid by Medicare. Dial appealed, arguing that Joerg allowed her to admit the full amount of her past medical expenses as evidence. The Second District affirmed the trial court’s ruling, explaining that “the Joerg court very clearly set the scope of its holding to evidence concerning future Medicare benefits, which is not in dispute here.” 308 So. 3d at 691. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Second District’s holding that the “the appropriate measure of compensatory damages for past medical expenses when a plaintiff has received Medicare benefits does not include the difference between the amount that the Medicare providers agreed to accept and the total amount of the plaintiff’s medical bills.” 2022 WL 1261150 at *2-3 (quoting Dial, 308 So. 3d at 691 (quoting Cooperative Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004))). Thus, Dial’s argument that Joerg allows her to admit the full amount of her past medical expenses failed and was rejected by the highest court in Florida.
While the Court’s finding may not be considered especially novel, given the history of case law decided between Joerg and Dial, the Court’s guidance on this issue is nevertheless instructive. Furthermore, Justice Polston’s concurring opinion may foreshadow the potential future direction of the court. Specifically, Justice Polston recognized Justice Bell’s previous specially concurring opinion in Goble v. Frohman, 901 So.2d 830 (Fla. 2005), which sought to limit admissible evidence of past medical expenses to the amounts medical providers were willing or required to accept in full satisfaction for services rendered to a plaintiff. This limitation would apply regardless of whether the discounted amounts were derived from government insurance, private insurance, or other third-party arrangement. Such a shift would reflect the principle that an inflated gross amount of medicals is irrelevant to the proper measure of compensatory damages and should be inadmissible at trial.
