Implications of EO 14157 and Recent “Foreign Terrorist Organization” and “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” Designations

On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 14157, “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (EO 14157). EO 14157 declares that cartels “function as quasi-governmental entities” that “threaten the safety of the American people, the security of the United States, and the stability of the international order in the Western Hemisphere.”¹ The order further states that “[o]ther transnational organizations, such as Tren de Aragua … [and] Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),” wage “campaigns of violence and terror in the United States” that “similarly threaten the stability of the international order in the Western Hemisphere.”²

Consistent with EO 14157, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has designated eight international cartel entities—primarily operating out of Mexico—as both Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)³ and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs):⁴ (1) Cartel del Golfo (a.k.a. CDG, Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas-Guillen Organization); (2) Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (a.k.a. New Generation Cartel of Jalisco, CJNG, Jalisco New Generation Cartel); (3) Cartel del Noreste (a.k.a. CDN, Northeast Cartel, Los Zetas); (4) Cartel de Sinaloa (a.k.a. Sinaloa Cartel, Mexican Federation, Guadalajara Cartel); (5) Carteles Unidos (a.k.a. United Cartels, Tepalcatepec Cartel, Cartel de Tepalcatepec, the Grandfather Cartel, Cartel del Abuelo, Cartel de Los Reyes); (6) Mara Salvatrucha (a.k.a. MS-13); (7) la Nueva Familia Michoacana (a.k.a. LNFM); and (8) Tren de Aragua (a.k.a. Aragua Train).⁵

These designations increase the legal risks facing individuals, companies, and organizations that may have business dealings or operations in regions of Latin America and the United States where these newly designated FTOs and SDGTs, or their agents or affiliates, are most active. Although these cartels are predominantly based in Mexico, their operations and distribution networks extend well beyond the border of Mexico and other key Latin American countries, such that these designations also increase risks for business entities, organizations, and individuals operating throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Companies in a wide variety of sectors—including banking, financial services, transportation, tourism, logistics, telecommunications, oil and gas, mining, real estate, agriculture, and agribusiness—may face increased risks of civil litigation and/or criminal investigation and prosecution if they directly or indirectly do business with, or otherwise engage in prohibited activities with, cartels designated as FTOs or SDGTs or with their agents or affiliates.⁶ Indeed, the US government’s designations of these cartels present litigation risks even to those individuals and entities that may not know of or suspect a connection to drug trafficking but that nonetheless may be sued under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) on a theory that they had constructive knowledge or “should have known” of an alleged connection to a designated cartel or its agents or affiliates. Individuals or entities may also face heightened scrutiny from the US government as it seeks to investigate and prosecute those most closely connected to the newly designated FTOs; additional regulatory obligations, particularly with respect to US financial institutions’ obligations to freeze and report on FTO funds; and increased risks of being subject to secondary sanctions.

This alert provides an overview of the legal landscape and encourages organizations to consult with experienced counsel to help them assess and navigate the increased risks, mitigate these risks, respond to US government investigations, and navigate criminal prosecutions and civil suits.⁷

I. Civil Litigation Risk Under the ATA

The new FTO designations open US courts to private civil suits against individuals, companies, or other organizations under the ATA. The ATA establishes US jurisdiction and provides terrorism-related causes of action for individuals or entities injured by the terrorist acts of a designated FTO or its affiliates or agents. Plaintiffs can sue not only the FTOs themselves for their acts of terrorism but also any company, entity, or individual that aids and abets such acts or conspires with an FTO or its affiliates or agents in support of such acts. In Twitter v. Taamneh, the US Supreme Court found it insufficient to plead secondary liability under the ATA based on nothing more than a defendant’s passive nonfeasance or failure to act. But the Taamneh decision may not fully protect an individual or a company from secondary claims under the ATA where plaintiffs allege affirmative conduct, such as providing goods or services to clients with alleged connections to designated FTOs, particularly when they do so in some unusual way.

The ATA, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)⁸ enables US nationals to bring claims of primary liability for acts of international terrorism or secondary liability for aiding and abetting a designated FTO or engaging in a conspiracy with a person or persons who committed an alleged act of international terrorism.⁹ Successful plaintiffs may be awarded treble damages, litigation costs, and attorneys’ fees.¹⁰

The construction of the term “international terrorism” in the context of cartel-linked activities may raise novel questions. The ATA defines “international terrorism” as “violent acts” or “acts dangerous to human life” that (1) violate federal or state criminal law; (2) appear to be intended to “intimidate or coerce” civilians, “influence … government [policy] by intimidation or coercion,” or affect a government’s conduct “by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”; and (3) “occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” or “transcend national boundaries.”¹¹

Disputes over whether cartel-linked violence satisfies this definition will likely center on the second and third elements. Most of the newly designated cartels generally attempt to acquire or maintain control through intimidation and coercion tactics targeting civilians and governments.¹² But litigation will be heavily fact-dependent and may turn on inquiries into whether the specific attack objectively appeared to involve terroristic intent.¹³ If the alleged act occurs in a US jurisdiction, the key inquiry will be whether the act “transcend[s] national boundaries.” The mere fact that a US-based perpetrator was influenced or radicalized by foreign content online has been held insufficient to satisfy the transnational component.¹⁴ But, as one court has suggested, an attack may transcend national boundaries if a perpetrator was, for instance, radicalized overseas and planned the attack abroad.¹⁵ Whether cartel violence in areas under US jurisdiction satisfies the third element will turn on considerations of the “means by which” the acts at issue “are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate[.]”¹⁶

A defendant may face aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA not just for direct acts of international terrorism but also for knowingly and substantially assisting an act of international terrorism that results in injury to the plaintiff.¹⁷ In Taamneh, the Supreme Court clarified that secondary liability under the ATA requires “conscious, voluntary, and culpable participation in another’s wrongdoing”—mere passive nonfeasance is generally not sufficient. In Taamneh, the plaintiffs asserted secondary liability claims under the ATA, alleging that Facebook’s, Google’s, and Twitter’s failure to remove the content of a designated FTO (i.e., ISIS) from their platforms amounted to providing substantial assistance to an ISIS terrorist attack in Istanbul. The Court held that such allegations were insufficient to allege secondary liability claims because the ATA requires more than defendants’ failure to act. Instead, defendants must affirmatively act, such that they “culpably associated themselves with the … attack, participated in it as something that they wished to bring about, or sought by their action[s] to make it succeed.”¹⁸ However, the Court left open the possibility of ATA liability based on mere inaction in “situations where the provider of routine services does so in an unusual way or provides such dangerous wares that selling those goods to a terrorist group could constitute aiding and abetting a foreseeable terror attack.”¹⁹

Lower courts have since considered what conduct meets Taamneh’s “culpable participation” standard. Courts have recently considered—and in many cases allowed cases to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage—aiding-and-abetting claims where plaintiffs plausibly alleged that transactions occurred in “unusual ways” or that aid to a terrorist enterprise was “pervasive and systemic,” including where plaintiffs asserted that:

• a bank allegedly provided non-routine banking services for customers with well-known, public, and direct ties to terrorists for a lengthy period by “affirmatively cho[osing] to ignore red flags regarding these individuals … and cho[osing] to insulate their transactions from scrutiny designed to expose violations of international sanctions and to prevent the flow of money to terrorists,” such that the bank’s management allegedly appeared to intend to assist the customer in harming Americans.²⁰
• a cryptocurrency exchange provided otherwise routine services—cryptocurrency transaction services—in an “unusual way” (i.e., in a way that was allegedly designed to circumvent anti-money laundering regulations) to, among other things, allegedly protect a user associated with Hamas, thereby aiding and abetting Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attacks in Israel.²¹
• a South African telecom company allegedly aided and abetted the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies by allegedly, among other things, spearheading a sanctions-evading procurement scheme for embargoed dual-use technology and supplying millions of dollars in funding, thus providing pervasive and systemic assistance.²²
• several global pharmaceutical and medical device companies allegedly provided goods through corrupt (and thus “unusual”) transactions spanning a multi-year period to the Iraqi Ministry of Health, which was allegedly overrun by a terrorist group controlled by Hezbollah, a designated FTO.²³ Defendants argued that the transactions characterized as “unusual” were in fact standard procurement contracts in Iraq. In the aftermath of the Taamneh decision, this court and others are grappling with how to analyze whether something was done routinely or “in an unusual way” and whether any such assessment should look to practices that are common within a certain geographic region or industry or, instead, to accepted US practices. It remains to be seen whether engaging in a practice that may be well established in a certain region could still subject the entity to ATA liability.

In light of the Taamneh decision and recent decisions interpreting it, plaintiffs generally must plead more than a mere failure to act. Rather, there must be culpable conduct or, at the very least, an indication of culpability based on the unusual manner in which goods or services have been provided. In the case of banks and financial institutions, ATA plaintiffs may seek to bring claims based on affirmative conduct, such as providing banking and financial services, funds, or materials to designated FTOs or their agents or affiliates. Violations of US secondary sanctions, such as a failure to block and report FTO funds in certain instances, could also give rise to ATA claims of aiding and abetting an FTO’s acts of terrorism (as discussed further below).²⁴

Moreover, recent ATA lawsuits alleging the provision of financial services or monetary funds have underscored the fungibility of money and survived motions to dismiss where they alleged that the defendant provided banking services to an entity that provided support to an FTO. In one case, for instance, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded aiding-and-abetting claims under the ATA where the defendant allegedly provided approximately $25 million in banking services to a Pakistani fertilizer manufacturer whose products had reportedly been used by al-Qaeda to make improvised explosive devices used in Afghanistan, which the bank allegedly knew or should have known.²⁵ Some courts, however, have dismissed financing-related claims outright, including for failure to plausibly allege that money passed from the defendant to finance an act of terrorism²⁶ or that the defendant had at least a general awareness of its customers’ links to terrorist attacks.²⁷

“Protection payments,” even if made under duress, may also give rise to ATA claims. Contractors have been sued for providing protection payments to the Taliban, notwithstanding that the contractors themselves might otherwise have been targeted by the Taliban.²⁸ A telecom company was unable to obtain a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of allegations that it provided protection payments to the Taliban to prevent attacks on its transmission towers instead of installing expensive security measures.²⁹

Notably, foreign defendants with only attenuated links to the United States—such as those working in concert with a US affiliate, distributing US-made products, or doing business with US companies—may still be subject to personal jurisdiction in suits alleging aiding-and-abetting claims under the ATA.³⁰ Even where courts may eventually hold that jurisdiction is lacking, defendants may still face years of litigation, jurisdictional discovery, and reputational harm.

II. Criminal Investigations and Enforcement Actions

The new designations also create heightened risks of US government scrutiny for businesses and nonprofits operating in countries where these cartels have a presence or for businesses that cartels use in furtherance of their illegal activities. Such businesses and nonprofits may face criminal investigations and enforcement actions—including for sanctions violations—or could receive more legal process in the course of US government investigations of the cartels.

For instance, corporations may face criminal investigation and prosecution for allegedly providing “material support or resources” to a designated FTO under 18 U.S.C. Section 2339B, which is defined broadly to mean “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, … communications equipment, … [or] transportation.”³¹ The risk is not theoretical: In 2022, Lafarge S.A., a global building materials company, and its indirectly owned Syrian subsidiary pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support and resources to two FTOs (ISIS and al-Nusrah Front (ANF)).³² The Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that Lafarge and it subsidiary conspired to pay more than $5.92 million to and for the benefit of the FTOs and $1.11 million to the third-party intermediaries that negotiated with and made payments to ISIS and ANF on behalf of Lafarge and its subsidiary.³³ The DOJ also alleged that, when the subsidiary evacuated the cement plant, ISIS stole cement produced in furtherance of the conspiracy and subsequently sold the cement “at prices that would have yielded ISIS approximately $3.21 million.”³⁴ Lafarge and its subsidiary were sentenced to probation and required to pay $777.78 million in financial penalties.³⁵ It is also worth noting that, shortly thereafter, victims sued Lafarge civilly under the ATA.³⁶

The new designations may also increase opportunities for criminal prosecution for alleged violation of sanctions laws. For instance, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), any “person who willfully commits, willfully attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of” a sanctions violation related to FTOs and SDGTs may be subject to criminal penalties of up to $1 million and 20 years of imprisonment.³⁷ In 2007, the DOJ prosecuted Chiquita Brands International Inc. for sanctions violations under the IEEPA. Chiquita pleaded guilty to making “security payments” to a Colombian paramilitary group that was designated as an FTO and an SDGT and agreed to pay a $25 million fine, undergo five years of probation, and implement an effective compliance and ethics program.³⁸ As with Lafarge, Chiquita subsequently faced civil liability for this conduct.

Additionally, US-incorporated electronic communication companies might be asked to provide larger volumes of information to the US government in connection with Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The US government has long relied on Section 702 in its counterterrorism efforts and will likely continue to use it to gather information on the newly designated cartels, including under additional counternarcotics intelligence collection authority provided in the most recent statutory reauthorization. Section 702 is relied on for a significant amount of intelligence collection. For example, in 2023, it covered an estimated 268,590 targets.³⁹ Given the size of some of these newly designated cartels, the number of targeted selectors in Section 702 orders could increase.⁴⁰

More broadly, the fact of designation will bring additional national security/terrorism authorities and resources to bear. Terrorism is the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) declared number one priority, and the agency has significant resources dedicated to it. The FBI has approximately 200 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States with thousands of agents, officers, and analysts;⁴¹ the new administration’s prioritization of the cartels will likely redirect many of those assets to target newly designated cartel FTOs. That additional attention will likely reach and reveal activities by individuals and entities associated (wittingly or unwittingly) with these newly designated cartel FTOs, which will expose them to risks of further investigation by the US government. And in the context of a criminal investigation, the government could seek to attribute to a company the knowledge of a specific employee—for instance, that a company is providing some amount of support to a cartel or that it has a material touchpoint with a cartel. “The test is whether the agent is performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform, and those acts are motivated—at least in part—by an intent to benefit the corporation.”⁴²

III. Increased Regulatory Obligations and Sanctions Risks

The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is likely to dedicate enhanced resources to sanctions targeting designated cartels and any aiders or abettors. These new designations are thus likely to increase US financial institutions’ regulatory risks, including the risk of secondary sanctions.

First, OFAC’s regulations require US financial institutions to freeze certain funds in which an FTO, or any of its affiliates or agents, has an interest and submit reports to the Treasury Department. Of the newly designated FTOs, Carteles Unidos is the only entity that had not previously been sanctioned by OFAC (see Appendix A). Thus, financial institutions will have to assess whether this new designation requires them to freeze or report any funds or other property to the Treasury Department. The burden of these additional requirements related to Carteles Unidos will depend on the reach of US jurisdiction and the amount of funds that can reasonably be tied to that entity or its affiliates or agents.

Second, the designation of these cartels as FTOs raises a particularly acute risk of secondary sanctions—i.e., sanctions imposed on third parties doing business with primary sanctions targets. This is a real risk for companies and individuals alike. Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13886—issued in President Trump’s first term and amending Executive Order 13224, issued post-September 11, 2001, to address blocking property and transacting with terrorists—expanded the reach of secondary sanctions by authorizing the US government to impose secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions that “knowingly conduct[] or facilitate[] any significant transaction on behalf of any person whose property and interests in property” are subject to US sanctions.⁴³ This expansion allows the US government to further pressure primary sanctions targets by limiting their access to the US financial system.

Additionally, any unauthorized transaction or dealing by a US person, or any transaction within the United States, related to any blocked property or interest in property of individuals or entities designated under EO 13224 can lead to civil and criminal liability.⁴⁴ The same is true for any transaction by a US person, or any transaction within the United States, that evades any such prohibited transaction or that attempts or conspires to do so.⁴⁵

In addition to the challenges posed by the relatively fluid structure of cartels, OFAC’s 50% Rule⁴⁶ could increase the number of individuals and entities that are blocked pursuant to these designations, even if such individuals or entities themselves are not listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list. Even with these challenges, it is important for both US and non-US persons and entities transacting in areas or industries in which these newly designated FTOs and SDGTs operate to assess and reasonably address the risks created by these designations on an ongoing basis.

IV. Key Takeaways

Companies with a presence in certain parts of Mexico, Latin America, or the United States, especially in industries most at risk of having connections to designated cartels or their affiliates or agents, should be conducting risk assessments to identify and mitigate the potential for material-support investigations, terrorism prosecutions, or civil lawsuits under the ATA for aiding and abetting cartel-related violence. Key considerations include:

• whether goods or services are likely to be provided or diverted to designated FTOs, SDGTs, or individuals or entities linked to designated cartels;
• the risk of maintaining accounts or facilitating transactions with individuals and entities that may be linked to cartels—whether directly or through intermediaries and whether in the recent past;
• whether the nature of the goods or services may increase the likelihood of misuse by FTOs and SDGTs, the frequency with which such goods or services may be diverted, and whether such goods or services could be used to facilitate alleged terrorist acts or otherwise support the cartels;
• whether the risk of diversion or misuse of goods and services by cartels is widely known or reported, such that companies may be said to have actual or constructive knowledge of the potential connection to alleged terrorist acts;
• whether there is an increased risk that individual employees are aware of, or involved in, the misuse of their employer’s goods and services by cartels, and the associated risk that such awareness or involvement may be imputed to the company; and
• whether companies have US affiliates, businesses, or activities that might provide a basis for personal jurisdiction in US courts, where civil suits for aiding and abetting terrorism under the ATA and other causes of action can be brought.

Importantly, compliance with foreign laws and foreign government directives may not be a safe harbor from ATA suits because, according to EO 14157, many of the designated cartels “function as quasi-governmental entities, controlling nearly all aspects of society,” and have “infiltrat[ed] into foreign governments[.]” Thus, such compliance may receive enhanced scrutiny.

Though the exact impacts of these designations remain to be seen, companies should take measures to assess their exposure to these new designations and prepare for potential litigation and investigations. WilmerHale has many years of experience in assisting companies with investigations, regulatory enforcement actions, criminal prosecutions, and civil litigation involving alleged connections to designated FTOs and SDGTs. The firm can also assist companies with risk assessments, due diligence, compliance program enhancements, compliance advice and counseling, risk mitigation measures, subpoena responses, Section 702 responses, and related services.

Appendix A: Pre-February 20, 2025 OFAC Sanctions of Relevant Cartel Entities

Footnotes

1. “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” Exec. Order No. 14157, 90 Fed. Reg. 8439, 8439 (Jan. 29, 2025), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-29/pdf/2025-02004.pdf.

2. Id.

3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189.

4. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702; “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism,” Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 25, 2001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2002-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2002-title3-vol1-eo13224.pdf, reprinted as amended, 31 C.F.R. § 594.201.

5. See “Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana,” 90 Fed. Reg. 10030 (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf; “Specially Designated Global Terrorist Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana,” 90 Fed. Reg. 10030 (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02870.pdf.

6. On February 5, 2025, Attorney General Pamela Bondi issued several memoranda, two of which highlight the DOJ’s focus on criminal prosecutions related to cartels. For more information, see WilmerHale’s alert on these memoranda. See Kimberly A. Parker et al., “President Trump and Attorney General Bondi Announce Significant Shift in FCPA and Other Corporate Enforcement Priorities,” WilmerHale (Feb. 11, 2025), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20250211-president-trump-and-attorney-general-bondi-announce-significant-shift-in-fcpa-and-other-corporate-enforcement-priorities.

7. Though not the focus of this client alert, it is worth noting that the administration will also deem involvement with Iran or an Iranian terror proxy as financing or supporting a terrorist organization, and it has established a task force related to the October 7 Hamas attack that is authorized to issue administrative subpoenas to foreign banks with correspondent accounts in the United States. See National Security Presidential Memorandum on Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran’s Malign Influence, 2025 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 202500223 (Feb. 4, 2025), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500223/pdf/DCPD-202500223.pdf; Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Pamela Bondi to All Dep’t Emps., “Establishment of Joint Task Force October 7,” 2 (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1388516/dl?inline. Secretary Rubio also designated Ansarallah (already designated as an SDGT) as an FTO on March 5, 2025, and the Treasury Department designated several entities linked to Ansarallah as SDGTs. See “Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation of Ansarallah,” 90 Fed. Reg. 11352 (Mar. 5, 2025), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-05/pdf/2025-03629.pdf; Press Release, US Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Houthi Leaders Involved in Smuggling and Procuring Weapons” (Mar. 5, 2025), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041.

8. JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853 (2016) (Amendment) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2)).

9. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).

10. Id. § 2333(a).

11. Id. § 2331(1)(C).

12. See, e.g., US Dep’t of State, “Designation of International Cartels: Fact Sheet” (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.state.gov/designation-of-international-cartels/; June S. Beittel, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations 48 (2022).

13. See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 207 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014); Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

14. Colon v. Twitter, Inc., 14 F.4th 1213, 1219–21 (11th Cir. 2021); Retana v. Twitter, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 3d 989, 999 (N.D. Tex. 2019), aff’d, 1 F.4th 378 (5th Cir. 2021).

15. Colon, 14 F.4th at 1221.

16. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C).

17. See id. § 2333(d)(2); Twitter v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471, 493 (2023). In enacting JASTA, Congress incorporated the legal framework in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which considers six factors to assess whether a defendant’s assistance was “substantial”; however, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Halberstam “formulations should ‘not be accepted as immutable components.’” Taamneh, 598 U.S. at 487, 493. Since the Court’s decision in Taamneh, it is unclear the extent to which courts will continue to rely on the Halberstam framework. See, e.g., Ofisi v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 77 F.4th 667 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (omitting evaluation of Halberstam factors in analysis of ATA secondary liability claims).

18. See Taamneh, 598 U.S. at 493 (cleaned up).

19. Id. at 502.

20. See Hakimyar v. Habib Bank Ltd., 2025 WL 605575, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2025).

21. Raanan v. Binance Holdings Ltd., 2025 WL 605594, at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2025).

22. See Zobay v. MTN Group Ltd., 695 F. Supp. 3d 301, 348–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2023).

23. Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22 F.4th 204, 210 (D.C. Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 2675 (2024). Following the DC Circuit’s reversal of the lower court’s dismissal, the US Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Taamneh. The case remains pending before the DC Circuit.

24. There has been at least one ATA suit involving allegations of financing of Mexican cartels. Because the cartels were not designated FTOs at the time, plaintiffs could not bring aiding-and-abetting claims under Section 2331(d) and instead only brought claims under the ATA’s criminal provisions, unsuccessfully. See Zapata v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 414 F. Supp. 3d 342, 355, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d, Zapata v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 825 F. App’x 55, 56 (2d Cir. 2020).

25. See Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC, 2023 WL 2390718, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2023), reconsideration denied, 2023 WL 7110774 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2023).

26. See, e.g., Ofisi v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 77 F.4th 667, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

27. See Honickman v. BLOM Bank SAL, 6 F.4th 487, 496–503 (2d Cir. 2021); Brown v. Nat’l Bank of Pakistan, 2022 WL 1155905, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2022).

28. See Complaint, Cabrera v. Black & Veatch Special Products Corp., No. 1:19-cv-03833 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2019), ECF No. 1 (alleging that Afghanistan reconstruction companies supported the Taliban to protect or further their business interests).

29. See Complaint, Zobay v. MTN Grp. Ltd., No. 1:21-cv-3503 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021), ECF No. 1; see also Zobay v. MTN Group Ltd., 695 F. Supp. 3d 301, 320, 345–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (denying dismissal of a secondary liability claim where alleged misconduct was based partly on protection payments).

30. See, e.g., Atchley, 22 F.4th at 210 (holding that the district court had personal jurisdiction over foreign pharmaceutical and medical equipment suppliers because they had “worked closely with their [US] affiliates … to bring to market in Iraq U.S. drugs and medical supplies”). But see Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 47 F.4th 856, 865–66 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (holding no jurisdiction over foreign banks that allegedly coordinated with affiliates to evade sanctions because there was no link between evasion and the plaintiffs’ injuries).

31. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (emphases added).

32. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Lafarge S.A., 1:22-cr-00444 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2022), ECF. No. 10.

33. Statement of Facts at 7, United States v. Lafarge S.A., 1:22-cr-00444 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2022), ECF No. 10-1.

34. Id.

35. Press Release, US Dep’t of Just., “Lafarge Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (Oct. 18, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/lafarge-pleads-guilty-conspiring-provide-material-support-foreign-terrorist-organizations.

36. Complaint, Murad v. Lafarge S.A., No. 1:23-cv-09186 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2023).

37. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a)–(c).

38. Press Release, US Dep’t of Just., “Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine” (Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html.

39. Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., “Annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Intelligence Community’s Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities,” 19 (Apr. 2024), https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2024_ASTR_for_CY2023.pdf.

40. While information about cartels is limited, a 2018 study indicated that MS-13 had between 50,000 and 70,000 members globally. Steven Dudley & Hector Silva Avalos, “MS13 in the Americas,” Off. of Just. Programs (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/ms13-americas-major-findings. In July 2023, it was reported to Congress that the Cartel de Sinaloa and Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion alone had almost 45,000 members. “How Many People Work for the Mexican Drug Cartels? Researchers Have an Answer,” Los Angeles Times (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-09-21/how-many-people-work-for-the-mexican-drug-cartels.

41. See “Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces (last visited Apr. 16, 2025).

42. United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

43. Modernizing Sanctions to Combat Terrorism,” Exec. Order No. 13886, 84 Fed. Reg. 48041, 48042 (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-09-12/pdf/2019-19895.pdf.

44. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.201(a), 594.204, 594.701–594.705.

45. Id. § 594.205.

46. The 50% Rule blocks transactions with entities that are at least 50% owned, directly or indirectly, by a natural or legal person blocked pursuant to an executive order or OFAC’s regulations (a blocked person) or at least 50% owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by more than one blocked person. See OFAC, “Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in Property are Blocked” (Aug. 13, 2014), https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/6186/download?inline.

47. See “Kingpin Act Update,” OFAC (June 1, 2007), https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20070601.

48. See Press Release, US Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade” (Dec. 15, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535.

49. See Publication, OFAC (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnew15.txt.

50. See Press Release, US Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade” (Dec. 15, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535

51. See “Kingpin Act Designations,” OFAC (Apr. 15, 2009), https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20090415.

52. See “Transnational Criminal Organizations Executive Order,” OFAC (July 25, 2011), https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20110725.

53. See Press Release, US Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade” (Dec. 15, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535.

54. See “Kingpin Act Designations,” OFAC (Apr. 15, 2009), https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20090415.

55. See Press Release, US Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade” (Dec. 15, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535.

56. See OFAC, “Changes to List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List Since January 1, 2012” (2012), https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnew12.pdf.

57. See “Counter Narcotics Designations; Iran-related Designations,” OFAC (Nov. 17, 2022), https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20221117.

58. See Press Release, US Dep’t of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Tren de Aragua as a Transnational Criminal Organization” (July 11, 2024), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2459.