Not under the U.S. Constitution. However, the chapter of Indiana’s property tax code addressing real property assessment provides that a county assessor or authorized representative “may, after first making known the assessor’s or representative’s intention to the owner or occupant, enter and fully examine all buildings and structures which are located within the township or county and which are subject to assessment.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-15(b) (emphasis added). Until a 1986 amendment, this statute went even further, requiring that the assessor or representative shall enter all buildings subject to assessment. See P.L. 24-1986, sec. 7, effective Sept. 1, 1986.
Even after the 1986 amendment, this statute represents a striking exercise of state power. Without consent, a warrant, or certain exigent circumstances coupled with probable cause, the state cannot enter your home to ensure compliance with public health and safety requirements (for instance, a housing or fire code), Camara v. Mun. Court of the City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967), or even to investigate a murder, Moore v. State, 827 N.E.2d 631, 638-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Yet, for property tax purposes, can section 6-1.1-4-15(b) permit assessors to waltz right in as long as they first announce their intention?
The Fourth Amendment Protects Hoosier Taxpayers from Warrantless Entries
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable government intrusions into the home (a right enforced against state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment):
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. How can we reconcile Indiana tax assessors’ warrantless entry powers with this fundamental right? A recent decision from New York’s intermediate appellate court offers compelling analysis suggesting we cannot.
In the Matter of Marlene Jacobowitz v. Board of Assessors for Town of Cornwall arose after a New York town substantially increased the assessed value of Marlene Jacobowitz’s home. 990 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). When Jacobowitz challenged the assessment in court, the town requested permission to conduct an interior appraisal of her home. Jacobowitz refused, and the town moved the court to compel Jacobowitz to acquiesce. The trial court denied Jacobowitz’s subsequent motion to prevent the inspection and instead ordered Jacobowitz to permit it. New York’s Second Department Appellate Division reversed, holding that the town bore the burden of demonstrating its entitlement to enter Jacobowitz’s home over her objection and that the trial court improperly shifted the burden to Jacobowitz to establish her right to prevent the inspection.
The court then balanced the town’s reasonable interest in conducting the interior appraisal against Jacobowitz’s Fourth Amendment rights to determine whether the town carried its burden. Relying heavily on Camara and the Fourth Amendment’s hallmark reasonableness standard, the court sided with Jacobowitz. On the one hand, the court credited the government’s interest in ensuring that all property owners contribute equitably to the public treasury. It also considered the town’s argument that Jacobowitz placed the market value of her home at issue when she challenged the assessment (and that preventing an interior appraisal would place the town at a severe disadvantage in the proceedings Jacobowitz had instituted). On the other hand, the record before the court included no affidavits or other evidence suggesting the town could not gather the information it sought without infringing on Jacobowitz’s privacy rights. Nor did the town explain why it required entry into Jacobowitz’s home to calculate an assessed value when it had never previously required entry to conduct or review past assessments of the property.
The Jacobowitz decision is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Camara, where the Court concluded that administrative searches are subject to a warrant requirement (albeit under a different reasonableness standard than the standard governing searches incident to criminal investigations). Jacobowitz involved the government’s interest in ensuring equitable contributions to the public treasury. This is a legitimate and important government interest. But it is no more compelling—and perhaps is less compelling—than the public health and safety concerns at issue in Camara, where the Court adhered to a warrant requirement.
The analysis underlying Jacobowitz and Camara suggests Indiana tax assessors’ warrantless entry powers rest on tenuous footing (at best). If government inspectors require a warrant to inspect a home for compliance with public health and safety requirements, surely the same protections apply to the less exigent task of assessing and reassessing property values.
Section 6-1.1-4-15(b) has not yet been tested in the courts. But the warrantless entry provision is vulnerable to a Fourth Amendment challenge. An assessor attempting to waltz into a taxpayer’s home may find the court playing a very different tune.
