In this Article:

- Introduction

- A Tale as Old as Time: The Evolution of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Before Stern

- Let’s Talk About Stern, Baby

- Much Ado About Nothing: Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison

- Ready, Set, Dodge: The Implied Authorization of Consent in Arkison

- The Times They Are a-Changin’: Proposed Amendments to § 157(b)

- The Upcoming Sequel: Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif

- Conclusion

- Excerpt from Introduction:

For bankruptcy and civil procedure enthusiasts, speculation over the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court would divest bankruptcy courts of jurisdiction in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison was rampant. In the wake of Stern v. Marshall, which prohibited bankruptcy courts from entering final judgments in certain core proceedings based on state law, the status of bankruptcy jurisdiction has become unsettled, undefined, and unknown. The once-simple procedural determination is now wrought with confusion and uncertainty as bankruptcy courts struggle to understand and accept their ill-defined boundaries. Enduring this turmoil for three years, practitioners and judges were hopeful that the Court would clarify its Stern analysis in the recent Arkison case. Specifically, litigators anxiously awaited an answer to the unsettled question of whether parties could consent to bankruptcy authority. Attempting to predict how far the Court would go in restricting the power of bankruptcy courts made the consent issue one of the most hotly debated topics of the Court’s term. When the decision was announced on June 9, 2014, however, what the nation received was simply another classic attempt by the Supreme Court to dodge the ball.

Originally published in Drake Law Review, Volume 63, Issue 1 - first quarter, 2015.