Speed read

The European Commission took into account the revenues of all Chinese SOEs active in the energy industry to establish jurisdiction for merger control of a transaction.
欧盟委员会在认定经营者集中反垄断审查管辖权时将所有中国国有能源企业的营业额合并考虑。

Main Content 主要内容

The European Commission (Commission) decided in Case M.7850 EDF / CGN / NNB published on 26 April 2016 that the revenues of all Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) active in the energy industry should be aggregated to determine whether an SOE meets the turnover thresholds under the EU merger control rules.
在2016年4月26日发布的M.7850 EDF / CGN / NNB号案例中，欧盟委员会裁决如下：在认定涉案国企是否已达到欧盟经营者集中反垄断申报要求的营业额标准时，应将所有在能源行业经营业务的中国国企的经营收入合并计算。

In that case, Electricité de France (EDF) and China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN) notified their partnership in relation to the development, construction and operation of three nuclear power plants in the UK.  The Commission found that competition in the wholesale supply of electricity in the UK will not be hindered by the transaction given the moderate market share of EDF, the very limited market shares of CGN and the presence of other competitors. 
在该案中，法国电力公司（下称“法国电力”）和中国广核集团（下称“中广核”）就在英国开发、建设和运营三个核电站的合作项目进行了申报。欧盟委员会经调 查发现，由于法国电力的市场份额不大，中广核在相关市场的市场份额非常有限，并且存在其他竞争者，该项目不会限制英国电力批发供应领域的竞争。

One of the most interesting aspects of the decision is the Commission’s examination of the links between Chinese SOEs to establish that it had jurisdiction to review the transaction. 
本案裁决最值得关注的一个方面是，欧盟委员会在认定其有权审查上述项目时考虑了中国国企之间的联系。

Under EU merger control rules, in order to assess whether a transaction should be reviewed by the Commission, it is necessary to take into account the revenues of each of the parties to that transaction.  Here, the Commission considered which turnover should be attributed to CGN, given that it is a SOE and that the majority of its shares are held by Central SASAC (the agency administering Chinese SOEs that are supervised by the central Chinese government).
根据欧盟的经营者集中反垄断申报制度，在确定欧盟委员会是否应对某交易进行审查时，有必要考虑每个交易方的经营收入。在上述案件中，鉴于中广核是国企，而 且其控股股东是国务院国资委（该机构负责对接受中国中央政府监管的中国国企进行管理），欧盟委员会考虑了中广核的经营收入具体采用什么标准的问题。

The Commission examined in detail a number of provisions in Chinese law and decided that in light of Central SASAC’s influence on the decision-making process, CGN does not enjoy autonomy from the Chinese government in deciding major matters like strategy, business plan or budget. 
欧盟委员会详细审查了中国法律的某些规定，鉴于国资委对决策过程的影响，欧盟委员会认定中广核无法在独立于中国政府的情况下自主决定战略、经营计划或预算等重大事项。

The Commission’s finding in that case is limited to central SOEs in the energy industry.  It leaves open the question whether the revenues of SOEs in other industries should also be aggregated and whether local SOEs should also be taken into account.
欧盟委员会在该案中的裁决仅限于能源行业的中央国企。我们还不清楚其他行业国企的经营收入是否也要合并计算、以及是否还需要考虑地方国企。

The Commission’s clarification of how revenues of Chinese SOEs should be accounted for will have considerable impact for the assessment of merger control filing requirements for transactions involving Chinese SOEs.  It is expected that a significant number of transactions that would fall under the filing thresholds, if only the revenues of the SOE directly involved in the transaction were taken into account, will now have to be notified to the Commission, or risk hefty fines in case of a failure to file. 
欧盟委员会的裁决明确了中国国企经营收入的计算方法，对评估中国国企参与交易涉及的经营者集中反垄断申报要求影响深远。仅考虑直接参与交易的国企时低于申报标准的大批交易预计须向欧盟委员会进行申报，不予申报将面临巨额罚款。

The full decision can be found here: 以下为欧盟委员会裁决全文链接 :
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7850_429_3.pdf