Previously, this Blog examined the doctrine of res judicata (here, here, here and here). Under the doctrine, a party may not litigate a claim where a judgment on the merits exists from a prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter.[1] The doctrine applies not only to claims actually litigated but also to claims that could have been raised in the prior litigation.[2] The rationale underlying the doctrine is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again.[3]
New York has adopted a transactional approach in deciding res judicata issues.[4] Under this approach, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.[5]
“Res judicata is designed to provide finality in the resolution of disputes to assure that parties may not be vexed by further litigation.”[6] “The policy against relitigation of adjudicated disputes is strong enough generally to bar a second action even where further investigation of the law or facts indicates that the controversy has been erroneously decided, whether due to oversight by the parties or error by the courts.”[7] As the Court of Appeals noted, “[c]onsiderations of judicial economy as well as fairness to the parties mandate, at some point, an end to litigation.”[8]
Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), a party may seek dismissal of a cause of action based upon the doctrine of res judicata.[9]
In Sunny v. Hossain, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 01251 (2d Dept. Mar. 5, 2025) (here), the Appellate Division, Second Department addressed the foregoing issues, finding that the subsequent action before it essentially asserted the same causes of action against the same parties as in the earlier action and, therefore, were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
In September 2013, plaintiffs, Saifus Sayeed Sunny and Shirin Akhter, as husband and wife, purchased a residential property in Ozone Park, N.Y. (hereinafter the subject property). In 2020, Sunny filed a petition for declaratory relief against the defendants, Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC (hereinafter, Lakeview), and Sardar M. Hossain, among other things, to quiet title to the subject property (hereinafter, the 2020 proceeding). In the 2020 proceeding, Sunny alleged, inter alia, that he acquired ownership of the subject property in 2013, and that a 2019 deed purporting to transfer title to Hossain contained Sunny’s forged signature. Lakeview moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against it on the ground that Sunny failed to comply with the requirements of RPAPL 1515.
By order and judgment entered September 15, 2021, the Supreme Court consolidated the petition and Lakeview’s motion to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against it “for purposes of disposition,” denied the motion, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The motion court concluded, among other things, that Sunny “fail[ed] to demonstrate his entitlement to judgment, as the evidence submitted [was] insufficient to support his allegations of forgery” and that his “signature was acknowledged before a notary.” Sunny did not move for leave to renew or reargue, and he did not appeal from that order and judgment.
In May 2022, plaintiffs commenced the action pursuant to RPAPL Article 15 against defendants, again to quiet title to the subject property and to void Hossain’s deed based on an allegedly forged signature. Lakeview moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, contending that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. By order entered April 10, 2023, the Supreme Court granted Lakeview’s motion. Plaintiffs appealed. The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed.
The Court held that the action was barred under the res judicata doctrine. In so holding, the Court noted that “[i]n the 2020 proceeding, Sunny sought declaratory relief and to quiet title to the subject property as against the defendants in this action.”[10] In the order and judgment entered in that action, said the Court, “the Supreme Court, inter alia, dismissed the proceeding on the merits, concluding, among other things, that the allegations of forgery were wholly conclusory and that the signature on the alleged deed had been acknowledged before a notary.”[11] Because the action before the Court “essentially asserts the same causes of action against the same parties,” concluded the Court, “all causes of action insofar as asserted by Sunny are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”[12]
The Court also held that because Akhter, as a former co-owner of the subject property, was in privity with Sunny, “the causes of action … asserted by Akhter in [the] action [were] also barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”[13]
[1] Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 37 N.Y.3d 107, 111 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gregg v. Lan Zhen Chen, 220 A.D.3d 697, 698 (2d Dept. 2023). “[R]es judicata also bars future litigation by those who were in privity with the parties to the prior action.” Bay Shore Family Partners v. Foundation of Jewish Philanthropies of Jewish Fedn. of Greater Fort Lauderdale, 270 A.D.2d 374, 375 (2d Dept. 2000); see also Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 277 (1970); Bayer v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 897, 898 (2d Dept. 2014).
[2] Jacobson Dev. Group, LLC v. Grossman, 198 A.D.3d 956, 959 (2d Dept. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gregg, 220 A.D.3d at 698.
[3] See O’Connell v. Corcoran, 1 N.Y.3d 179, 184-185 (2003); Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485 (1979)).
[4] Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24 (1978).
[5] O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357 (1981) (citation omitted).
[6] See Matter of Reilly, 45 N.Y.2d at 28 (citations omitted).
[7] Id. (citations omitted).
[8] Id.
[9] See Ciafone v. City of New York, 227 A.D.3d 946, 946 (2d Dept. 2024).
[10] Slip Op. at *2.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. (citing Gregg, 220 A.D.3d at 699).