On June 18, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order (order) against a Delaware-based business communication and marketing service provider (respondent) to settle allegations of cybersecurity controls violations related to a 2021 ransomware attack.

According to the order, the SEC alleged respondent did not have adequate controls to ensure cybersecurity incidents were reported to its management and did not respond to alerts indicating unusual network activity in a timely manner. Among other allegations, the order contended that respondent relied on a third-party vendor to review and escalate the large volume of alerts issued by its cybersecurity detection systems but did not implement procedures or controls to effectively confirm that the vendor’s review and escalation of alerts were consistent with the respondent’s expectations. The order noted that respondent cooperated with the investigation, reported the cybersecurity incident promptly, and took steps to enhance its cybersecurity technology and controls. Without admitting the SEC’s allegations, respondent agreed to a $2,125,000 civil money penalty.

Notably, in addition to alleged violation of Exchange Act Rule 13a-15(a) requiring public companies to maintain disclosure controls and procedures designed to ensure timely disclosure of incidents in compliance with the Commission’s rules, the order also alleged that respondent’s failure to design effective procedures to ensure escalation and timely decisions regarding potential security incidents violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 13(b)(2)(B) required covered companies to “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances, among other things, that access to company assets was permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization.”

In a statement responding to the order, SEC Commissioners Pierce and Uyeda took issue with the Commission’s application Section 13(b)(2)(B). Specifically, the commissioners argued that the requirement to maintain internal accounting controls ensuring “that access to company assets” must be authorized by management and was intended to protect the accuracy of corporate transactions for the use and disposition of assets in transactions. They noted that “[w]hile [respondent’s] computer systems constitute an asset in the sense of being corporate property, computer systems are not the subject of corporate transactions,” and that faulting respondent’s internal accounting controls in the context of a ransomware attack “breaks new ground with its expansive interpretation of what constitutes an asset under Section 13(b)(2)(B)(iii).”