U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Plaintiff Leona Rhoades, on behalf of the estate of her husband, Dewey T. Rhoades, commenced this action against a variety of defendants, alleging that their products contained asbestos that contributed to her husband’s lung cancer and eventual passing. Mr. Rhoades had been employed as a mechanical repair worker on various jobsites, including on U.S. Navy Ships in Florida. The three remaining defendants, General Electric Company (GE), Raytheon Technologies Corporation (RTC), and Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) each filed motions for summary judgment.

First, RTC and NGC argued that Florida law applied to this action, while GE argued that maritime law applied. Ultimately, the court determined that Florida law, rather than maritime law, applied. “[A] party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). The first condition, known as the locality test, “requires that the tort occur on navigable waters or, for injuries suffered on land, that the injury be caused by a vessel on navigable waters.” Id. The second condition, known as the connection test, is comprised of two elements: (1) “whether the incident has ‘a potentially disruptive impacton maritime commerce'” and (2) “whether ‘the general character’ or ‘the activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to maritime activity.'” Id. As to this latter element, a court looks to “whether a tortfeasor’s activity … is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying specialty admiralty rules would apply in the suit at hand.” Id.

Here, the court noted that the plaintiff clearly met the locality test, as Mr. Rhoades alleged exposure occurred aboard U.S. Navy ships. As to the connection test, the court determined that the first prong was met, as exposure to defective products onboard could potentially slow or frustrate work being done on the vessel. However, the court determined that the second prong was not met because the general character of Mr. Rhoades’ work (i.e., fixing aircraft engines) was not substantially related to a maritime activity because aircraft engines are not essential to the proper functioning of Navy ships.

Turning to causation, under Florida law a plaintiff must show that a defendant’s product was a “substantial contributing factor” to the injury that occurred. Moreover, if a defendant’s products are identified in a given case, “traditional” methods of finding causation apply, which require plaintiffs to “introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result.” Gooding v. University Hospital Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fl. 1984). Notably, the Court of Appeals of Florida has liberally applied the substantial contributing factor test, allowing a plaintiff to survive summary judgment based on strong circumstantial evidence of exposure through co-worker testimony. Here, the court determined that the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence via co-worker testimony from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Rhoades was exposed to asbestos from the defendant’s products.

Next, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the government contractor defense. When employing the government contractor defense, a defendant must show that: (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications for the product at issue; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) it warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to it but not to the United States. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). Ultimately, the court determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the government merely provided a “rubber stamp” for the decision to use asbestos products on its ships, or if such a specification was in fact approved by the government.

Additionally, RTC and NGC argued that the plaintiff’s claims were precluded because of derivative sovereign immunity. Under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity, government contractors cannot be sued if: “(1) the government authorized the contractor’s actions and (2) the government validly conferred that authorization, meaning it acted within its constitutional power.” However, the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is not absolute. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., “the liability of an agent for his own negligence has long been embedded in the law.” 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943). Here, the court determined that because summary judgment was not granted on the plaintiff’s negligence claim, and there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the government authorized the use of asbestos in the products at issue, there are still questions of fact as to the derivative sovereign immunity defense.

Lastly, defendant NGC moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff’s conspiracy and punitive damages claims, arguing that the plaintiff failed to produce adequate evidence to establish each claim. Here too, the court determined that issues of fact remain, as summary judgment was denied on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. Moreover, the court noted that consideration of the punitive damage claim was also premature, as a decision on whether to allow a claim for punitive damages depends on evidence presented at trial.

For these reasons, the court denied each of the remaining defendants’ motions in their entirety

Read the full decision here.