On August 20, 2024, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued a ruling in Wolfe v. Reading Blue Mountain & Northern RR Co. The Court overturned the Commonwealth Court’s determination that a condemnation of private land by a railroad was lawful.
Reading Blue Mountain and Northern Railroad Company (RBMN) sought to reestablish rail service over a long-defunct crossing to connect one of its customers, an asphalt plant, to a railroad line. RBMN had an easement over the Wolfes’ property. However, per the provisions of a deed, the Wolfes requested that RBMN remove any siding from their property. RBMN would not, after which the Wolfes sought an injunction to prevent RBMN from entering their property. The Wolfes alleged that this taking was not for a public purpose and was, instead, merely for the exclusive benefit of the asphalt plant.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately concluded that the taking was unlawful, as the intention was to benefit a single private business rather than the public at large. Any public benefit to be garnered from this taking was merely speculative in nature. Moreover, the Court noted that the taking by the railroad would not lead to the transportation of passengers, and the only goods moved because of the taking would be from the asphalt plant. The evidence also showed that the primary motivation for the taking was to save the asphalt plant and the railroad time and money. Furthermore, the Wolfes demonstrated that the asphalt company used trucks and other means of transportation to haul the materials that it wished to import via rail. Thus, the taking was not an economic necessity. Therefore, for all these reasons, the public was not the “primary and paramount beneficiary” of the taking.
The Court differentiated this case from other decisions that it rendered approximately one century ago. In C.O. Struse & Sons Co. v. Reading Co., 153 A. 350 (Pa. 1931), a railroad took property to connect a single entity to a Sears, Roebuck & Company plant, which was, at the time, a major supplier of consumer goods. Furthermore, in Pioneer Coal Co. v. Cherrytree & Dixonville Railroad Co., 116 A. 45 (Pa. 1922), a railroad took private land to allow easier railroad access for a coal company. The Court found that, because coal was so significant to the wellbeing of Pennsylvania’s citizens, the taking was for a public benefit. In both C.O. Struse and Pioneer Coal, the railroads put forth evidence illustrating the substantial economic impacts of the takings to the public at large, thereby convincing the Court of the necessity of allowing them. However, RBMN did not provide evidence articulating the economic impact that connecting the asphalt company to the railroad would have.
In conclusion, Wolfe demonstrates that any taking by a railroad will not lead to a near-automatic finding of a public benefit. Instead, any railroad that wishes to take private property should provide comprehensive and thorough evidence demonstrating that the public at large will be the primary beneficiary of a taking, rather than a sole business or individual.
