On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group does not need to meet a more stringent burden of proof in order to prove unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, the Court reversed a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a heterosexual woman who alleged that she was passed over for a position in favor of a gay man and later demoted did not have a viable claim under Title VII because she lacked evidence of that the employer was the kind of “unusual” employer who discriminates against the majority. The Court held that this “background circumstances” requirement is inconsistent with the text of Title VII and the caselaw interpreting it.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. To establish a prima facie case under Title VII using the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework: 1) a plaintiff must raise an inference of discriminatory; 2) the employer must offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; and 3) the plaintiff must show that the reason was pretextual. Five circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, had applied or suggested a heightened burden for majority plaintiffs at the first step.
The Court clarified that Title VII does not distinguish between majority and minority plaintiffs. It protects any individual from discrimination. The statute “makes it unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The Court emphasized that Congress did not authorize courts to impose extra hurdles on majority-group plaintiffs. The Court also cited precedent confirming that Title VII’s standard for proving discrimination was intended to remain the same— regardless of demographic identity.
In the concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed interest in revisiting the use of McDonnell Douglas an appropriate tool for evaluating Title VII claims. Though not squarely before the court, he questioned whether the framework is compatible with the summary judgment standard, noting that it limits the ways plaintiffs can prove their case, and forces courts to draw artificial lines between direct and circumstantial evidence—leading to significant judicial confusion.
Notably, the Seventh Circuit raised similar concerns in Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2016) and other cases, where it criticized the mechanical application of direct and indirect methods of analyzing evidence in discrimination cases. The court emphasized that the key questions is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” The court reaffirmed the McDonnell Douglas framework as a method of organizing evidence—not a required test.
Employers should evaluate all Title VII discrimination claims using the same legal standards, regardless of the plaintiff’s background.
