In a significant ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its 6-3 opinion in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, addressing the scope of judicial review under the Hobbs Act. The decision marks a pivotal moment in administrative law, particularly concerning the deference required to agency orders in enforcement proceedings. While the Supreme Court previously addressed whether the Hobbs Act applied in private litigation, it ultimately did not resolve whether a district court is required to follow a particular Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order interpreting the TCPA.
Background of the Case
The case stemmed from McKesson Corporation’s allegedly unsolicited fax advertisements sent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The controversy centered on whether district courts must adhere to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA, as outlined in the Amerifactors order, which excluded online fax services (which transmits fax messages as email attachments) from the definition of “telephone facsimile machine.”
The district court ultimately held that it must treat the Amerifactors ruling as authoritative and decertified the plaintiffs’ class because they could not distinguish between faxes sent by an online service and those sent manually. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Hobbs Act’s exclusive jurisdiction provision forecloses a federal district court from considering whether the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA is wrong.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts to an agency’s interpretation of a statute in civil enforcement proceedings. Justice Kavanaugh emphasized, “District courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.” The Supreme Court clarified that the Hobbs Act’s provision for “exclusive jurisdiction” to the courts of appeals pertains to pre-enforcement declaratory judgments, not enforcement proceedings.
Implications of the Ruling
The ruling underscores the principle that district courts are not automatically bound by agency interpretations, allowing them to independently assess statutory meanings. This decision aligns with the Administrative Procedure Act’s presumption of judicial review, reinforcing that unless Congress explicitly precludes such review, district courts retain the authority to interpret statutes in enforcement contexts.
Justice Kavanaugh noted, “The availability of pre-enforcement review does not ordinarily preclude judicial review in enforcement proceedings,” highlighting the importance of maintaining judicial oversight over agency interpretations.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the majority’s interpretation undermines the Hobbs Act’s intent to centralize judicial review in the courts of appeals. “By its terms, the Hobbs Act gives courts of appeals exclusive authority to ‘determine the validity’ of specified agency actions. ‘Exclusive,’ of course, means courts of appeals alone, not district courts.”
Justice Kagan warned that this decision could lead to regulatory uncertainty and disrupt established administrative frameworks. “[I]t prevents the Hobbs Act from functioning as Congress wanted — by allowing regulated parties to end-run the Act’s pre-enforcement judicial review scheme, and thereby undermine the stability and efficacy of administrative programs.”
