In Bush v. Yarborough Oil & Gas, LP a decades-old tax foreclosure judgment did not affect a previously severed mineral interest not owned by the delinquent taxpayer. The mineral owners were neither named nor served in the foreclosure suit, and the judgment and sheriff’s deed expressly limited the scope to the taxpayer’s interest.
In 1937 property owner Piercy conveyed an undivided 1/2 mineral interest to Vaughn, who later conveyed his interest to Johnson, who conveyed fractional interests to the Vaughn Successors.
Severance and competing claims
Years later, a tax foreclosure suit was filed against Piercy. Some of the taxes had accrued before the 1937 severance. Tax liens attached to her property. Johnson and his grantees were not sued or served.
A default judgment was rendered, and the sheriff executed a tax deed conveying the tract to taxing entities, who later quitclaimed their interest to Bush, whose interest passed to the Bush Successors.
The issue was dormant until 2014, when oil production began on leases from the Bush Successors. Yarborough, a Vaughn Successor, sued for trespass-to-try-title, claiming ownership of a fractional share of the minerals.
Interpreting the scope of the judgment
The court focused on three elements to determine the scope of the judgment: the language of the judgment itself, the contemporary legal context, and corroborating evidence.
According to the decretal language, the tax lien was “foreclosed on each tract of said land against the rights, titles, liens and claims of each and all of the said defendants herein.” The sheriff’s deed conveyed “all the right, title and interest of the said Mrs. M.A. Piercy, … .”
The Bush Successors argued that references to “tract of said land” encompassed the entire mineral estate. But the court found that the express limitation to Piercy’s interest in the judgment and deed could not be disregarded.
The court also rejected arguments that contemporary statutes created a presumption that the judgment foreclosed on the Vaughn Successors’ interest. The Delinquent Tax Act of 1895 speaks in terms of owners being served with process, reflecting its purpose to ensure due process.
The court also cited Texas Supreme Court decisions establishing that a title-based judgment “does not conclude” the interests of owners not joined in the suit.
Extrinsic evidence corroborated the limited scope of the foreclosure. Property records showed that no mineral owners were sued. Bush purchased a fractional mineral interest two months after the tax sale, and the quitclaim deed expressly limited the conveyance to Piercy’s interest only.
Limitations and standing
The court rejected arguments that the Vaughn Successors’ claims were barred by the Tax Code’s one-year limitations period for actions “relating to the title to property . . . against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale.” The court distinguished between a title challenge—covered by the statute—and this case, which sought a declaratory judgment clarifying the scope of a deed. It found no procedural bar to suit.
The court rejected arguments that the Vaughn Successors lacked standing or that policy considerations weighed against allowing title claims after decades. Recording statutes enable owners to prove ownership back to the sovereign, while adverse possession statutes address concerns about endless claims. Further, property owners are on notice of prior claims in their chain of title but not deeds recorded after conveyance to a predecessor.
The judgment did not affect the severed mineral interest, which remained undisturbed due to the interest owners’ absence from the suit and the express limitations in the judgment and sheriff’s deed.
Your two-fer musical interlude: funky/reggaeish, not funky/reggaeish.
[View source.]
