On July 1, the U.S. Supreme Court entered an opinion delaying a 6-year statute of limitations to legally challenge federal regulations until a plaintiff is injured. In Corner Post Inc., vs. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 603 U. S. ____ (2024)., the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for an Administrative Procedures Act challenge accrues from the date of a plaintiff’s injury, not from the date of final agency action. In general, the APA authorizes parties injured by agency action to obtain judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702. In most cases, this review is limited to “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Both elements–injury and final agency action–are necessary, but not sufficient, for an APA claim. In Corner Post, the Court considered whether the absence of one of these elements–injury–prevents the limitations period from starting. The APA’s limitations period is “six years after the right of action first accrues,” the default limitations period for civil actions against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). The Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split over the interpretation of “accrues.” The Eighth Circuit, and others, held that the limitations period accrues from the date of final agency action, regardless of the date of injury. The Sixth Circuit, however, held that the limitations period accrues from the date of injury.
Corner Post is a North Dakota-based truck stop and convenience store, incorporated in 2017 and opened in 2018. In 2021, it brought an APA challenge under 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C) to the Federal Reserve Board’s Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing Rule, Regulation II. Corner Post alleged that Regulation II permitted interchange fees above Dodd-Frank’s threshold: “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.” 15 U.S.C. §1693o–2(a)(3)(A). The District Court dismissed the suit as barred by § 2401(a). It held that the six-year limitations period accrued from the date of final agency action–when Regulation II was promulgated, in 2011–not the date Corner Post suffered an injury, in 2018. As such, the limitations period had expired. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
To identify the original meaning of “accrues,” the Court reviewed the term’s meaning in 1948, when Congress passed § 2401(a). At that time, accrue had a “well-settled meaning”–rights accrue when they “come[ ] into existence.” Corner Post Inc., 603 U.S. at 7 (quoting United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S. 568, 569 (1954)). Legal dictionaries contemporaneous with § 2401(a)’s passage support this definition. Precedent also supports this reading, referring to this interpretation as the “standard” or “traditional” rule. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 418 (2005); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J.). Nothing in § 2401(a)’s text indicates that Congress sought to depart from this traditional rule. As such, the limitations period begins accruing when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, which requires injury. There is no distinction, moreover, between facial and as-applied challenges because § 2401(a)’s text lacks finality-focused language such as “promulgation” or “entry.” In addition, Congress’ passage of statutes with finality-based limitations periods contemporaneous with § 2401(a)’s passage does not defeat the text’s ordinary meaning.
To complete the analysis, the Court examined the Board’s reliance on Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58 (1926) and Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503 (1967). Koons considered a Federal Employer’s Liability Act that used “accrued” to describe a limitations period for estate claims that run from the decedent’s death, even though those claims are only available to an estate administrator, who may not be appointed for some period after the decedent’s death. The Court distinguished Koons by noting beneficiaries’ capacity to sue immediately and amend that suit when appointed administrator. Crown Coat applied § 2401(a) to a Government contractor’s claim against the United States. There, the claim did not “mature” until the contractor exhausted all administrative remedies, meaning that § 2401(a)’s limitation period did not begin until the contractor exhausted those administrative remedies. Even if Crown Coat’s dicta supports a more flexible reading of “accrues,” it is not enough to overcome decades of precedent supporting the traditional reading of accrues. In closing, the Court rejected the Board’s policy arguments, finding that later opportunities to challenge agency action will often meet binding (or persuasive) precedent.
Justice Kavanagh concurred, writing separately to emphasize the APA’s authorization of vacatur for unlawful agency action. No other Justices joined the concurrence. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan, dissented. Justice Jackson worried about gamesmanship. Corner Post’s procedural history shows Corner Post’s addition to the suit only after the Government moved to dismiss under § 2401(a)’s limitations period. Plaintiffs may manufacture injury for a Regulation II challenge by, for example, purchasing a cash-only business and choosing to accept debit cards. In general, however, the dissent proposed a more flexible meaning for “accrues” based on the cause of action at issue. Plaintiff-specific claims would not accrue until injury, but facial administrative-law claims would accrue when a rule is finalized, regardless of injury.