January 2025 – including the first 10 days of Donald Trump’s second term as President of the United States – likely marks the beginning of substantial changes in federal transportation law and regulation, including a number of potentially disruptive changes to regulation of the motor vehicle industry and related funding and incentives.
Republican control of the White House and both Houses of Congress, combined with a federal judiciary increasingly skeptical of expansive federal agency regulation, make this a ripe time for major changes in federal law and regulation, including regulation of transportation. President Trump and his supporters have expressed strong opposition to many transportation-related regulations and policies adopted by his predecessors. The new Administration has made clear its intention to move aggressively to reverse or eliminate many of those regulations, incentives, and policies.
President Trump initiated that process with a series of executive orders issued on his very first day in office. As detailed in this article, the new Administration also has an ambitious agenda of new policies and regulatory approaches that could have significant implications for transportation industries and the businesses and customers they serve – ie, most Americans.
Changes in federal agency transportation regulation and policies, undoing Biden policies
During the Biden Administration, Congress adopted two of the largest and most sweeping federal laws affecting transportation, energy, and infrastructure in our nation’s history. The Infrastructure Improvement and Jobs Act (aka the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law or BIL), enacted in late 2021, and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) created a broad range of federal loans, grants, tax credits, incentives, and other programs and policies designed to repair and modernize US physical infrastructure and to propel a transition to electric-powered transportation in the US. Together, those laws provide for roughly a trillion dollars’ worth of federal transportation and “clean energy” tax incentives, funding, and subsidies intended to be disbursed over a number of years. Biden’s Administration spent much of the last three years implementing those landmark laws, including disbursement of billions of dollars in federal funding and incentives. In its final weeks in office, the outgoing Biden Administration issued a number of new regulations and orders governing motor vehicles and equipment.
The Trump Administration (commencing with the January 20 inauguration of President Donald Trump) has not released detailed plans regarding intended changes to federal motor vehicle and equipment regulations. However, during the election campaign, transition, and the first week of the new Administration, it has signaled its intention to seek extensive changes in federal transportation law and policy, including regulation of motor vehicle air emissions, safety, and fuel economy; electric vehicle, battery and related regulation, tax credits, and funding; increased tariffs and trade sanctions; infrastructure programs and funding; changes in aviation regulation, public transit funding and policy, and freight and passenger rail regulation; and a general effort to reduce federal spending and regulation.
The Trump Department of Government Efficiency
During the post-election period, President Trump and his advisors announced their intention to reverse or substantially revise many regulations and policies promulgated by the outgoing Administration, and generally to eliminate regulations it believes are unnecessary or excessive. Shortly after the election, Trump created the “Department of Government Efficiency” initially as a private advisory council led by businessmen Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, charged with recommending actions to reduce federal spending, “dismantle government bureaucracy, slash excess regulations, cut wasteful expenditures, and restructure federal agencies.” Despite its name, DOGE is not a federal cabinet department. However, shortly after taking office, President Trump issued an executive order establishing DOGE as an official arm of the Executive Office of the President, replacing the former US Digital Service, and providing for the installation of DOGE representatives in most federal agencies. See Establishing and Implementing the President’s Department of Government Efficiency, executive order (January 20, 2025). Ramaswamy has now indicated he will leave DOGE to run for governor of Ohio. Reportedly, DOGE has recruited several Silicon Valley, tech, and other business leaders – some of whom have keen interests in federal regulation of their enterprises – to join or advise the agency in its efforts.
Presently, it appears that the newly created DOGE may have substantial influence on federal regulation and policy over the next four years, including federal transportation policy and spending. Last fall, Mr. Musk estimated that DOGE could eliminate a total approximately $2 trillion in federal spending (the federal government spent roughly $6.7 trillion in fiscal year 2024). He scaled back that projection this month, stating such cuts would be a “best case scenario,” and that aiming for $2 trillion of spending cuts would provide a good chance of achieving $1 trillion worth of cuts.
Congress and the courts
And that’s only the Executive Branch. More than any other time in recent history, the confluence of changes in all three branches of the federal government are likely to drive a period of regulatory disruption, change, and uncertainty. November’s elections also gave the Republicans control of both Houses of Congress. Single party control of Congress and the Presidency enhances opportunities for regulatory and policy change, beyond revisions to implementing regulations and other Executive Branch actions.
In addition, recent Supreme Court decisions and pending cases appear to be the leading edge of a sea change in federal administrative law, limiting executive agency power and authority, and shifting the balance of power in the federal government. Those decisions – including for example last summer’s Loper Bright decision overruling the longstanding Chevron doctrine of deference to administrative agency interpretations of unclear statutory provisions – open several new avenues for challenge of agency regulations and actions, enhancing the likelihood of success in such challenges. See Chevron overruled: In Loper Bright v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court reshapes the regulatory landscape; SEC v Jarkesy, US No. 22-859 (June 2024); Biden v. Nebraska, US No. 22-506 (2023); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022); see also McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v McKesson Corp., Docket No. 23-1226 (argued January 21, 2025) (deference to be afforded by district courts to FCC regulations implementing TCPA, implications for other Hobbs Act challenges). The broader effects of those and other Supreme Court rulings are in their early stages, as lower courts begin to apply the new precedents in various contexts and federal agencies adjust their regulatory actions and activity.
This article summarizes some key potential regulatory developments that would affect the automotive industry and transportation sector, and factors that may influence those developments. Some foreseeable regulatory changes will likely take effect in the first 100 days of the Trump Administration, and others will be set in motion during that early period. An important determinant of the timing will be whether a change may be effected through executive order (EO) or other expeditious agency action or would require a notice-and-comment APA rulemaking process.
President Trump’s initial orders freeze, seek repeal of transportation related policies
As promised, President Trump issued a flurry of executive orders on January 20, 2025, the first day of his second term. Among them is an EO entitled “Unleashing American Energy,” which outlines the Administration’s energy- and transportation-related policy goals and initial directives aimed at accomplishing them. The order includes directives focused on eliminating federal regulations, funding, and incentives created to address climate change, including:
- Eliminating EV Subsidies and Market Distortions: The Administration aims to remove subsidies and other government incentives and interventions that it believes distort transportation and energy markets and create an unlevel playing field favoring electric vehicles (EVs) over other technologies. This policy is discussed further in Section II.A.
- Terminating State Emissions Waivers: The order calls for "terminating, where appropriate," state emissions waivers that limit sales of gasoline-powered automobiles. This is likely a reference to the Clean Air Act preemption waiver granted to California, detailed in Section II.B.
- Halting Disbursement of IIJA and IRA Funds: The Administration has immediately paused the disbursement of funds appropriated through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). This specifically affects federal allocations for EV charging stations, including billions of dollars from the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Formula Program and the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Discretionary Grant Program.
These and other initial executive orders seek to implement changes to federal energy and transportation policy advocated by President Trump in the election campaign and during the post-election transition. However, many of the policy statements and instructions for executive agencies in these orders are both general and indefinite and will take time to flesh out and officially adopt. Consequently, many of the changes announced by this and other new EOs will not take effect immediately, and specific changes to regulations, programs, and funding remain uncertain.
I Late-term Biden Administration actions
As is often the case at the end of a presidential administration that will be succeeded by an administration of a different party, the Biden Administration issued a number of rules and took other actions aimed at establishing or securing its preferred policies during its last several weeks in office. This includes several actions by the Department of Transportation (DOT)and other agencies that may have significant effects on the auto industry, other modes of transportation and related infrastructure.
New regulations prohibiting imports of connected vehicles and equipment from China or Russia
On January 16, 2025, the US Department of Commerce published final regulations broadly prohibiting the sale or import to the US of (i) software or hardware that directly enables connected vehicle systems and automated driving systems and functions, or connected vehicles containing such components; if (ii) those components are “designed, developed, manufactured or supplied” by a “person(s) owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or control of the People’s Republic of China or Russia.” Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles. The regulatory prohibitions, adopted pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, are intended to protect critical US infrastructure, automotive supply chains, and private information from misappropriation, manipulation, and other malicious use by foreign adversaries.
As explained in in our summary of the proposed rule, the coverage of these prohibitions is broad and extends to most new vehicles manufactured or sold in the US today. The regulations also impose significant and potentially burdensome new supply chain analysis, due diligence, recordkeeping, and “Declaration of Conformity” requirements on importers and manufacturers of covered components, systems, and vehicles. In response to comments on Commerce’s proposed rule, the final rule clarified and narrowed the scope of the prohibitions and expanded some exceptions. However, the coverage of the final regulations – and the corresponding obligations of importers and manufacturers of connected vehicles and systems – remains broad and in some instances vague and indefinite.
The connected vehicle software prohibitions are scheduled to take effect in vehicle model year 2027, and hardware prohibitions will take effect in model year 2030. Otherwise-covered software that is imported or sold prior to March 17, 2026 is exempt from the prohibitions. President Trump has not yet indicated whether he supports this regulation, but greater restrictions on technology imports from China and Russia to protect US economic and military security are generally consistent with policy priorities of the incoming Administration.
Elimination of Buy America waiver for manufactured products in federally funded highway projects
On January 14, 2025, the Federal Highway Administration terminated a longstanding waiver of “Buy America” requirements for manufactured products used in federal-aid highway projects. A general waiver of those domestic content requirements had applied since 1983. Consistent with the broader “Buy America, Build America” provisions of the BIL, FHWA’s final rule rescinded that waiver, subjecting manufactured products used in federally funded highway projects to domestic content requirements similar to those that apply to other federally funded projects. To provide a transition period, the domestic assembly requirement for such products will take effect on October 1, 2025, and the effective date of domestic content requirements is deferred to October 2, 2026. Iron and steel used in federally funded highway projects remain subject to more stringent domestic manufacturing requirements. FHWA also notes that specific waivers may be available for products not manufactured in sufficient quantities in the US to meet the Buy America domestic content requirements.
New NHTSA safety standards
Automatic emergency braking requirement
In mid-2024, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) adopted a new federal motor vehicle standard, requiring new passenger vehicles and light-duty trucks sold in the US to be equipped with Automatic Emergency Braking systems (AEB), and establishing minimum performance standards for such systems. The provision, adopted in response to a congressional mandate contained in the BIL, is scheduled to take effect in 2029. AEB is a general term for vehicle systems that automatically apply vehicle brakes in order to avoid rear-end collisions with other vehicles. Most new passenger vehicles manufactured today are equipped with some type of AEB, as a result of a voluntary agreement between automakers and NHTSA in 2016. However, the new standard (FMVSS 127) is significantly more demanding, requiring that vehicles be able to stop and avoid contact with a vehicle in front of them when travelling at up to 62 MPH, and requires AEB capability to detect pedestrians in both daylight and night conditions and to apply brakes automatically when a pedestrian is detected in the path of the vehicle travelling at up to 45 MPH. NHTSA and FMCSA also proposed an AEB standard for heavy-duty trucks in 2023. That rulemaking remains pending, and the Trump administration will determine the parameters of any final regulations it may issue with respect to an AEB standard for medium- and heavy-duty trucks.
The US auto industry has objected strongly to the new AEB standard, contending that it is not feasible with current technology, and is substantially more stringent than European standards. Following the election, the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (trade association representing nearly all automakers selling vehicles in the US) sent a letter to President Trump and his transition team, urging the Trump DOT to re-open and revise the AEB rule. On January 17, 2025, the AIA filed a court challenge to the new standard in the federal court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
AV STEP – new proposed voluntary AV framework
On January 15, 2025, NHTSA published a proposal to establish a “voluntary framework for the evaluation and oversight of motor vehicles equipped with automated driving systems (ADS).” NPRM, ADS-equipped Vehicle Safety, Transparency, and Evaluation Program (AV STEP), 90 Fed. Reg. 4130. The proposed regulation seeks to create a federal program, supervised by NHTSA, which would facilitate limited deployment (on public roads) of automated vehicles that do not satisfy some safety standards, potentially including vehicles that do not have human operated controls such as a steering wheel and accelerator and brake pedals. AV STEP would create a “tailored” pathway for such vehicles to obtain exemption from certain standards, contingent on the manufacturer’s agreement to a number of system design and safety disclosures, reporting, and transparency requirements. This proposal would not require congressional amendment of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act but would remain subject to the significant limitations of that statute, and the glacial pace of development of new vehicle safety standards necessary to facilitate deployment of unconventional autonomous vehicles at scale.
Withdrawal of proposed rule to amend DOT NEPA procedures
DOT withdrew its pending update to procedures it uses to evaluate the environmental effects of proposed federal actions under the National Environmental Policy Act. This withdrawal may have been driven by uncertainty created by recent amendments to the Act, in combination with the D.C Circuit’s recent ruling calling into doubt the validity of agency NEPA regulations based on Council on Environmental Quality regulations in Marin Audubon Society v. EPA and the Supreme Court’s pending consideration of the appropriate scope of NEPA review and analysis of a proposed new freight rail line. See Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Docket No. 23-975 (argued Dec. 10, 2024).
Surprise “continuation” of airbag inflators defect proceeding
In late 2024, NHTSA issued a memorandum stating it was re-opening its review of potential defects in airbag inflators installed in vehicles sold in the US over the last quarter century. In 2023, following an eight-year investigation, NHTSA issued an initial decision concluding that the inflators have a safety defect that would require the recall and repair of approximately 50 million vehicles produced by nearly every major auto manufacturer selling passenger vehicles in the US.
Affected vehicle and equipment manufacturers challenged NHTSA’s extraordinary decision, which would compel a huge, extremely disruptive, and costly recall based on the failure of seven of 52 million airbag inflators sold in the US over the course of nearly 20 years, and without a determination of a common cause for those failures. A year later, on July 31, 2024, NHTSA issued a supplemental decision affirming and expanding its initial decision and indicating its intention to order the huge recall over the vociferous objections of affected automakers.
Then, on December 13, 2024, NHTSA issued a short memorandum stating that it would seek more information and conduct an additional investigation, and then consider whether to issue a final decision at all. In mid-January 2025, NHTSA sent supplemental information requests to auto and equipment manufacturers, which also suggest the agency has expanded the scope of its investigation and potential recall to cover vehicles and inflators sold in the US from 2001 to the present. The practical effects of this unexpected NHTSA action are at least threefold: (i) injecting significant new doubt as to whether NHTSA will order a recall; (ii) expanding the potential scope of a recall to encompass vehicles sold from 2019 to 2025; and (iii) ensuring that any decision regarding how to proceed in the matter will be made by the new Administration, which may have a different view of the matter and could be more responsive to industry concerns.
FTC decision sanctioning automaker for disclosure of consumer information sharing without consent
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that General Motors and its OnStar subsidiary sold vehicle drivers’ geolocation and driving behavior gathered from millions of connected vehicles to consumer reporting companies without obtaining those drivers’ affirmative consent for disclosure of such private information. On January 16, the FTC issued a complaint alleging that unauthorized information disclosure, and its use by insurance companies to deny insurance coverage or increase insurance rates, violated the FTC Act. A proposed consent order settling the FTC’s allegations would prohibit GM from providing such driver information to consumer reporting agencies for five years, and require it to obtain express affirmative consent from consumers prior to collecting connected vehicle data. The Commission adopted the proposed consent agreement by a 3-0 vote, with the two Republican commissioners recorded as absent. The FTC findings and complaint mark the agency’s first action related to connected vehicle data.
POTENTIAL CHANGES TO AUTO AND TRANSPORTATION REGULATION AND POLICY GOING FORWARD
The Trump Administration has not released detailed plans regarding intended changes to federal motor vehicle and equipment regulations, but officials have signaled there likely there will be significant changes to (i) federal emissions and fuel economy standards and California vehicle emissions regulatory authority; (ii) federal regulation of automated and autonomous vehicles; (iii) federal tax credits, incentives and funding for vehicle electrification, charging infrastructure, and related “clean energy” projects and activities; and (iv) tariffs and trade policy affecting the automotive industry. A number of variables may affect the specifics, magnitude, and timing of potential regulatory changes, but we anticipate several general regulatory initiatives and changes that will be significant for the motor vehicle and equipment and other transportation industries.
II Potential changes to vehicle emissions standards
EPA vehicle air emissions standards (GHG, criteria pollutants)
The Biden Administration significantly increased the stringency of greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant emissions standards for new MY 2027-32 light duty cars and trucks. See our summary. President Trump has promised to roll back EPA’s new emissions standards, which he and other Republican lawmakers have described as a de facto EV mandate.
Trump EPA likely to move to reduce stringency of standards
The Trump EPA likely will initiate rulemaking proceedings to amend the Biden GHG tailpipe emissions standards for passenger cars and light trucks by substituting new, less stringent standards for future model years. Similar rulemakings may follow to reduce the stringency of Biden EPA standards for other pollutants and other vehicle types and engines.
In the first Trump Administration, EPA issued a rule effectively freezing the federal GHG emissions and fuel economy standards at MY 2020 levels for MY 2021-2026 vehicles (the SAFE rule). If the second Trump Administration follows a similar approach, EPA will be required to initiate a formal rulemaking process, which may take 2-3 years to complete. Further affecting the timeline for any revised standards to take effect is EPA's statutory obligation to provide manufacturers lead-time before new standards take effect. However, the amount of lead time required for compliance is left to EPA’s discretion and the Agency could determine less time is needed when reducing the stringency of the emission standards.
In the interim, President Trump may also issue an executive order directing EPA to not enforce the Biden-era tailpipe emissions standards, effectively suspending enforcement of those standards. The legality of such an EO is uncertain, and it likely would be subject to court challenge.
Court challenges by environmental groups, states and other interests
Less stringent emissions and fuel economy standards promulgated by the Trump administration are likely to face significant opposition and court challenges litigation from environmental and other interest groups, California and several other states.
Pending court challenges to Biden mobile source emissions standards
Two cases pending before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals challenge EPA’s MY 2023-26 tailpipe emissions standards (Texas v. EPA) and the MY 2027-32 emissions standards (Kentucky v. EPA). Among other arguments, the challengers assert that the standards are barred by the “major questions doctrine” (adopted by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA) and that the rule should be vacated under Loper Bright (overruling Chevron deference) because EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act embodied in the final rule (establishing the standards) is not entitled to deference.
Last summer, the DC Circuit requested supplemental briefing in Texas v. EPA regarding the effect of its decision in Ohio v. EPA (dismissing challenge to California waiver as moot, see III below) on the Texas challenge. That supplemental briefing was completed in August. Oral argument has been scheduled on those issues, and the case remains pending. It is possible the Texas challenge (to MY 2023-2026 standards) could be dismissed as moot, because the final model year covered by those standards commences (for most automakers) in mid-calendar year 2025.
Briefing in the appeal of Kentucky v. EPA (a challenge to MY 2027-32 EPA standards) is scheduled to be completed in March 2025.
California vehicle emissions standards under pre-emption waivers
Under Section 209 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA has authority to issue a waiver of federal preemption to California to establish and enforce its own (more stringent) standards for new motor vehicle and engine emissions, provided they meet certain statutory criteria. Whether to grant a waiver to California for GHG standards has been a political football over the last few presidential administrations, with successive EPA leaders reversing the ruling of the preceding administration. For some time, EPA has been considering waiver applications for several California rules, including the Advanced Clean Cars II Program, which would pose significant compliance challenges and costs for the auto industry. ACC II also includes a zero emission vehicle (ZEV) sales percentage mandate, which automakers have stated is unachievable (eg, requires that 35 percent of all MY 2026 light vehicles sold in California be ZEVs, with increasing percentage requirements in subsequent years). The Trump EPA’s determination of California’s waiver authority will also determine GHG vehicle emissions standards in the multiple states that have adopted those California vehicle emissions standards under CAA Section 177.
Trump Administration likely to revoke California waiver for MY 2027-32
The Biden EPA granted California’s GHG tailpipe emissions regulation waiver application on December 18, 2024, thereby renewing CARB authority to regulate GHG emissions for MY 2027-32 (including the ZEV mandate).
The Trump Administration is expected to move quickly to revoke the waiver for separate California GHG mobile source emissions regulations. This imminent action is evidenced by an EO that Trump issued on his first day in office, declaring it to be the policy of the US to “terminat[e] . . . state emissions waivers that function to limit sales of gasoline-powered automobiles.” The Trump EPA likely also will seek to revoke most other Section 209 preemption waivers (Biden EPA granted several in late 2024), except those that uniquely apply to California-specific issues. Such revocations would not require a formal rulemaking process, and so could be accomplished fairly quickly. A court challenge to that revocation (by California and other states and interests) will likely follow. The practical result in the near-term is that separate GHG vehicle emissions standards set by California for MY 2027-32 will not be enforceable (in CA or any other state), pending the outcome of any court challenge(s).
If a waiver revocation were ultimately upheld, California and Section 177 states would be barred from setting more stringent GHG emissions standards and federal standards would govern. If experience is a guide, a court challenge to a waiver revocation is likely to proceed slowly. California challenged the first Trump Administration’s revocation of its waiver authority. The court challenge was still pending at the end of that Administration, and the Biden Administration reinstated the waiver.
Pending court challenge to EPA authority to waive pre-emption for GHG emissions
In April, the DC Circuit rejected a challenge to the in-force California waiver for MY 2018-2025 in Ohio v EPA. The challenge, brought by several states and petroleum and fuel industry interests, argued that EPA lacks statutory authority to grant a waiver for vehicle GHG emissions because such emissions contribute to global climate change, rather than localized air pollution in California. The Court of Appeals avoided the substantive issues by concluding that the challengers lacked standing and dismissed the consolidated appeals. The States and industry challengers filed separate petitions for review with the Supreme Court.
In December, the Court granted certiorari in Diamond Alternative Energy v. EPA, agreeing to review the DC Circuit’s Ohio v. EPA rejection of the challenge brought by fuel producers and related interests on the ground that those parties lacked standing to challenge the waiver EPA granted to allow California to regulate GHG emissions. Although the petitioners also sought to challenge the EPA waiver on the merits, the Supreme Court limited its review to the question of whether the petitioners had standing to bring the challenge. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court denied the State petitioner’s request for review of Ohio v. EPA.
If the Court were to hold in Diamond Alternative Energy that petitioners do have standing, it could set the stage for a future challenge to the lawfulness of a GHG emissions regulation waiver (under CAA § 209) itself. In the short term, a decision holding petitioners have standing in that case likely would have little effect on the challenged waiver, which ends with MY 2025 vehicles.
III Potential changes to motor vehicle safety, fuel economy regulation
Vehicle safety regulation
Regulation of autonomous and automated driver assistance systems
It appears likely that the Trump DOT will initiate action to facilitate deployment of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and higher-level autonomous driving systems and vehicles, and “robotaxi” services. Existing federal law and regulations have impeded commercial deployment of autonomous driving systems and vehicles in the US and related innovations, technology, and services. Trump Administration advisors have advocated prompt DOT action to remove unnecessary regulatory obstacles to deployment of autonomous vehicle technologies and services.
In 2021, NHTSA issued a standing general order (SGO) requiring vehicle and equipment manufacturers to report promptly all vehicle crashes in which automated driving systems (ADS) or ADAS were engaged, and to provide summary reports of the results of investigations of such incidents. Those reports, covering thousands of incidents, have been made public on a roughly annual basis.
Developers and manufacturers of ADS, ADAS, and automated vehicles generally have not supported the ADS/ADAS reporting SGO. Many believe the SGO results in over-reporting of minor incidents and incidents in which the automated system was clearly not at fault. Other industry leaders find the reporting requirements unduly burdensome or unwarranted under the law. It appears likely that NHTSA under Trump will likely either repeal or substantially revise the SGO.
More broadly, we anticipate that the Trump DOT/NHTSA will move quickly to develop a streamlined and expeditious regulatory path for the deployment of automated driving systems and SAE Levels 3-4 autonomous vehicles and to eliminate regulatory obstacles to deployment of those and other new and unconventional motor vehicle technologies and functions. Establishment of federal standards and regulations to govern automated vehicles and systems could also forestall regulation of those technologies by individual states and the potential creation of a patchwork quilt of divergent state regulations and requirements.
During the final days of President Trump’s first term, DOT sought comments on an “Automated Vehicles Comprehensive Plan,” outlining principles and ideas for a regulatory approach intended to facilitate the safe and transparent deployment of autonomous vehicles. The Biden Administration did not pursue that initiative, but the second Trump Administration might revive it as a partial foundation for new regulations or guidance designed to enable more expeditious deployment of automated vehicles and technologies.
Whether and how regulations to facilitate commercial deployment of automated vehicles (particularly those that lack human driver controls required by existing standards) at scale without amending the Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA) or other statutes is not clear. Development and issuance of new vehicle safety standards to cover technologies less complex than ADS has generally taken about 8-10 years – significantly longer than President Trump will be in office. Under the MVSA, exemptions from existing standards are allowed only for very limited numbers of vehicles, and for a short period.
This month the Autonomous Vehicle Industry Association issued federal AV policy recommendations. Recognizing the limitations imposed by existing law, those recommendations called for Congress to make several revisions to the MVSA to remove statutory impediments to broader testing and deployment of a range of AVs (including those that do not have human driver controls) and to require NHTSA to adopt regulations to accommodate such testing and deployment. AVIA also called for increases funding for NHTSA and FMCSA to provide the agencies with adequate resources to regulate and support the AV industry. Given the Administration’s goal of dramatically reducing federal spending and regulation, prospects for the last proposal may be dim.
Enforcement
During the first Trump Administration, NHTSA engaged in substantially less regulatory enforcement activity than under former Presidents Obama and Biden. Based on widely expressed views of the new Administration regarding excessive federal regulation, it is reasonable to anticipate that, all else being equal, NHTSA under Trump 2.0 will also conduct less enforcement activity than under Biden. And all else may not be equal – President Trump, DOGE, and others in the incoming Administration have promised to dramatically cut federal spending and personnel. Significant reductions in agency resources alone may necessitate reduced regulatory and enforcement activity.
Corporate average fuel economy standards (NHTSA)
Current status: Earlier this year, DOT’s NHTSA set new fuel economy standards for MY 2027-2031 vehicles, which would operate in parallel with EPA's emission standards for passenger cars and light-trucks. A separate rulemaking set standards heavy-duty pickup trucks, vans, and other vehicles.
Trump DOT/NHTSA likely to reduce stringency of fuel economy standards
The new Administration appears likely to act to roll back Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards established by its predecessor. During the first Trump term, NHTSA rescinded more stringent fuel economy standards set by the Obama Administration and adopted lower CAFE standards commensurate with Trump EPA’s revised emissions standards. We anticipate the second Trump Administration will take similar action to reduce fuel economy requirements. Some supporters suggest the new Administration return those standards to 2020 levels (roughly equating to fleetwide average of 35 mpg).
Such regulatory changes typically require NHTSA to go through a formal rulemaking process, which could take a few years. While NHTSA’s rules prohibit issuing a more stringent fuel economy standard less than 18 months before the start of the MY to which the new standard would apply, there does not appear to be a similar lead-time requirement for less stringent standards.
Pending court challenge
A federal judicial panel recently consolidated various challenges to the Biden Administration CAFE rules into a single case: West Virginia v. Buttigieg. The case is in its early stages. If the court challenge were finally decided before the Trump DOT completed a rulemaking issuing revised standards, the result could be either no effective standards or the Biden CAFE standards taking effect in the interim before Trump replacement standards were issued.
IV Changes to federal incentives and funding for electrical vehicles, batteries, charging infrastructure, and clean energy projects
The federal Inflation Reduction Act and the Infrastructure Improvement and Jobs Act created a broad range of federal loans, grants, tax credits, incentives, and other programs and policies designed to propel a transition to electric-powered vehicles in the US. Together, those laws provide for nearly a trillion dollars’ worth of federal tax incentives, funding, and subsidies intended to be disbursed over a number of years. President Trump opposes much of the EV-related funding, tax credits, and programs created by the IRA, and objects to significant parts of the funding and activities authorized by the IIJA. During the presidential campaign, Trump promised to eliminate what he referred to as “EV mandates” under federal and California regulations, and generally indicated that the Trump Administration will seek to de-fund, eliminate, or limit much of the funding and incentives created established by the IRA.
In particular, the Trump transition team reiterated that the incoming administration aims to eliminate the $7,500 per vehicle tax credit for purchasers of new electric vehicles (created by the IRA and codified in Section 30D of the Internal Revenue Code), and to redirect federal funding for EV charging stations and infrastructure (largely under the IIJA) to activities intended to enhance US domestic capacity for processing of battery critical minerals and reduce US EV battery supply chain dependence on China. The new Administration also appears likely to target IRA-established tax credits of up to $4,000 for purchasers of used EVs and up to $7,500 for lessors of light-duty EVs. (latter, under IRC § 45W, is not subject to critical mineral and battery domestic content requirements that apply to 30D purchase credits).
The flood of executive orders signed by President Trump on January 20 included an order broadly directing federal agencies to stop disbursement of funds under the IRA and BIL:
All agencies shall immediately pause the disbursement of funds appropriated through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 . . . or the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act . . . , including but not limited to funds for electric vehicle charging stations made available through the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Formula Program and the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Discretionary Grant Program.
Unleashing American Energy § 7(a) (EO Jan. 20, 2025). It is questionable whether, under federal statutes and constitutional allocation of powers, the President has the power to direct executive agencies not to disburse funds appropriated by Congress and obligated pursuant to federal statutes. Perhaps recognizing this broad fiat may be an overreach, the acting director of OMB distributed guidance to federal departments on January 22, seeking to clarify that the order only applies to funds “that may be implicated by” a general policy outlined in that EO, and that agencies “may disburse funds as they deem necessary after consulting with [OMB].”
Following issuance of the EO, the Federal Highway Administration stopped reimbursement payments for work already completed pursuant to IRA and BIL funding awards. After the OMB clarification, FHWA resumed those payments. Despite OMB’s attempted clarification, there remains substantial confusion regarding the effect of the Unleashing American Energy order. On January 23, noting continuing confusion, the Chair of the Senate Environment Committee stated that the Administration “needs to make sure that they clarify all this.”
Although President Trump and other Administration leaders support repeal of EV credits, the prospects for elimination of those credits are uncertain. Because these credits are statutory, it is unlikely that they could be eliminated by executive action alone – Congress likely would have to enact a change to the law. Many automakers and suppliers have made large capital investments and re-tooled manufacturing facilities, and engaged in major vehicle and powertrain re-design, to support a transition to electric-powered vehicles, in part on reliance on IRA tax credits and incentives (including the 30D and 45W credits). Due to the very narrow GOP margins in both Houses, including some Representatives whose districts have a significant auto industry presence, mustering even a simple majority to support repeal of EV credits may be difficult. Highlighting that challenge, the Alliance for Automotive Innovation – which represents all major automakers in the US except Tesla – has repeatedly urged the Trump Administration and Congress to retain those credits.
More stringent domestic content requirements for EV tax credits?
In the event that EV tax credits are not eliminated, the Administration could make credit eligibility requirements more stringent while simultaneously seeking to advance the goals of increasing domestic production of high voltage batteries and EVs and curtailing the involvement of manufacturers and suppliers in China and other disfavored nations (aims largely shared with the Biden Administration and having bipartisan support in Congress). The IRA makes an EV’s eligibility for the purchase credits contingent (in part) on the vehicle’s containing certain percentages of battery “critical minerals” that are extracted or processed in the US or countries having a free trade agreement with the US, and a percentage of the vehicle’s battery components that are manufactured or assembled in the US. The language of the IRA provisions establishing those criteria are ambiguous and open to a range of interpretations. See our alert, "Treasury guidance on clean vehicle credit eligibility." Under President Trump, the Treasury Department and IRS could amend the existing interpretations, regulations, and guidance to make those US domestic content requirements more strict and thus make it more difficult for manufacturers with ex-US battery supply chains to produce qualifying vehicles.
Similarly, the incoming Administration could tighten credit exclusions for EVs containing critical minerals or battery components sourced from a “foreign entity of concern.” The term FEOC is broadly defined by statute as a person or entity “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a government of a covered nation” (currently China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran). The Departments of the Treasury and Energy have developed regulatory definitions, requirements, and guidance to implement the FEOC exclusion, but its vague and ambiguous terms could be interpreted more stringently to exclude any vehicles whose supply chain has some connection to a person or entity in China or one of the other three covered countries. See our alert, "Treasury and DoE FEOC Regulations." One target for such revision might be partnerships or joint ventures between an FEOC and an entity that is not an FEOC, even if the FEOC does not have legal control over the venture’s activities or decisions.
Funding and tax incentives for battery and EV manufacturing facilities, clean energy projects
President Trump also has promised to reverse other policies and programs established by the IRA and BIL, particularly those he views as inappropriately favoring alternative energy sources and uses over fossil fuels. The new Administration’s policy aims and ambitions with respect to such programs, funding, and regulations may be crystallized, at a high level, in Unleashing American Energy, an EO issued the day Trump was sworn into office. In addition to directing federal agencies to suspend all disbursement of funds under the IRA and BIL (discussed above), the order revokes numerous Biden EOs that sought to mitigate climate change by reducing the use of fossil fuels to power factories and vehicles, and generate electricity; and declares that US policy is to “Terminat[e] the Green New Deal” and eliminate “unfair subsidies and other ill-conceived government-imposed market distortions that favor EVs over other technologies and effectively mandate their purchase by individuals, private businesses, and government entities.” It is not clear whether the EO’s stated aims extend to elimination of billions of dollars of funding for US battery and EV manufacturing facilities and projects (primarily administered by the Department of Energy), but statements attributed to Trump advisors suggest the Administration is also targeting elimination of those subsidies.
These are early days, and relevant EOs issued to date are more in the nature of policy manifesto and statements of intention than a roadmap of how Trump officials will accomplish those goals. As explained below, even more definite and specific executive actions, alone, may have limited effect on IRA expenditures for “clean” transportation and energy activities and projects.
Majority of clean energy and transportation funding under IRA is in form of tax credits – elimination would likely require congressional action
The majority of the IRA’s federal expenditures for clean vehicles, clean energy, and climate-related measures are in the form of tax credits, not direct federal spending such as loans and grants. Original estimates projected total expenditures for those programs would be approximately $392 billion, of which tax credits and incentives accounted for $271 billion or 69 percent. In early 2024, updated IRA projections put total expenditures for such “climate provisions” at approximately $901 billion, with tax credits accounting for an estimated $780 billion, or 87 percent of the total. As previously discussed, repeal of tax credit provisions very likely would require action by Congress and could not be achieved by executive action alone.
Republican members of Congress representing districts with significant auto industry presence or clean energy facilities may make it difficult to muster even a simple majority of the House to support such a repeal. In addition, unofficial analyses estimate that about 75 percent of IRA clean energy project funds have been expended in congressional districts represented by Republicans. Repeal of IRA credits and programs could be unpopular in those districts that have received substantial funding and economic development under those programs.
The historically narrow Republican majority in the House means the GOP could not lose even three votes and sustain a majority on a party-line vote (for a time following the anticipated departure of GOP members to serve in the Trump Administration, the GOP numerical edge could be only two votes, meaning the defection of a single member in that fractious caucus could prevent passage of a bill opposed by all Democratic members).
A large majority of IRA direct funding for clean energy projects has been spent
In addition, it appears a large proportion of IRA direct funding for EV and battery manufacturing projects and facilities (and related clean energy projects) – in the form of federal grants and loans – has already been spent. The Biden Administration reported on January 17 that approximately 84 percent of such clean energy project funds ($96.7 billion) had been “obligated” (meaning federal agencies have signed contracts for the payment of grants and loans to recipients). Legally and practically, it would be very difficult for federal agencies to claw back those obligated funds. In addition, Biden further stated that awards of most the remaining direct funds provided for such projects by the IRA (approximately $11 billion) had been publicly announced but not yet obligated.
President Trump may have the power to withhold the approximately 16 percent of direct funding for clean energy projects that has not yet been obligated. However, to the extent those funds have already been appropriated by Congress, there is some question as to whether the Administration may refuse to spend those funds. Also, with respect to the $11 billion awarded and announced for particular projects, but not yet obligated, withholding those funds could face some political opposition.
Rescinding funds that have been appropriated and obligated would face significant legal obstacles.
Federal statutes, practice, and precedent over the last half century have been understood to bar a president from withholding obligated funds or seeking the return of finds that have been obligated and disbursed. President Trump has indicated he might nonetheless seek to prevent the disbursement of funds obligated for IRA projects and facilities, without congressional action, by refusing to spend funds appropriated by Congress and obligated by federal agencies – an action referred to as “rescission” or “impoundment.” Such impoundment of duly obligated funds appropriated by Congress for IRA (or BIL) projects almost certainly would be subject to court challenge under the Impoundment Control Act, (and/or as an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the executive branch), which essentially requires congressional approval of any such funding recission.
Trump Administration officials, including his nominee for OMB director, have indicated that, at least in some instances, they may refuse to spend appropriated or obligated funds because they believe the Impoundment Act is unconstitutional. Court challenges to such recissions could take years to reach final resolution.
Securing congressional repeal of clean energy programs and funding could be difficult
In addition to legal obstacles to eliminating IRA and BIL expenditures through executive action, eliminating such funding through congressional action to change the law would be challenging. Partly due to the narrow GOP majorities in Congress, the prospects for broad repeal of major provisions and funding may be limited. It appears the best prospect for such repeal may be through the use of the “reconciliation” process, which allows passage of certain measures in the Senate by a simple majority vote, instead of the filibuster-proof majority effectively required for most legislation.
V Highway and infrastructure programs and funding
During the election campaign, President Trump favored funding for traditional highway and related infrastructure and elimination of funding for mass transit and passenger rail, clean energy infrastructure, widespread broadband infrastructure deployment, and other less traditional infrastructure projects and activities promoted and funded during the Biden presidency. Statements from President Trump and his transportation advisors indicate that the Trump DOT, DOE, and other agencies will seek to substantially cut subsidies and funding for transit and “green” infrastructure, and to redirect some of that funding to increased highway, bridge, and tunnel construction, expansion, and improvement.
A prominent example of that approach is Trump’s announcement that he intends to eliminate the EV charging infrastructure program and funding established by the BIL, referred to as the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) program, which provides $5 billion to fund the construction of high-speed EV chargers and infrastructure along key roadways and support an interconnected national EV charging network. Trump has frequently stated that his view that NEVI is unnecessary and unfairly subsidizes and favors electric vehicles over internal combustion engine vehicles and facilities. His Unleashing American Energy executive order expressly singled out NEVI and another charging infrastructure grant program for immediate cessation of funding. Trump has previously stated he would seek to redirect NEVI funds to highway construction and infrastructure.
Here again, elimination and claw back of NEVI funding may be easier said than done. The program has been notoriously slow to deploy charging stations, with less than 100 charging stations funded out of the projected 30,000 stations. However, at least $2.4 billion of NEVI funding has already been obligated by FHWA, and another $1 billion has been apportioned for FY 2025. There also have been smaller fund distributions through related programs. Conservatively, more than half of total NEVI funds appear to be insulated from repeal or reprogramming by the new Administration, unless it decides to impound those funds and defend a legal challenge under the Impoundment Act.
It is more difficult to estimate with precision the amount of BIL funds that have already been obligated, and hence would be difficult for the new Administration to retract without a significant legal battle. However, various estimates suggest that at least half of BIL funding for infrastructure and related projects has already been obligated.
Separately, there are increasing calls in Congress and other quarters to require EVs to contribute to the federal Highway Trust Fund. Presently, that fund (used for highway construction, maintenance, and repair) is supported by the proceeds from a federal gasoline tax, paid by vehicle drivers at the pump. EVs, whose motors do not burn petroleum fuel, do not pay this tax. Collection of some type of fee from EVs that use public roads is seen by many as appropriate to require EV drivers to contribute to the maintenance of those roads. In his confirmation hearing, DOT Secretary nominee Sean Duffy voiced strong support for requiring EVs to pay for their use of roads. To date, the policy challenge has been developing a fee mechanism that is fair and political acceptable. The Administration’s position on airport construction and expansion funding has not yet come into focus.
President Trump’s communications office promised last week that he will make a “massive” announcement regarding infrastructure funding on January 28, 2025.
VI Import tariffs and other foreign trade limitations
An important variable that could have profound effects on the auto industry, and the entire US economy, is the extent to which Trump and Congress will impose tariffs or other limitations on trade with China and other US trading partners. During the election campaign, President Trump promised to raise tariffs on most goods and materials imported from China, including vehicles and equipment, by 60 percent. These tariffs would be in addition to those imposed in Trump’s first term, and the further tariffs imposed by the Biden Administration on EVs, batteries, and related materials and equipment imported from China. The Trump transition team has advocated imposition of import tariffs on essentially all high-voltage battery materials (from any foreign country), in further support of increased US production of such materials and creation of a domestic battery supply chain and manufacturing industry, independent of China’s current worldwide dominance of flows of battery critical minerals and components. The Trump transition team proposed that such tariffs initially be applied globally, with exceptions to be negotiated with nations that meet certain conditions and criteria. Further limits on advanced semi-conductor and technology exports to China also seem likely.
Following the election, President Trump reiterated support for “universal” tariffs on most imported goods and materials – not just those from China. His rhetoric and initial proposals suggest a level of trade restrictions and protectionism not seen in the US for about a century.
Trump surprised many when, after his election, he advocated the imposition of 10 percent tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada, two of the nation’s largest trading partners, and parties to the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, adopted with significant fanfare by the first Trump Administration. Significant tariffs or other limitations on imports from, and exports to, those US neighbors could have a particularly disruptive effect on the US auto industry. During the three decades since the adoption of the USMCA in its original form (as NAFTA), the North American auto industry and its supply chains have become integrated across the three nations’ borders. Vehicles finally assembled and sold in the US often contain parts, equipment, and systems manufactured or assembled in Mexico or Canada.
The impacts of US import tariffs likely would not be limited to increased costs of imported goods. If, for example, the US imposes substantial tariffs on imports from China and other countries, those countries would likely respond with tariffs on goods exported by the US. An example is Canada’s recent publication of a list of US exports it could subject to tariffs if the US were to implement threatened tariffs on Canadian imports. At least in the short-to-medium term, such reciprocal actions could cause inflation and inflict financial harm on US-based companies and consumers and economies around the world. And a major trade war with China alone could cause substantial economic disruption in both countries.
For these and other reasons, broad tariff proposals may face significant opposition from US business interests and Trump supporters in Congress. As with a number of policy proposals floated by President Trump and his advisors, it is not clear which tariffs and trade sanctions may come to fruition, and which may be intended to seek bargaining leverage to advance other aims. In support of tariff increases, President Trump has noted that tariff revenues could be used to offset the budgetary impact of the proposed extension of income tax cuts adopted in what many regard as a signature achievement of Trump’s first term in office. Nonetheless, given the razor-thin GOP margins in Congress, broad tariff increases that require congressional action may be difficult to achieve.
Post-inauguration tariff announcements
On January 21, the President announced he intends to impose 25 percent tariffs on all imports from Canada and Mexico and an additional 10 percent tariff (over and above current tariffs previously imposed by Trump and Biden) on all imports from China, to take effect on February 1, 2025. The announced tariff increases on Mexico and Canada goods are higher than the 10 percent increase Trump had proposed a few weeks earlier. Conversely, the 10 percent tariff increase on Chinese imports is substantially lower than the 60 percent increase Trump proposed during the election campaign. Other Trump statements last week suggest a potential softening of his position on China tariffs in favor of negotiated solutions. As of this writing, Trump has not issued a final EO or other written directive implementing the tariffs he announced last week – revisions or refinements of those proposed tariffs could still be forthcoming.
In his inaugural address, President Trump floated the idea of creating a new agency for administering and collecting import tariffs, which he called the “external revenue service.” In a speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 23, the President described his intention to use tariffs to respond to unfair trade practices and cut US trade deficits with other countries. In response to questions, Trump indicated that he aims to incentivize production in the US by lowering income taxes for companies producing goods in the US and increasing tariffs on goods produced elsewhere and imported to the US (stating, in part, “My message to every business in the world is very simple: Come make your product in America and we will give you among the lowest taxes of any nation on Earth. But if you don’t make your product in America, [then] you will have to pay a tariff”).
VII Changes to other federal transportation regulations and policies
The new Administration and Congress are also interested in making changes to other transportation policies and regulation, including those affecting aviation, transit, motor carrier (truck) transportation, freight rail, maritime shipping, and space policies. We will address those policy areas in an upcoming article but mention a few highlights here.
Mass transit
President Trump has long opposed public funding for urban and inter-city mass transit, and in his first term sought to repeal funding for public transit projects, including the huge Los Angeles to San Francisco California high-speed rail project initiated under the Obama Administration (which today remains very far from completion). Trump previously successfully blocked funding for the Gateway Project, which would have built a new rail tunnel and rehabilitated existing tunnels under the Hudson River between New York and New Jersey that carry Amtrak and commuter rail trains. In a sharp departure from the Biden Administration’s infusion of funds for passenger rail, all indications are that Trump will likely seek drastic decreases in such funding and terminate Biden public transit policies.
Aviation safety and economic regulation
The Trump Administration appears likely to reverse or substantially revise several aviation policies and regulations adopted or proposed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT, and other Biden Administration agencies, including:
- Airline services, economic regulation, and competition policy, such as skeptical review (and disapproval) of airline mergers and combinations, required disclosure of ancillary airline fees, prohibition of charges for seating families together on commercial airlines, monitoring and sanctions for airline service delays and disruptions, and cancellation refunds and other compensation to consumers for flight cancellations. Less demanding competition review of airline combinations (by the Justice Department, DOT, or other cognizant agencies) could allow certain alliances and mergers that were rejected by the Biden Administration, and possibly spur more consolidation in the commercial aviation industry.
- Sustainable aviation fuel incentives and aircraft hydrogen fuel and electrification initiatives
- ATC privatization: The Trump Administration may revive an initiative from his first term, seeking to privatize the National Airspace System and eliminate the FAA air traffic control organization. Among other things, supporters of privatization argue that it could expedite modernization of air space management and long-awaited replacement of the nation’s air traffic control systems and technology.
Reciprocal tariffs imposed by other countries could have an acute effect on exports by US aircraft manufacturers.
FAA, aircraft, and airspace safety regulation
FAA is currently experiencing a shortage of air traffic controllers and aircraft safety inspectors; absent rapid privatization of those functions, hiring and retaining qualified personnel to alleviate those shortages may require more federal funding. DOT Secretary nominee Duffy emphasized the importance of aviation safety in his confirmation hearing and vowed to “ensure that our skies are safe.” At the same time, FAA has been criticized for delegating aircraft safety inspections to industry and perceived failings of air traffic systems and operations. Increased and improved FAA airworthiness oversight and ensuring air traffic safety may require more federal safety inspectors and air traffic controllers, which could be in tension with the Trump Administration’s broader goals of cutting federal spending and reducing the federal work force.
New aviation and aerospace technologies and advanced air mobility
FAA appears likely to advance policies and regulations to facilitate the commercial deployment of uncrewed air vehicles and systems (UAV and UAS), colloquially referred to as aviation “drones.” UAS have been widely deployed in military use for a number of years and have significant commercial potential in a number of civilian commercial applications, including certain freight transportation and delivery. The Biden Administration issued initial regulations to allow some use of drones, but its efforts were perceived by industry as proceeding too slowly and unnecessarily impeding deployment of a technology with significant commercial promise. The Trump FAA may take actions to expedite approval of the use of drones for commercial purposes.
Similarly, the FAA under Biden took initial steps toward modifying regulations to allow the broader use of electrical vertical take-off-and-landing aircraft (eVTOL), which do not require runways and other costly facilities needed for traditional aviation and may eventually be used as “air taxis” and in other commercial applications. See our alert. Helicopters are a type of VTOL that have existed for decades, but their cost and challenges of integrating them into airspace management (particularly in urban areas) and regulatory limitations have precluded their widespread use in commercial transportation of passengers or standard freight. Current technology (including potential for integration with UAS to allow use without human pilots) may reduce cost barriers to wider deployment of VTOL craft. The Trump Administration seems likely to continue, and perhaps seek to expedite, regulatory development to facilitate broader commercial use of VTOL.
Commercial space regulation
FAA is also responsible for commercial space regulation. President Trump strongly supports space exploration, and his inaugural speech endorsed a program to land humans on Mars. Several prominent and influential Trump supporters and policy advisors are also very interested in expanding commercial space flights (eg, to deploy and maintain earth orbit satellites and transport payloads), space exploration, and related private space flight opportunities. It thus appears that FAA and other government agencies will be encouraged to take actions designed to enable more commercial space flight and exploration.
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