Seyfarth Synopsis: In another high-profile religion school case this term, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses foreclosed the adjudication of employment-discrimination claims of two elementary school teachers at Roman Catholic schools. In interpreting the ministerial exception, the Court issued a decision that will provide welcome clarity for religious organizations as to their Constitutional rights to make employment decisions with respect to employees who are subject to the ministerial exception.
Ministerial Exception Background
Eight years ago, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Supreme Court unanimously recognized that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses preclude certain employment discrimination claims brought against religious organizations. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court held that an elementary school teacher’s employment claim against the religious school employer was barred under the “ministerial exception.” The underlying principle of this exception is that governments may not interfere with the internal workings of religious organizations. The Court specifically highlighted the teacher’s ministerial title, religious training, and her job duties that, taken together, reflected a role in conveying the message and mission of the religious institution. For more information on Hosanna-Tabor, please find our previous alert. Until this year, the Court did not have an occasion to decide whether the ministerial exception applied to employees who did not possess all four of the factors present in Hosanna-Tabor.
Our Lady of Guadalupe School Case Background
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and joined two separate cases brought by two elementary school teachers at Roman Catholic schools in the Los Angeles area who had filed separate federal employment discrimination suits against their respective religious employers, with one teacher alleging age discrimination for failure to renew her employment contract and the other alleging disability discrimination for termination following a request for a leave of absence to obtain treatment for breast cancer.
The District Court in each case granted summary judgment to the religious schools by holding that the discrimination claims were barred under the ministerial exception. However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed and found that neither teacher met the ministerial exception established in Hosanna-Tabor, in that one of the teachers did not have the formal title of “minister,” had limited formal religious training, and did not hold herself out publicly as a religious leader, and the other teacher lacked religious training and a ministerial background.
Supreme Court’s Opinion
In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Alito, the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit’s approach of treating the circumstances in Hosanna-Tabor as a rigid checklist of items assessed and weighed against each other: “[O]ur recognition of the significance of those factors in [Hosanna-Tabor] did not mean that they must be met — or even that they are necessarily important — in all other cases.”
Rather, the Court held that “[w]hat matters, at bottom is what an employee does.” For the majority opinion there was an implicit recognition in Hosanna-Tabor “that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious school.” Applying those principles to the case at hand, the Supreme Court noted that the teachers performed vital religious duties, including providing religion instruction, praying with the students, attending Mass with students, and preparing the children for other religious activities. Furthermore, the schools saw the teachers as playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the church, and, according to the majority, “the schools’ definition and explanation of their roles is important.” Notably the Court did not require any particularly rigid religious academic requirements for a teacher to fall within the ministerial exception, noting that “[t]eaching children in elementary school does not demand the same formal religious education as teaching theology to divinity students. Elementary school teachers often teach secular subjects in which they have little if any special training.” In all, the Supreme Court held that the ministerial exception did apply to the facts presented and foreclosed the employment actions.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas (who was joined by Justice Gorsuch) wrote separately to reiterate his view that the First Amendment requires courts “to defer to religious organizations’ good-faith claims that a certain employee’s position is ‘ministerial.’” In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor (who was joined by Justice Ginsburg) took issue with the majority’s approach of distilling Hosanna-Tabor into a single question: whether a religious institution thinks its employees play an important religious role.
Moving forward, courts interpreting federal law will have to operate under a broader understanding of the “ministerial exception” and provide far more deference to the explanations of religious employers as to their employees’ roless.
Applicability to State and City Anti-Discrimination Laws
The Supreme Court’s decision in Our Lady clearly broadens the extent to which the First Amendment’s ministerial exception shields religious institutions from employment discrimination claims under federal anti-discrimination laws. State and local laws are likewise constrained by the protections of the First Amendment, and therefore must provide for similar exceptions.
In New York, for example, both the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) expressly prohibit all employers from discriminating against employees based on a variety of protected characteristics. Yet, both laws provide similarly broad exemptions for religious institutions to: (1) provide preferential employment treatment to persons of the same religion or denomination; or (2) take actions that are “calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained.” See N.Y. Executive Law § 296(11); N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-107(12). Courts interpreting these statutes will need to ensure that they are consistent with the First Amendment and the ministerial exception now fully-embraced by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, following this religious-friendly decision by the Supreme Court, a religious school in New York City now has broad liberty under federal, state, and city law to take employment actions against employees who, for example, do not share the religious views and values of the religious employer.
Employer Takeaways
With the Supreme Court’s blessing, religious institutions should begin to revisit whether their employees could be covered under the ministerial exception. Seyfarth lawyers are available to assist employers with this determination.
