According to “SEC No Action Statistics to May 1, 2024” from the Shareholder Rights Group, this proxy season, the SEC staff “has nearly doubled the number of exclusions” of shareholder proposals compared with 2023; that is, relative to the prior year, the staff has issued almost twice the number of letters indicating that it would not recommend enforcement action if the company excluded the proposal from its proxy statement. While that surge reflects primarily a “sharp increase” in the number of requests for no-action filed by companies, importantly, the article indicates that it also reflects an increase in the relative proportion of no-action requests granted. From November 1, 2023 to May 1, 2024, the article reports, the SEC has granted company requests for no-action regarding shareholder proposals about 68% of the time (excluding requests withdrawn), compared with 56% at the same point last year. Notably, the article reports, that percentage (68%) is fairly comparable to the average exclusion rate (69%) during the prior administration (2017 to 2020). Since the issuance of SLB 14L in 2021, the staff has come in for criticism for applying a revised approach to evaluating no-action requests that some market participants considered perhaps a bit too generous to proponents of proposals, leading to an excess of overly prescriptive proposals presented at shareholder meetings. As the article suggests, has this criticism led to a moderation of that approach?
The Shareholder Rights Group describes itself as “an association of investors formed to defend the shareowner’s right to engage with public companies on governance, corporate accountability and long-term value creation.”
According to the article, as of May 1, the staff had made 259 decisions (203 excluding withdrawals) on requests for no action, compared to 167 (135 excluding withdrawals) as of the same date in the prior year. This year, the staff has granted no-action relief related to 139 proposals compared with 76 last year.
This season, the article observes, “micromanagement” appears to be a frequent argument that has been successfully used in favor of excluding proposals regarding both climate and social topics.
To illustrate, the article identified two categories of climate proposal where a micromanagement argument was persuasive to the staff in determining no-action relief: proposals seeking a breakdown of greenhouse gas emissions by category of product sold, and proposals seeking “disclosure of the proportion of sector emissions attributable to clients not aligned with a credible Net Zero pathway.” According to the article, the proponents of these proposals contended that the disclosures would reveal “material shortcomings of the companies’ climate transition plans,” a topic of concern to many mainstream investors. However, the staff viewed the proposals to be micromanaging by requesting information that was too granular.
A social proposal identified in the article relating to “union suppression” activities requested disclosure of “both internal and external expenditures made for union suppression,” as well as various details surrounding unionization and collective bargaining activities. The staff issued a no-action letter stating that there was some basis to agree that the proposal involved micromanagement. With regard to social proposals related to a “living wage,” whether the staff issued a no-action response depended largely on how the proposal was framed. In one instance described in the article, a proposal regarding compliance with human rights standards and income inequality concerns asked for data regarding the number of workers “paid less than a living wage, broken down by full-time employees, part-time employees, and contingent workers with additional analytics on how much the aggregate compensation falls short of living wage.” The staff issued no-action relief on the basis of micromanagement. However, in other proposals requesting that the board “exercise its fiduciary duty to provide employees with a living wage,” the staff declined to issue no-action relief; according to the article, the proponent framed the proposal as an important social issue—the “impact on the whole economy due to failure to pay employees a living wage, placing additional burden on taxpayer funded social support programs.”
The article concludes that issuers and other market participants should be relieved that the staff has apparently heard and responded to their concerns about overly granular shareholder proposals: the results for this proxy season “should demonstrate that the SEC staff takes feedback from the market in its exclusion decision-making, and that the process remains a functional system for screening proposals.” However, the article makes a plea for companies not to seek exclusion of proposals on important issues: “many of the proponents whose proposals were excluded had provided evidence that the proposal targeted a material issue for the receiving companies; exclusion of proposals often represents a serious setback for investors seeking to voice or vote upon critical matters of risk management or governance. Companies wishing to remain dynamic and responsive to their investors should consider the critical feedback and monitoring of potentially costly strategic shortcomings that is lost when a shareholder proposal is excluded.”
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