A statement of undisputed facts, submitted in support of a summary judgment motion, cannot be used against the moving party at trial as an admission. (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 747-748.) These Undisputed Material Facts are set forth for purposes of this motion only. Because in a summary judgment motion the CDCR cannot dispute Plaintiff's evidence, Plaintiff's allegations in his discovery responses, deposition and complaint are included as "undisputed material facts." By including such allegations within this statement, CDCR in no way agrees that these allegations accurately state what actually occurred. CDCR reserves its right to present evidence challenging Plaintiff's allegations at trial. (See id.)

Please note that for ease of reference below, all names and sources of evidence which are abbreviated have been highlighted in **bold** where they are first referenced and abbreviated.

ISSUE NO. 1: The first cause of action for discrimination and retalitation is without merit. Plaintiff alleges exactly the same conduct as grounds for retalitation, discrimination and harassment. (e.g., see FAC, pp. 39-40, ¶¶ 52-59, Ex. H to Request for Judicial Notice); so to avoid wasting paper, the same list of material facts will not be restated separetly for the first and second causes of action.

UNDISPUTED FACTS AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

1. Plaintiff David P. Tristan, Jr. ("Plaintiff" or "Agent Tristan" or "Tristan") has been employed by the California Department of Corrections ("CDCR") since 1992 and became a Correctional Officer in 1995. He worked at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego until he attended the Parole Agent Academy in the early 2000s. He became a Parole Agent I in the Chula Vista office of Region IV Parole Division of CDCR in 2003.

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1	Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint	
2	[hereinafter 1st Am. Compl.], ¶ 10 (attached to the Request for Judicial Notice	
3	[hereinafter, "RJN"] as Ex. H).	
4.	2. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action purports to	
5	state Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") claims for discrimination and	
6	retaliation in one cause of action. His Second Cause of Action alleges that he was subjected	
7	to harassment under the FEHA.	
8	Plaintiff alleges that CDCR engaged in	
9.	discrimination, harassment and retaliation against him in violation of FEHA when CDCR	
10	engaged in a litany of trivial personnel actions including such allegations as he was unable to	·
11	log into his computer for a short period of time, his supervisors did not submit his workers'	•
12	compensation paperwork quickly enough, he	
13	was required to work overtime to complete his caseload, he was required to cancel a vacation	
14	because the unit was short staffed, he was offered the opportunity to transfer to a different	
15	unit, and he was required to serve as officer of	
16.	the day on the day of the fires in San Diego in October, 2007. Plaintiff also alleges that CDCR	
17	failed to adequately assist him in obtaining workers' compensation benefits and filing a	
18	workers' compensation claim, failed to accurately document the incident leading to his	
19	injury, instituting an internal affairs investigation and allegedly not allowing him to	
20	return to work in a light duty capacity in a	,
21	timely manner.	
22	Plaintiff's 2008 allegations involve his claim CDCR failed to negotiate an acceptable "Light"	
23	Duty Agreement" with him when he returned to work in a limited capacity in 2008.	
24	Deposition of Plaintiff David P. Tristan, Jr.	
25	["Tristan Depo."] Vol. I, pp. 63:20-65:1 (attached to Declaration of Elizabeth Vann	
26	["Vann Decl."] as Ex. A); Vol. III, 479:6- 481:9; Exhibits 3 and 4 (Vann Decl., Ex. C)	
27	1st Am. Compl., ¶¶12, 20, 39, 47-50, 52-59	
28	(RJN, Ex. H).	
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1	Plaintiff's Amended Response to Special Interrogatories ["Am. Resp. to Spec. Rogs"]	
2	Nos. 16, 19 (Vann Decl., Ex. K).	
3	Plaintiff's Amended Responses to Employment Form Interrogatories ["Am.	
4 5	Resp. to Form Rogs"], No. 202.1(a) pp. 3:3-17, 5:208, No. 202.1(c), p. 23:9-24, No.	
6	203.1(b) p. 60:13-24 (Vann Decl., Ex. I).	
7	3. The primary role of a Parole Agent assigned to a Field Unit is to supervise a caseload of	
8	parolees and early released inmates. A Parole Agent is required to perform a variety of peace	
9	officer duties that are both physical and administrative in nature.	
10	The job functions of a Parole Agent include	
11	working directly with parolees and releasees, as well as their friends, relatives, community	
12	service agencies and law enforcement to arrange for various necessary services. Parole	
13	Agents also continually monitor and verify an individual's participation in release programs	
14	and parole requirements. Where parole	
15	violation or criminal activity is alleged or suspected, an Agent's caseload supervisory	
16	responsibilities include conducting interviews, surveillance, searches and seizure,	
17	apprehensions and arrests.	
18	In order to perform these tasks, the essential functions of a Parole Agent require Agents to	·
19	be able to defend themselves against an armed,	
20	dangerous, and violent parolee and engage in prolonged standing or walking, climbing,	
21	bending, stooping, squatting, kneeling, pivoting, or lifting more than ten pounds.	
22	Castaneda Decl., ¶6; Garcia Decl., ¶2.	
23	4 Di CO 11	
24	4. Plaintiff's problems with his employment with CDCR began on October 21, 2005, when	·
25	he suffered a knee injury after he pursued and arrested an escaping parolee on foot.	
26		
27	Plaintiff reported to work on Monday, October 24, 2005 with a visibly swollen right knee.	
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2	As a result of the injury, Plaintiff filed a	
3	Workers' Compensation claim on or about October 25, 2005. On Tuesday, October 25,	
4	2010, Plaintiff was provided with the	
5	appropriate State Compensation Insurance Fund ("SCIF") forms, filled out his portion,	
6	and turned them in to Defendant Garcia, who	
	returned the completed forms to Plaintiff on the same day. These forms were received by the	
7	Return to Work Coordinator's office on October 26, 2005 and provided to the SCIF that	
8	day.	
9		
10	1st Am. Compl., ¶¶13-16, 22 (RJN, Ex. H);	·
11	Tristan Depo., Vol. I, pp. 115:14-21; 117:5-12; 138:1-140:13 (Vann Decl., Ex. A);	
12	Declaration of A.J. Garcia [hereinafter Garcia Decl.] ¶5; Declaration of Martha	
13	Castaneda [hereinafter "Castaneda Decl."]	
14	¶5.	
15	5. On October 28, 2005, the return to work office was notified of activity restrictions	•
16	imposed by Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Markman, including no jumping, twisting, or	
17	involvement in altercations for 21 days.	
18	Because Plaintiff's doctor was restricting him	
	from performing some of the essential functions required of a Parole Agent, Plaintiff	
19	was placed on temporary disability leave on or about October 28, 2005.	
20	Prior to this date, Plaintiff was not aware of the	
21	distinction between Industrial Disability	
22	Leave ("IDL") and Enhanced Industrial Disability Leave ("EIDL") and did not know	,
23	that he would receive additional pay if he qualified for EIDL.	
24	quantities for Expl.	
25	1st Am. Compl., ¶22; Castaneda Decl., ¶8,	
26	Exhibit D; Garcia Decl., ¶7; Tristan Depo., Vol. I, pp. 153:1-23; 156:11-157:25 (Vann	
27	Decl., Ex. A).	
28	6. Initially there was a dispute as to whether	
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1	Plaintiff's injury qualified for EIDL as opposed to ordinary IDL.	
2	Under IDL, an employee is entitled to receive	•
3	their full normal pay for the first 22 working days following an employee's injury and two-	
4	thirds gross monthly salary for the remaining	
5	period, during which time the employee can supplement with leave credits to receive full	
6	normal pay.	:
7	In contrast, under EIDL, an employee receives	
8	the equivalent of their net take home salary tax free for up to one year, but specific eligibility	
9	requirements apply. Pursuant to CDCR's	
10	Department Operations Manual, a Parole Agent is eligible to receive EIDL when injured on the	
11	job as a result of an assault or criminal act of violence by a parolee.	
12	Castaneda Decl., ¶ 9; Fowler Decl., ¶5.	
13	7. Initially, Return to Work Coordinator	
14	Martha Castaneda believed Plaintiff's injury did not qualify for EIDL, because the	•
15	information available to her indicated the injury was sustained when Plaintiff jumped a fence,	
16	rather than as a result of a violent contact with a parolee.	
17	Subsequently, Plaintiff informed Castaneda that	
18	violent contact with the parolee was involved in the arrest when he had the parolee in a prone	
19	position on the ground and had to place his	
20	right knee on the parolee's back to get the subject to release his hands to be handcuffed.	,
21	Castaneda was aware that the scenario described by Plaintiff would constitute a	•
22	reportable use of force, and such a use of force	
23	would be required to be documented in a Field Incident Report. However, in this case no Field	
24	Incident Report had been submitted documenting this alleged altercation. In	
25	addition, Castaneda did not believe the conduct Plaintiff described met the requirement of the	
26	policy of violent contact or an assault, because	
27	the parolee was not assaulting Plaintiff. Castaneda informed Plaintiff that she did not	
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1	believe this information qualified him for	
2	EIDL, but that she would review any additional documentation he provided in support of his	
3	request.	
4	Castaneda Decl., ¶¶10, 11.	, .
ļ	8. Plaintiff's claim for EIDL benefits was	
5	approved by Parole Administrator Jeff Fagot on January 12, 2006, retroactively approving	
6	EIDL back to October 21, 2005. Accordingly, as a result of this determination, Plaintiff was	•
7	awarded EIDL benefits for his October 2005	·
8	injury, entitling him to 100% of his pay during his disability period, for up to one year.	
9	Plaintiff received his backpay EIDL benefits retroactively from October, 2005 – January,	
10	2006.	
11	Plaintiff had surgery on his knee in May or	
12	June of 2006. Plaintiff requested and received a six month extension of his EIDL benefits in	
13	or about October, 2006. Between the time of his injury on October 25, 2005 and January,	·
14	2008 Plaintiff was paid either through EIDL	
15	benefits or regular salary. He is not aware of any lost income during this time.	
16	Plaintiff has been employed continuously since	
17	that time and has never been demoted or transferred at any time in his employment with	
18	CDCR.	
19	Castaneda Decl., ¶13; Fowler Decl., ¶10.	
20	Tristan Depo., Vol. II, pp. 203:6-204:8 (Vann Decl., Ex. B); Tristan Depo., Vol. III, pp.	
21	449:3 – 20, Ex. 19 (Vann Decl., Ex. A); Tristan	
22	Depo., Vol. III, pp. 449: 21-24; 464:1-13; 465:25-466:1 (Vann Decl., Ex. C); Vol. VII,	
23	pp. 1133:19-1134:16 (Vann Decl., Ex. G Am. Resp. to Form Rogs, No. 201 (Vann Decl., Exs.	
24	H and I).	
25	9. In December 2005, the CDCR instituted an	
26	Internal Affairs Investigation, with respect to Plaintiff, Parole Agent I Larry Ferguson, and	
27	Parole Agent II Michael Ayala, to investigate the unreported use of force incident on October	
28	21, 2005, which incident was the basis for	
<u>ب</u>		7

Separate Stmt. Of Undisputed Material Facts ISO Motion For Summary Judgment (37-2009-00075534-CU-OE-SC)

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1 -	Plaintiff's EIDL claim.	
2	Declaration of Tim Fowler (hereinafter, "Fowler Decl."), ¶6, Ex. A; Tristan Depo. Vol.	
3	IV, pp. 523:17 – 524:13, 525:21-526:14, Ex. 25 (Vann Decl., Ex. D).	
4	,	
5	10. Assistant Parole Administrator Tim Fowler	, i
6	recommended recommend an investigation be instituted because of questions regarding	
7	Plaintiffs attempt to get improved EIDL benefits, including that Plaintiff had now	
8	alleged his injury was due to his use of physical force to handcuff the parolee, but had not	
9	submitted an Incident Report documenting any use of force within 24 hours of the incident as	
0	required by CDCR policy. Moreover, Plaintiff	
1 2	had allegedly provided different versions of the events surrounding his injury to other	
3	employees. In addition, there were concerns that Plaintiff's Assistant Unit Supervisor,	
4	Parole Agent II Michael Ayala may have told Plaintiff not to file a report documenting the	
5	use of force.	
6	Fowler also was concerned that Plaintiff and other Parole Agents may have failed to follow	
7	CDCR's use of force reporting procedures. Fowler had been informed that Plaintiff's	
8	Assistant Unit Supervisor, Parole Agent II Michael Ayala, allegedly told Plaintiff not to	
9	file a report documenting the use of force. As a	
20	result, Fowler requested this investigation to determine whether not only whether Plaintiff,	
21	but also whether Agents Ferguson and Ayala had engaged in any misconduct in connection	
22	with this incident.	
23	Fowler Decl., ¶5-6, Ex. A.	
24	11. The investigation was conducted by the Office of Internal Affairs and resulted in a	
25	finding that no misconduct had been sustained. In May 2006, Regional Administrator Fagot	
26	notified Plaintiff in accordance with CDCR policy that the allegations against him were not	
27	sustained, and no action would be taken as a result of the investigation.	
28	result of the investigation.	
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1 2 3 4 5 6	At all times during the course of the investigation, the period of review, and following disposition, Plaintiff continued in his position as a Parole Agent I and there was no adverse affect on his salary, benefits and employment status as a result of the investigation. Fowler Decl., ¶¶7-8, Ex. B. Tristan Depo., Vol. IV, pp. 525:21-526:14; 526:19-527:5; 531:8-14, Exs. 25 and 26 (Vann Decl., Ex. D).	
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	12. CDCR policy required an investigation of alleged misconduct to be completed within one year of the discovery of the alleged misconduct, and it often took a full year before an investigation was officially resolved. In this matter, the investigation was completed in January 2006 and the CDCR finished its decision making process and notified Plaintiff that the investigation was concluded in May 2006. Since the investigation was requested in November 2005 relating to an October 2005 incident, the investigation was completed and the matter resolved within the one year period in accordance with CDCR policy.	
ļ	Fowler Decl., ¶9, Ex. B.	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	13. In October 2005, Parole Region IV did not permit Parole Agents who could not perform all of the essential functions of the position to work in a light duty capacity with some of the essential functions being temporarily waived. This policy was based on a July 12, 2005 memorandum issued by Jim L'Etoile, the then Acting Deputy Director of CDCR's Division of Adult Parole Operatoins ("DAPO") which explained that the essential job functions of Parole Agents could not be waived due to medical limitations because Parole Agents were required to be physically capable of performing the required functions of their jobs at all times. This policy remained in effect in Parole Region IV at the time of Plaintiff's injury in October of 2005. Castaneda Decl., ¶7, Ex. "C".	
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1	14. Plaintiff was on disability leave from	
2	October 28, 2005 through January 16, 2007.	Į.
3	On January 10, 2007, Plaintiff faxed a copy of medical documentation signed by Dr. Hanson	
4	which indicated that as of that date, he could perform "office duty" and could work 8-hour	
5	shifts. Because the note did not actually indicate whether Plaintiff could return to work	
6	as a Parole Agent, and did not state what his	
7	restrictions were, if any, Castaneda directed the return to work coordinator, Farida Hanna, to	
8	ask Agent Tristan to have his doctor provide clarification. On January 11, 2007, Plaintiff	
9	provided medical documentation to Castaneda	
10	from Dr. Hanson indicating he could return to work on modified (light) activity, with the	
11	following restrictions: "Office duty; Hours 8-5:00; no altercations with parolees; no	
12	ransportation of parolees." Plaintiff did not request light duty at any time before January	
13	10, 2007.	
14.	Castaneda Decl., ¶¶9, 14 and 17, Exs. "F" and "G".	
15	15. Initially Castaneda denied Plaintiff's light	
16	duty request based on the no-light-duty policy articulated by Jim L'Etoile (Castaneda Decl.,	
17	Ex. "C") but shortly thereafter she was notified	·
18	that Region IV of DAPO had changed its position based on input from CDCR	
19	Headquarters. Starting in January 2007 and continuing to the present it has been Region	·
20	IV's policy to provide light duty assignments to Parole Agents who cannot perform the essential	
21	functions of their position for a limited duration	
22	as operational needs allow, but for a period not to exceed 60 days. These assignments are	
23	individually assessed by the Hiring Authority in light of the operational needs of the affected	
24	employee's facility, institution, or region.	·
25	Castaneda Decl. ¶16, Ex. "H".	
26	16. Based on this change, Plaintiff was permitted to return to work in a limited term	
27	light duty assignment effective on or about January 16, 2007.	
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1	Castaneda Decl., ¶17; Garcia Decl. ¶10, Ex. D.	
2	Tristan Depo., Vol. II, pp. 217:6-9 (Vann Decl., Ex. B).	
4	17. Between July 12, 2005 and the time	
5	Plaintiff returned to work on limited term light duty in January 2007, Parole Region IV did not waive the essential functions of the Parole	
6	Agent position, or allow any other Parole Agent to return to work in a light duty capacity.	
7	Castaneda Decl., ¶17.	
8	18. Agents Garcia and Ayala worked together to determine appropriate assignments for	
9	Plaintiff while he was on Limited Term Light Duty, and Plaintiff was not assigned an	,
11	excessive workload between January, 2007 and March, 2007.	
12	Garcia Decl., ¶¶12-16, Exs. D-F.	
13	Declaration of Michael Ayala ["Ayala Decl."], ¶9-14, Exs. C-D.	
14	19. On or about March 5, 2007, Castaneda	
15	received a medical note from Dr. Hanson, dated March 5, 2007, informing her that as of March 6, 2007, Plaintiff could return to work as a	
16 17	Parole Agent I with no restrictions. On this basis, Plaintiff was medically cleared to return	
18	to full duty. Plaintiff was cleared by CDCR to	
19	return to performing field work after he completed his then-lapsed firearms certification	
20	and Parole Agent Safety Training on March 13, 2007.	
21	Castaneda Decl., ¶18, Ex. "I"; Ayala Decl., ¶16.	
22	20. In or around early April 2007, Fowler	
23	became aware that Plaintiff was alleging his supervisor, Agent Michael Ayala, had	
24	subjected him to a "disparate treatment/hostile work environment." Because Fowler	
25	associated these terms with complaints of	
26	discrimination or harassment, he believed Plaintiff may have intended to implicate Equal	
27	Opportunity issues, and forwarded his complaint to the CDCR's Office of Civil Rights	
28	for intake.	
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1	Fowler Decl., ¶11, Ex. C.	
2	21. Administrator Fowler considered	
3	separating Plaintiff and Agent Ayala during the	•
ار	pendency of the investigation by transferring one of them to a different unit, but determined	
4	it would not be necessary. Since the complaint	
5	did not involve abusive language, inappropriate	
6	touching, or threats of violence, Fowler felt that the subjects about which Plaintiff complained,	
7	which included alleged excessive work load,	•
	denials of overtime, and vacation leave did not	
8	warrant imposing a transfer on either employee. Fowler was also aware that Plaintiff was	
9	unwilling to transfer out of the Chula Vista	
10	office and Ayala's removal from Unit 1 would have disrupted its functioning at that time	
	because his services were required in order to	•
11	cover the former duties of Parole Agent III	
12	Garcia who had recently retired.	
13	Fowler Decl., ¶12.	
14	22. In support of his whistleblowing retaliation	
	claim, Plaintiff alleges that he reported to Maritza Rodriguez in a letter dated March 13,	
15	2007 that he was being assigned an excessive	•
16	workload after returning to work on light duty in January, 2007. He subsequently made	
17	complaints to her that his workload upon return	
18	to full duty in March, 2007 was also excessive.	•
	Tristan Depo., Vol. V, 710:19 –711:6, 772:13-	
19	774:19, 775:24-777:22, depo Exs. 30, 33 and 34 (Vann Decl., Ex. E).	
20		
21	23. The workload provided to Plaintiff when he returned to work in January 2007 was	•
	assigned for legitimate, nondiscriminatory	
22	reasons. Prior to Plaintiff's return to work on	
23	light duty on January 17, 2007, Garcia and Ayala discussed how to assign an equitable	
24	workload to Plaintiff upon his return to Unit #1.	
25	Plaintiff was not permitted to perform any field duties, requiring other Agents in the unit to	
	spend additional hours in the field. In an effort	
26	to balance job responsibilities, Plaintiff was	
27	assigned as the OD on a daily basis, allowing the other Agents to spend more time in the	
28	field. Plaintiff was also given Unit #1's	
•		12
	Separate Stmt Of Undisputed Material Facts ISO Motion	For Summary Judgment (37-2009-00075534-CU-OE-SC

		·
1	Release Program Studies ("RPS" or "pre-	
2	paroles"), and a caseload which is represented on the February, 2005 Caseload Roster for	
3	Plaintiff. This was expected to be a temporary workload assignment since Plaintiff was	
4	expected to return to full duty within 60 days and the requirements could be completed	
5	within the office and while Plaintiff was performing OD duties.	,
6	Ayala Decl., ¶¶9-13, Ex. C.	
7	Garcia Decl., ¶9-14, Ex. D.	
8	24. Each assigned caseload carries a	·
9	numerical workload point value and the caseload assigned to Plaintiff while on light	
10	duty carried a point value of 141. This was well below the highest workload in the unit of 154	
11	and met the union contract requirements that all Agent's workloads be within 20 points of one	
12	another.	
13	Ayala Decl., ¶14, Ex. D.	
14	Garcia Decl., ¶15, Ex. F.	
15	25. Plaintiff was not counseled or disciplined, or the subject of any other adverse action, for	
16	not completing all assigned work while on light duty.	,
17		•
18	Ayala Decl., ¶16.	
19	26. The workload provided to Plaintiff by Acting Unit Supervisor Tryna Woods and	
20	Ayala when Plaintiff returned to full duty in March 2007 was assigned for legitimate,	
21	nondiscriminatory reasons as soon as he	
22	completed lapsed training required to permit him to return to field work. Plaintiff's newly	
23	assigned caseload carried a workload of 194 points, which was within 20 points of the	
	lowest agent workload in the unit of 180 points,	
24	as required by the governing union contract.	
25	Ayala Decl., ¶16-17, Ex. E.	
26	27. Plaintiff's new caseload assigned in mid- March, 2007, is reflected in the March 28, 2007	
27	Caseload Roster for Plaintiff and was designed	
28	to allow for many of his cases to develop over	
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1 2	time from the pre-parole status so that he would be familiar with the case prior to a parolee's	
3	release and could supervise the parolee from the beginning. It was also designed with the	
4	knowledge that the requirements of some of the assigned cases had already been met by other	
5	Agents, or by Plaintiff, while he was on light	
6	duty, and would not require additional work in March. Additionally, the required work was	,
7	waived for March, April and May on 25 of the assigned cases, which represented 48 of	
	Plaintiff's workload points (or 38 % of his active cases), allowing additional time for	,
8	Plaintiff to get up to speed and get these cases	
9	back in compliance. Ayala Decl., ¶¶18-21, Ex. F.	
10	28. Plaintiff was not counseled or disciplined,	
11	or the subject of any other adverse action, for	
12	not completing all assigned work in the new caseload assigned to him in March 2007.	
13	Ayala Decl., ¶22.	·
14	29. Ayala's denial of Plaintiff's request	
15	demand to leave his OD coverage early at 11 a.m. on March 13, 2007, to allow him to have	,
16	an hour for lunch and an hour for driving to his scheduled 1 p.m. training, as well as the denial	
17	of a 1/2 hour of overtime to drive to training,	
18	was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Plaintiff had previously been	
19	scheduled as the OD from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m., had ample notication of this schedule, and	
20	needed only half an hour to drive to the training	
21	location approximately 19 miles away. This allowed for a half-hour lunch break and the	
22	denial of overtime was something that Plaintiff was permitted to appeal thereafter through the	·
23	grievance process. Additionally, permitting	
24	Tristan to leave early would have adversely affected another Agent in the Unit.	·
25	Ayala Decl., ¶22, Ex. G.	
26	30. On December 26, 2007, Ayala promoted to	
27	Parole Agent III and was then assigned to his current position as the of Chula Vista Unit	
28	#IV, thus having no more responsibilities over	
		14 n For Summary Judgment (37-2009-00075534-CU-OE-SC)
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1	Unit #I or the Agents assigned thereto. Unit Supervisor Garcia retired February 2007.	
2	Ayala Decl., ¶ 1; Garcia Decl., ¶1.	
3	31. Plaintiff made requests for Employee Opportunity Transfers ("EOT") to a Field Unit	
4	Notice Agent ("FUNA") position in San Diego	
5	County in 2006 and 2007. There was only one vacancy for a FUNA Parole Agent I located	
6	within San Diego County that was filled via the EOT process in these years. This selection was	
7	made by Plaintiff's union, which selected an Agent with greater seniority than Plaintiff and	
8	Region IV Parole did not have input into this	
9	selection.	
10	Castaneda Decl., ¶ 22.	
11	Tristan Depo., Vol. V, pp. 710:22-711:9; 789:2-12; Exs. 30 and 35 (Vann Decl., Exh. E).	
12	32. After Plaintiff voluntarily relinquished his	
13	scheduled vacation in April, 2007, it was re- offered to him by his Acting Unit Supervisor	
14	and Regional District Administrator but he declined.	
15	Tristan Depo., Vol. V, pp. 775:24-777:22; Ex.	
16	34 (Vann Decl., Exh. E).	
17	33. In January 2008, Plaintiff re-injured his knee when he jumped down a set of fire escape	
18	stairs in the course of pursuing and	
19	apprehending a parolee. 1st Am. Compl., ¶48 (RJN Ex. H).	
20	34. On February 5, 2008, Return to Work	
21	Coordinator Cheyenne De Leon received paperwork relating to Plaintiff's injury of	
22	January 28, 2008, including the Employee's Claim (SCIF 3301), Employer's Report (SCIF	
23	3067), and a note by Dr. Peter Hanson dated January 30, 2008 indicating that Plaintiff could	
24	return to work with modified (light) activity	
25	restricted to semi-sedentary work. De Leon submitted this paperwork to SCIF on February	
26	7, 2008 to initiate the processing of Plaintiff's claim.	
27	Declaration of Cheyenne De Leon	
28	(hereinafter, "De Leon Decl."), ¶4, Exh. A.	
		15 CH OF GOV