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Research proposal

Introduction

This research proposal is situated in the United States' policy-making realm of international relations, specifically towards conflict resolution through economic sanctions of the 1992 Yugoslavian (Serbia and Montenegro) war. There has been a lot of literature and research conducted in the hegemony of the United States (Keohane, 1984) and effectiveness of sanctions on nations (Drezner, 1999). However, my proposal seeks to look more specifically at the cooperation within the United States Department of State and other entities involved in deliberation and creation of sanctions. Since it is commonly realized that sanctions in the Yugoslavian conflict played a large role in creating a resolution, (Rogers, 1996) it is important to discover how policy makers reached an agreement, or lack thereof, to apply sanctions and what the process included. The Yugoslavian conflict was chosen because it was one of the first internationally addressed conflicts after the fall of the Soviet Union, when sanctions started to play a larger role in public diplomacy.

This research is important because it will allow people to discover and understand why sanctions are applied to some countries as opposed to others. There is a lot of mystery surrounding international politics. This proposal will attempt to clear up some of the misconceptions and misunderstandings. It will also give an inside theory as to what officials today are contemplating as sanctions are considered and applied to countries such as North Korea and Iran for nuclear proliferation, Syria for violence against humanity, and many others.

To discover how the thinkers behind sanctions came to their resolution in the Yugoslavian conflict, I will start my search by interviewing and surveying officials from the State Department. From there I will try and gain more leads from others who participated from within the Clinton Administration, and Congress as well. I want to particularly examine the consensus among the State Department and other departments within the Administration, the Administration's goals and proposals, and the reaction from Congress.

Past Research

There has been much research done on the effects of sanctions on countries by Hufbauer (1990), Schott (1990), Elliot (1990), Drezner (1999), Keohane (1984), Martin (1992) and many other scholars. There is a gap of research conducted on how the process of creation and deliberation of sanctions occurs internally. Keohane has done a lot of work and research into developing international relations and cooperatively applying sanctions on a country. I found this useful in learning what steps are taken normally in the formulation of sanctions. Drezner's book, *The Sanctions Paradox* (1999), provides evidence of the theory that sanctions against allies have a much larger effect than those on adversaries. Obviously Milosevic was a former Soviet Union ally, so it had a rocky relationship with the United States. If we agree with Rogers's analysis that sanctions had an effect on Yugoslavia, this situation is somewhat contrary to Drezner's theory.

Keohane's *After Hegemony* (1984) explores an intricate investigation into the logic of international cooperation (Buzan, 1985). While this theory was considered much needed and overdue at the time of publication, it does not zero in on the process of creating sanctions and demonstrating the extreme difficulties of coming to a consensus by all the stakeholders in the process. Keohane does, however, argue that cooperation exists naturally when self-interest is common between agencies and nations. The proposed research will see if this theory holds true

through one of the most successful sanctions campaigns the United States has engaged in, the Yugoslavian conflict.

Martin's *Coercive Cooperation* (1992) is one of the first books to truly examine how countries cooperate in the formulation of sanctions. She theorizes that the United States was gaining more support for economic sanctions just prior to the Yugoslavian conflict than it had in the past. This is somewhat contrary to what most hegemonic stability theorists were considering the case. As the Yugoslavian conflict and other conflicts played out, we could see that Martin's theory held true until more recent years of the Middle Eastern conflicts.

Context

During May and June of 1992, the United States in cooperation with the United Nations imposed aid, trade and financial sanctions on Yugoslavia. The United States did not want an independent Bosnian nation included in a resolution, which led to a very uncompromising stance. If the Clinton Administration had a more pragmatic view from the beginning, then there probably would have been a resolution prior to the Dayton accord in late 1995. While the airstrike campaign that NATO led undoubtedly had an impact on Milosevic coming to the negotiation table, there is also evidence to support the theory that the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did play a major role as well. The sanctions caused hyperinflation to an unprecedented level and isolated the country economically. It could be argued that the bombing campaign was merely the straw to break the camel's back. Because sanctions were thought to have an impact on the conflict, officials most likely knew they were going to be making a difference and had a clear objective. This, opposed to merely trying to signify their opposition to Yugoslav policies, made Yugoslavia a good choice for this proposal.

Another advantage of this case is that many questions can be derived from it. The Clinton Administration received a lot of criticism for not acting earlier to stop the conflict; did the formulators of sanctions within the Administration believe that sanctions would be enough to truly stop the genocide, rape and conflict that engulfed the region? Were officials in the State Department on the same page as those in the Defense Department? Did Congress try to involve itself, as it so often does, in the policy formulation? Did it threaten oversight onto the process? Once the United States came up with its policy, was there conflict with the UN? All of these are questions that will be answered in the research.

Research Design

The proposed research is a process trace that includes snowballing to gather more informants and details. It will examine the relationship within the State Department, Defense Department, and others if it is found necessary upon further investigation. It will also include what exactly was happening within the Administration's top officials, if that information presents itself. Finally, I will examine whether Congress tried to insert themselves into the process.

The proposal will examine and research these relationships primarily through interviews and surveys of the interviewed. The survey questions asked will be open-ended questions to allow for information gathering of all kinds. The goal will be to compare narratives from different officials to see if they conflict or coincide and get different perspectives. Comparing the different narratives may present difficulties, as they may be autonomous of each other; however, the main goal is information gathering. Comparing stories is merely to verify for truth and reliability of the survey answers.

The selection the officials interviewed will be the most challenging aspect of the proposed research. The strategy will be to start with some top figures formerly in the State Department. Madeleine Albright will be invited to participate in the survey; however, it is unlikely she agrees to participate. From there, Assistant Secretaries of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Thomas Niles and Raymond Seitz, will be contacted. Seitz was in the position until October of 1991, and Niles succeeded him through the imposition of sanctions on Yugoslavia through April of 1993. Both men had relatively short tenures as Assistant Secretaries, so it will be interesting to discover the reasons of why they parted from the Department of State. From here, the process will be to contact the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, working down the ladder through the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the region Yugoslavia was considered to be located at the time, the Senior Advisor, and finally the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe. Of course, I will be contacting and surveying the officials that all were serving in the positions within the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs during the crisis, or within a close timeframe.

While interviewing these candidates, they will be asked and listened to for other names that come up during the process. Names that are indicated to be involved in the sanction development process will be recorded and pursued for interviewing and questioning as well. By doing this there will be a web created, growing from the Department of State officials. This will provide many people to survey and many different views to be considered. If the web grows too large, there will be a limit of fifty people total that will be surveyed due to time and money constraints. To ensure that all incorporated groups are included, there may have to be a limit to how many officials from each group, bureau, or department that are interviewed, this will also

limit the bias from a single group. Once there are several legitimate leads created, they will be pursued on a basis that will try and spread through different departments. For example, if there are three Defense Department officials, two Congressmen and one policy advisor considered to be leads involved in the process, one from each group will be interviewed and asked for more leads before pursuing all Defense Department officials.

The Department of State officials will be asked if there were any Defense Department officials that they were working along side of during the process to investigate the second question above. This should provide leads into who participated in negotiations inside the Clinton Administration. If none are gathered from State Department officials, then requests to interview must start at the former Joint Chiefs of Staff and possibly the former Secretary of Defense. Again, the interview selection process will start from the top and work its way down the ladder until a willing official arises. From there, attempts will be made for more leads to be obtained.

If no input considering Congress is added to help answer the third and fourth question listed above, then party leaders of both chambers that were in place in the early 1990s will be requested to be interviewed. If they cannot be reached, then committee chairman and members from the Foreign Affairs committees will be asked. It will be especially important to get a Republican perspective, because the Administration was Democrat, to see if the parties had conflicting views of how the Yugoslavian conflict should have been handled.

Through the survey, there will be questions concerning whom the United States was in contact with during the formation of UN sanctions. As much information will be gathered as possible on whether cooperation came smoothly from other nations or there was conflict in what

steps should be taken. All names mentioned will be noted along with the person who mentioned them.

The confidentiality of the informants will be protected so as not to incriminate them. I will not release their names or any information that will specifically link them to someone else to accomplish this. To be sure, I will ask the informant to point out situations or certain things that they want me to be particularly careful with. This will ensure my integrity as well as protect those that are offering their help.

Finally a survey must be created. A couple questions will be created specifically for the person being interviewed. The following questions will be asked of all interviews to try and get a common system throughout the process:

1. Did you participate in creating, negotiating, or organizing in sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1992? Who did you work closely with?
2. To your knowledge, did the President work with Congress to create in creating the sanctions? If so, how did they work together?
3. What other officials from different departments, bureaus, or groups were involved in the creation of the sanctions?
4. What options were presented other than sanctions such as military involvement within the administration or elsewhere? What did you support?
5. What was the international communities response to the Yugoslav conflict? What was the reaction to the American proposal of sanctions?
6. Why was Yugoslavia important enough to take action compared to other conflicts, like Rwanda a couple years later?

7. There is a lot of criticism that the Administration did not act quickly, or boldly enough, how do you respond to that?
8. The violence was present and obvious well before 1992 so why did you, and other officials, wait until then to start implementing sanctions?

Works Cited

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