	-1 Filed 11/18/14 Page 1 of 27
KAMALA D. HARRIS	
Attorney General of California Sara J. Drake, State Bar No. 102565	
WILLIAM P. TORNGREN, STATE BAR NO. 5	8493
Deputy Attorney General 1300 I Street, Suite 125	
P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550	
Telephone: (916) 323-3033 Fax: (916) 323-2319	
E-mail: William.Torngren(a)doj.ca.gov	
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of California	
IN THE UNITED STAT	TES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DI	STRICT OF CALIFORNIA
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	Case No. 3:14-cv-02724-AJB/NLS
Plaintiff,	
v.	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AN
Y•	AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
IIPAY NATION OF SANTA	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S APPLICATION FOR A
YSABEL, also known as SANTA YSABEL BAND OF DIEGUENO	TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
MISSION INDIANS, a federally-	
recognized Indian Tribe, SANTA YSABEL INTERACTIVE, a tribal	Date: December 4, 2014 Time: 2:00 p.m.
YSABEL INTERACTIVE, a tribal economic development entity, SANTA YSABEL GAMING COMMISSION	Courtroom: 3B Judge: Honorable Anthony J. Battagli
YSABEL GAMING COMMISSION, DAVID CHELETTE, DAVID	Trial Date:
WIAI DANDO ANTIIONY	A -4! T:1 - 1 NT 1 10 0014
BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY,	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
VIALPANDO, ANTHONY BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE TAYLOR,	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
VIALPANDO, ANTHONY BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE TAYLOR,	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
VIALPANDO, ANTHONY BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE TAYLOR,	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
VIALPANDO, ANTHONY BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE TAYLOR,	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
VIALPANDO, ANTHONY BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE TAYLOR,	Action Filed: November 18, 2014
VIALPANDO, ANTHONY BUCARO, MICHELLE MAXCY, VIRGIL PEREZ, and BRANDIE TAYLOR,	Action Filed: November 18, 2014

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 INTRODUCTION......1 3 **FACTS** 4 ARGUMENT The Court Has Original Jurisdiction Over the State's Action5 5 I. The Tribe Does Not Have Sovereign Immunity From This II. 6 IGRA Allows Gaming Only On Indian Lands; the Tribe's III. Internet Gambling Off Indian Lands is Contrary To IGRA......7 8 The Tribe's Internet Gambling Occurs Both Where The Bettor is Located and Where the Wager is Received11 IV. 9 The Tribe's Internet Gambling is a Facsimile of Bingo and Thus V. 10 is Class III Gaming.....14 A Temporary Restraining Order is Appropriate in This Case15 VI. 11 Because the evidence shows that the Tribe's Internet 12 gambling breaches the compact and violates the UIGEA, 13 Because the Tribe's Internet gambling offends the State's public policies and potentially has far-reaching impact, the State is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence В. 14 15 The balance of the equities tips in the State's favor......19 C. 16 An injunction is in the public interest......19 D. 17 CONCLUSION.. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page 3 CASES 4 Amador County v. Salazar 640 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir. 2011)......7 5 AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 6 295 F.3d10 7 AT&T Corporation v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 8 9 Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming Comm'n 10 14 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1994)......15 11 Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson 12 124 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1997)5, 6 13 Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Comm. v. 14 California Gambling Control Comm'n 618 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2010)16 15 16 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians 17 Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. AT&T Corp. 18 1999 WL 33622333, Case No. 99-35088 (9th Cir. 1999)......9 19 County of Madera v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians 20 21 Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int'l v. Davis 22 21 Cal. 4th 585 (1999)......18 23 In re Mastercard Int'l Inc., Internet Gambling Litig. 132 F.Supp.2d 468(E.D. La. 2001)......14 24 25 Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Assn. Inc. v. Attorney General 26 27 Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Ashcroft 360 F.Supp.2d 64 (D.D.C. 2004).....9 28 The State of California's Memorandum in Support

of Temporary Restraining Order

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	(continued) Page
3	Martin v. United States
4	389 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1968)14
5	Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community 134 S.Ct. 2014 (2014)
6 7	Neighbors of Casino San Pablo v. Salazar
8	773 F.Supp.2d 141 (D.D.C. 2011)7
9	People v. Shira 62 Cal.App.3d 442 (1976) 17
10	Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America
11	68 Cal.2d 822 (1968)
12	State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
13	164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999)
14	Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache
15	54 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994)15
16	<i>United States v. Lombardo</i> 639 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D. Utah 2007)14
17	
18	United States v. Lyons 740 F.3d 702 (1st Cir. 2014)13
19	
20	Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 555 U.S. 7 (2008)16
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	$oxed{iii}$

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
2	Page
3	STATUTES
4 5	California Business and Professions Code § 19801(d)2, 18
6	
	California Penal Code § 31917
7	§ 32017
8	§ 32117
9	§ 32217
0	§ 326.5(m)
1	§ 33/a17
-	18 United States Code
2	§ 108413
3	§ 1084(b)
4	§§ 1166-11681
5	25 United States Code
	§§ 2701-2721
6	§ 2701(1)8 § 2702(3)8
17	§ 2702(3)
8	§ 2703(4)(A)3
9	§ 2703(6)14
.	§ 2703(7)
20	§ 2703(7)(B)
21	§ 2703(8)
22	§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)
23	§ 27198
24	28 United States Code
25	§ 13315
26	
27	
28	
40	iv
	The State of California's Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order

- 1	
1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	(continued)
3	Page
	STATUTES (CONT'D)
4	31 United States Code
5	§§ 5361-53671
6	§ 5361(a)(4)11
7	§ 5362(1)1/
′	§ 5362(1)(A)
8	§ 5362(2)
9	§ 5362(7)6
10	§ 5362(10)(A)
11	§ 5362(10)(B)
12	§ 5362(10)(C)
	§ 5362(10)(C)(ii)
13	§ 5362(10)(C)(iii)13
14	§ 5362(10)(E)
15	§ 5363
16	§ 5365(b)(2)6
	§ 5365(b)(3)(A)(ii)6, 7
17	
18	CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
19	California Constitution, article IV
20	§ 19(a)
	§ 19(e)
21	§ 19(f)18
22	
23	OTHER AUTHORITIES
24	25 Code of Fodoral Regulations
25	25 Code of Federal Regulations § 502.814
26	http://pokerfuse.com/news/law-and-regulation/26019-california-tribe-
27	launches-real-money-bingo-poker-coming/4
28	http://www.iipaynation-nsn.com/gaming.html4

The State of California's Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	(continued) Page
3 4	http://www.online-casinos.com/news/13007-tribal-interests-california-introduce-online-gambling19
5	Senate Report No. 100-446 (Aug. 3, 1988)8
6 7 8 9	Letter from Kevin Washburn, General Counsel, NIGC, to Robert Rossette, Monteau, Peebles & Crowell, re: Lac Vieux Desert Internet Bingo Operation (Oct. 26, 2000)9
10 11 12	Letter from Montie Deer, Chairman, NIGC, to Ernest L. Stensgar, Chairman, Coeur d' Alene Tribe, re: National Indian Lottery (Jun. 22, 1999)9
13 14	Letter from Penny Coleman, Deputy General Counsel, NIGC, to Terry Barnes, Bingo Networks, re: U-PIK-EM Bingo (Jun. 9, 2000)9
15 16 17	Letter from Kevin Washburn, General Counsel, NIGC, to Joseph Speck, Nic-A-Bob Productions, re: WIN Sports Betting Game (Mar. 13, 2001)9
18 19 20	Letter from Richard Schiff, Senior Attorney, NIGC, to Don Abney, Principal Chief, Sac and Fox Nation, re: Tele-Bingo (Jun. 21, 1999)9
21 22	Memorandum from Penny Coleman, General Counsel, NIGC, to George Skibine, Chairman, NIGC, re: classification of card games played with technological aids (Dec. 17, 2009)
23 24	
25	
26 27	
28	vi

The State of California's Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order

INTRODUCTION

On November 3, 2014, without any state or federal legislative authority, defendant Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, also known as Santa Ysabel Band of Diegueno Mission Indians (Tribe), launched "the nation's first web browser-based i-Gaming platform," which is targeted directly at computers, smart phones, and other Internet-accessible devices operated by the State of California's (State) residents. The Tribe's Internet gambling platform allows any Californian over the age of eighteen to gamble with the Tribe from anywhere that he or she can browse the Internet, including in the workplace, at school, or at home. No trip to the Tribe's reservation or casino is required.

The Tribe's self-proclaimed "groundbreaking" efforts to make Internet gambling available to Californians "anytime & anywhere" breach the tribal-state class III gaming compact (Compact) between the Tribe and the State, do not comply with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168, and violate the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367. Because the Tribe's Internet gambling has far-reaching and immediate effects on million of Californians, the State seeks a temporary restraining order enjoining the Tribe and the other defendants from offering Internet gambling to residents of, and visitors to, California and accepting payments that violate the UIGEA. Such an order is

The Tribe's Internet gambling also potentially has far-reaching policy implications for both California and the United States. The legislative bodies of both have considered – and rejected – wholesale Internet gambling. Additionally, legislative staff and tribal representatives have inquired regarding the State's position concerning Internet gambling and the Tribe's facsimile of bingo. (Declaration of Joginder Dhillon, 2, ¶ 5 (Dhillon Dec.).)

The requested temporary restraining order is limited to residents, and visitors, to California because that appears to be how the Tribe has limited its Internet gambling. The State believes that the Tribe offering Internet gambling outside of California also breaches the Compact and violates the UIGEA.

necessary to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and good order in the State. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 19801(d).

FACTS

The facts are not in serious dispute.³ The Tribe and the State entered into the Compact under which the Tribe agreed to conduct gambling in accordance with law. The Tribe now is offering Internet gambling to California residents ages eighteen and older. Before the Tribe began to offer Internet gambling, the State sought, but the Tribe refused, to meet and confer in accordance with the Compact. (Dhillon Dec., 2-3, ¶¶ 6 & 7.)

On September 8, 2003, the Tribe and State entered into the Compact, which is Exhibit 1 to the complaint. (Dhillon Dec., 2, ¶ 3.) The Compact requires that the Tribe operate its gaming activities legally. Specifically, the Compact provides that the Tribe may combine and operate in its gaming facility "any kinds of gaming permitted under law, except to the extent limited under IGRA" (Compact, 8, § 4.2 (emphasis added).) The Compact further provides that a tribal gaming agency – here, the Santa Ysabel Gaming Commission — will conduct on-site gaming regulation and control "in order to enforce the terms of this . . . Compact [and] IGRA." (Compact, 22, § 7.1.) That commission is to ensure enforcement of all relevant laws and prevent illegal activity. (Compact, 25, §§ 8.1.1, 8.1.4.)

The Tribe agreed not to engage in class III gaming that is not expressly authorized in the Compact. (Compact, 7, § 3.0.) Under Compact section 4.1, the Tribe is authorized and permitted to operate (a) gaming devices – i.e., slot machines, (b) banking and percentage card games, and (c) "any devices or games that are authorized under state law to the California State Lottery, *provided that the*

The facts are set forth in the Declaration of Joginder Dhillon and the Declaration of Micah Scott (Scott Dec.), both of which are filed concurrently with the State's motion for a temporary restraining order.

The Santa Ysabel Gaming Commission, as well as its agents, is a defendant. The Compact specifically provides that the term "Tribe" includes the Tribe, as well as its officials and agencies. (Compact, 6, § 2.13.1.)

[Tribe] will not offer such games through use of the Internet unless others in the state are permitted to do so under state and federal law." (Compact, 8, § 4.1(c) (emphasis added).) The Tribe is not to permit persons under the age of twenty-one years to be present in any room or area in which class III gaming activities are conducted. (Compact, 11, § 6.3.)

Despite the express limitations in the Compact, on November 3, 2014, the Tribe began to offer Internet gambling in the form of a facsimile of bingo. (Scott Dec., 2, \P 3.) According to the press release issued on the same day, the Tribe purported to do so pursuant to IGRA and its tribal sovereign authority. (Dhillon Dec., Exh. A.) Also according to that press release, by using any web browser on any computer, mobile device, or tablet, a California resident can purchase bingo cards to be eligible to win cash prizes. (*Id.*) Play is available to California residents over the age of eighteen. (*Id.*)

The Tribe's Internet gambling is not restricted to its Indian lands. ⁵ As described in the Declaration of Micah Scott and consistent with the press release, the Tribe's Internet gambling apparently is accessible to California residents irrespective of their location. Bettors need not travel to the Tribe's Indian lands to gamble. (Scott Dec., 3, \P 7.) Bettors use the Internet and log into the Tribe's bingo website. (*Id.* at 2-3, \P 5.) They place bets by withdrawing money from accounts that they have opened with the Tribe. (*Id.*) Bettors may fund their accounts by credit card or other electronic funds transfer. (*Id.* at 2, \P 4.) After the bet is placed, the game system plays the game including covering a facsimile bingo card and determining the winner. (*Id.* at 3, \P 6.) The bettor's participation is limited to electing the amount to bet and how many cards to play in any game. (*Id.*; *see also*

⁵ Under IGRA, "Indian lands" include lands within the limits of an Indian reservation, 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A), and "any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power," *id.* § 2703(4)(B).

Dhillon Dec., 2, \P 4 & Exh. A ("At no time is live bingo game action performed by the user.").)

Except under certain circumstances, the Compact provides for a meet and confer process when disputes arise under it. The requirement is "without prejudice to the right of either party to seek injunctive relief against the other when circumstances are deemed to require immediate relief." (Compact, 27, § 9.1.) In July 2014, information appeared in the gaming press and gambling blogs that the Tribe intended to "launch real money online poker" in California within a short time. On July 14, 2014, the State sent a letter requesting that the parties meet and confer concerning whether the Tribe's planned Internet gambling materially breached the Compact. (Dhillon Dec., 2-3, ¶ 6, Exh. B.) That letter also referred to Internet bingo. (*Id.*) The Tribe rejected the State's request to meet and confer. (Dhillon Dec., 3, ¶ 7, Exh. C.)

ARGUMENT

The Tribe's Internet gambling breaches the Compact, violates IGRA, and can be enjoined under both the Compact and the UIGEA. The Tribe's gambling is legal only if conducted entirely on Indian lands. Its class III gaming is legal only if conducted on the Tribe's Indian lands in compliance with the Compact. Its Internet gambling is not being conducted only on the Tribe's Indian lands. Instead, bettors located off the Tribe's Indian lands can participate in its Internet gambling. Its Internet gambling is not being conducted in compliance with the Compact or IGRA. Importantly, the Tribe's Internet gambling is not expressly authorized by the Compact and, therefore, is prohibited.

The Tribe's website reports that it has established defendant Santa Ysabel Interactive and launched an I-gaming poker website. (http://www.iipaynation-nsn.com/gaming.html.) Gaming blogs report that real money online poker under PrivateTable.com remains part of the Tribe's plans. (See, e.g., http://pokerfuse.com/news/law-and-regulation/26019-california-tribe-launches-real-money-bingo-poker-coming/.)

I. THE COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE STATE'S ACTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, IGRA, and the UIGEA. The State's complaint invokes the Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the State's claim arises under federal statutes and the federal common law. This Court has jurisdiction under section 1331 to enforce a compact. *Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson*, 124 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 1997) (*Cabazon II*), *cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians*, 524 U.S. 926 (1998). In *Cabazon II*, the State asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was purely contractual. *Id.* at 1055. In rejecting that argument, the Ninth Circuit concluded:

The State's obligation to the Bands thus originates in the Compacts. The Compacts quite clearly are a creation of federal law; moreover, IGRA prescribes the permissible scope of the Compacts. We conclude that the Bands' claim to enforce the Compacts arises under federal law and thus that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331....

Id. at 1056. Here, the same analysis applies. The Tribe's obligation to the State arises from the Compact, which is a creation of federal law and entered into pursuant to IGRA. Importantly, the State seeks to enforce the Compact.

The Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) because this action is initiated by the State to enjoin conduct related to the Tribe's class III gaming activity that violates the Compact. In *Cabazon II*, the Ninth Circuit also addressed jurisdiction under IGRA. The court concluded that "IGRA necessarily confers jurisdiction onto federal courts to enforce Tribal-State compacts and the agreements contained therein." *Cabazon II*, 124 F.3d at 1056. This is

Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) provides district court jurisdiction over "any cause of action initiated by a State . . . to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exactly what the State seeks to do in this case – i.e., enforce the Tribe's public safety duties under the Compact. Finally, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction under the UIGEA to prevent and restrain restricted transactions. 8 31 U.S.C. § 5365(a). The State generally may institute proceedings for an injunction. 31 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(2). Here, the Tribe may assert that the restricted transactions are initiated, received, or otherwise made on Indian lands. (See Dhillon Dec., Exh. A.) That assertion, however, does not divest the Court of jurisdiction. Under the UIGEA, the State then may pursue remedies provided in the Compact with respect to restricted transactions. 31 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(3)(A)(ii). The State's second claim for relief arises under the UIGEA, and the Court has jurisdiction.

THE TRIBE DOES NOT HAVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM THIS ACTION II.

The Tribe does not enjoyo sovereign immunity with respect to the claims for relief made in the State's complaint because Compact section 9.4 provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity:

- (a) In the event that a dispute is to be resolved in federal court . . . as provided in this Section 9.0, the State and the Santa Ysabel Tribe expressly consent to be sued therein and waive any immunity therefrom that they may have provided that:
 - (1) The dispute is limited solely to issues arising under this Gaming Compact;
 - (2) Neither side makes any claim for monetary damages (that is, only injunctive, specific performance, ... or declaratory relief is sought); and
 - (3) No person or entity other than the Santa Ysabel Tribe and the State is party to the action

⁸ Under the UIGEA, a "restricted transaction" means any transaction involving any credit, funds, instrument, or proceeds that the recipient is prohibited from accepting. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(7).

(Compact, 30-31, § 9.4.) Clearly, this action meets those criteria to waive sovereign immunity.⁹

Additionally, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) constitutes a congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. That issue was central in the Supreme Court's recent *Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community*, 134 S.Ct. 2014 (2014), decision. There, the Supreme Court determined that the section's sovereign immunity waiver did not apply when class III gaming was not conducted on Indian lands. The Court observed that IGRA partially abrogates tribal sovereign immunity in section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii). *Id.* at 2032. Here, the Tribe publicly asserts that the gaming activity 10 occurs on its Indian lands. Moreover, the complaint alleges that some equipment integral to the Tribe's Internet gambling is located on the Tribe's Indian lands. (Complaint, 9, ¶ 34.) Therefore, IGRA's sovereign immunity waiver also applies.

III. IGRA ALLOWS GAMING ONLY ON INDIAN LANDS; THE TRIBE'S INTERNET GAMBLING OFF INDIAN LANDS IS CONTRARY TO IGRA

IGRA establishes federal standards for gaming on tribal lands. It creates a regulatory framework for tribal gaming intended to balance state, federal, and tribal interests. *Amador County v. Salazar*, 640 F.3d 373, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Under IGRA, a tribe may conduct gaming only on Indian lands. *Neighbors of Casino San Pablo v. Salazar*, 773 F.Supp.2d 141, 143 (D.D.C. 2011). "Indian lands" is a defined term and means, among other things, lands within the limits of a reservation and lands held in trust by the United States for a tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4).

This waiver also applies to the State's claim under the UIGEA, which looks to the enforcement authorities under an IGRA tribal-state compact. See 31 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(3)(A)(ii).

Gaming activity is not limited to an actual class III game. *See County of Madera v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians*, 467 F.Supp.2d 993, 1002 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

1	Congres
2	throughout th
3	numerous tri
4	U.S.C. § 270
5	gaming on In
6	"regulate gan
7	declared that
8	and federal st
9	Congress ger
10	17, 1988. <i>Se</i>
11	relating to the
12	lands. See, e
13	(d)(1) (class)
14	Senate I
15	conclusion th
16	report summa
17	and the Feder
18	compacts bet
19	The act was t
20	between gam
21	Congress, in
22	lands." <i>Id</i> . 7
23	Indians, 480
24	federal, state.
25	gaming activ

Congress manifested its intention to limit IGRA to gaming on Indian lands throughout the act. First, in IGRA's findings section, Congress found that numerous tribes engaged in or licensed "gaming activities on Indian lands," 25 U.S.C. § 2701(1), existing federal law did not provide clarity for the "conduct of gaming on Indian lands," *id.* § 2701(3), and tribes have the exclusive right to "regulate gaming activity on Indian lands," *id.* § 2701(5). Second, Congress declared that one of IGRA's purposes is to establish federal regulatory authority and federal standards for "gaming on Indian lands." 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3). Third, Congress generally prohibited gaming on tribal trust lands acquired after October 17, 1988. *See* 25 U.S.C. § 2719. Finally and importantly, all of the provisions relating to the licensing and regulation under IGRA apply only to gaming on Indian lands. *See*, *e.g.*, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (class I gaming), (b)(1) (class II gaming), (d)(1) (class III gaming).

Senate Report No. 100-446 (Aug. 3, 1988) (Senate Report) supports the conclusion that IGRA and the gaming that it allows are limited to Indian lands. The report summarizes IGRA as providing "for a system of joint regulation by tribes and the Federal Government of class II gaming on Indian lands and a system for compacts between tribes and States for regulation of class III gaming." *Id.* at 1. The act was the "outgrowth of several years of discussions and negotiations between gaming tribes, States, the gaming industry, the administration, and the Congress, in an attempt to formulate a system for regulating gaming on Indian lands." *Id.* The report characterized *California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians*, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (*Cabazon I*), as using a balancing test between federal, state, and tribal interests to find "that tribes . . . have a right to conduct gaming activities on Indian lands unhindered by State regulation." Senate Report, 1. The report observed, "in the final analysis, it is the responsibility of Congress, consistent with its plenary power over Indian affairs, to balance competing policy

28

27

interests and to adjust, where appropriate, the jurisdictional framework for *regulation of gaming on Indian lands*." *Id.* at 2 (emphasis added).

Because IGRA and the Senate Report are clear that IGRA gaming is limited to Indian lands, the NIGC concluded that non-electronic bingo played through human proxies offered to patrons over the Internet "is not authorized under IGRA." (Letter from Kevin Washburn, General Counsel, NIGC, to Robert Rossette, Monteau, Peebles & Crowell, re: Lac Vieux Desert Internet Bingo Operation (Oct. 26, 2000)); 11 see Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Ashcroft, 360 F. Supp. 2d 64, 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (describing the game).

Moreover, the NIGC consistently has concluded that tribes making Internet gambling available to persons not located on Indian lands violate IGRA. (*See*, *e.g.*, Letter from Montie Deer, Chairman, NIGC, to Ernest L. Stensgar, Chairman, Coeur d' Alene Tribe, re: National Indian Lottery (Jun. 22, 1999); letter from Penny Coleman, Deputy General Counsel, NIGC, to Terry Barnes, Bingo Networks, re: U-PIK-EM Bingo (Jun. 9, 2000); letter from Kevin Washburn, General Counsel, NIGC, to Joseph Speck, Nic-A-Bob Productions, re: WIN Sports Betting Game (Mar. 13, 2001); *see also* letter from Richard Schiff, Senior Attorney, NIGC, to Don Abney, Principal Chief, Sac and Fox Nation, re: Tele-Bingo (Jun. 21, 1999) (bingo played by telephone off-Indian lands violates IGRA).) In its only known entry into tribal Internet gaming, the United States Department of Justice shared the NIGC's opinion. *See* Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, *Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. AT&T Corp.*, 1999 WL 33622333, Case No. 99-35088 (9th Cir. 1999).

The State is not aware of any published court decision that expressly authorizes tribal gaming under IGRA off of Indian lands. Rather, the decisions lead to the conclusion – consistent with IGRA's provisions and the Senate Report – that IGRA gaming is limited to Indian lands. In *AT&T Corporation v. Coeur d'Alene*

¹¹ Each NIGC gaming opinion letter cited herein is contained in Appendix A, filed concurrently with the State's motion for a temporary order.

Tribe, 45 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Idaho 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 295 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2001), the district court found that, to the extent the tribe's planned National Indian Lottery (NIL) occurred outside the limits of the reservation, IGRA did not preempt state gambling laws. Based upon that finding, the court concluded that notices given by states under the federal Wire Act precluded AT&T's providing toll-free telephone services for the NIL to those states. Id. at 999-1000. The court observed that under the plain language of IGRA, the gaming activities constituting the NIL had to occur on lands within the limits of the tribe's reservation to be unregulated. Id. at 1001. The court found that placing a wager was a gaming activity within the meaning of IGRA. Id. ("But for the act of placing the 'lottery wager,' the player could not participate in, and the Tribe could not operate, the [NIL]."). 13

In *State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe*, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit addressed Missouri's challenge to the NIL. The state filed actions in state court against the tribe and its contractor to enjoin conducting the NIL with Missouri residents. Defendants removed both cases, which the federal district courts subsequently dismissed. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court pointed out that "IGRA established a comprehensive regulatory regime for tribal gaming activities *on Indian lands*. . . . Once a tribe leaves its own lands and conducts gambling activities on state lands, nothing in the IGRA suggests that

In reversing, the Ninth Circuit focused on the NIGC's approval of the management agreement for the NIL and the failure of the states, which issued letters to AT&T under the federal Wire Act, to challenge the NIGC's approval as final agency action. The Ninth Circuit expressly did not address the issue of the NIL's legality: "This Court draws no conclusion as to how the Lottery might fare when properly challenged in federal court and balanced against state laws and interests." AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d at 910 n. 12.

In County of Madera v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians, 467 F.Supp.2d at 1002, the court found that "gaming activity" would be the actual playing or provision of the games and the necessary conduct associated with playing or providing the identified games. See also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. at 2032-33.

Congress intended to preempt the State's historic right to regulate this controversial class of economic activities." *Id.* at 1108 (emphasis in original). The court concluded that if the NIL was being conducted on Missouri lands, IGRA did not preempt the state law claims or even provide a defense thereto. *Id.* at 1109.¹⁴

In sum, the Tribe's Internet gambling does not fall within the purview of IGRA because some of the gaming activity necessarily takes place outside of the Tribe's Indian lands. Thus, IGRA does not give the Tribe the power to engage in, or license and regulate, the Internet gambling. Instead, the State has the power to regulate the Tribe's Internet gambling.

IV. THE TRIBE'S INTERNET GAMBLING OCCURS BOTH WHERE THE BETTOR IS LOCATED AND WHERE THE WAGER IS RECEIVED

Although the Tribe may argue that its Internet gambling offerings are lawful because servers or some other equipment is located on its Indian lands, the UIGEA confirms Congress's recognition that Internet gambling may cross state and national borders:

New mechanisms for enforcing gambling laws on the Internet are necessary because traditional law enforcement mechanisms are often inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions or regulations on the Internet, especially where such gambling crosses State and national borders.

31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(4).

This finding apparently leads to the UIGEA's definition of "bet or wager" as including the movement of funds. Under the UIGEA, bet or wager means staking or risking something of value upon the outcome of a game, subject to chance, upon an agreement or understanding of receipt of something of value in the event of a certain outcome. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A). Bet or wager includes the purchase of a chance or opportunity to win a lottery, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(B), and any instructions

Even though the cases were remanded for a determination of whether the NIL was being conducted on Missouri lands, no subsequent history is reported.

7

6

8 9

10

11 12

13

15

14

16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23

24

25

26 27

28

or information pertaining to the establishment or movement of funds by the bettor or customer in, to, or from an account with a business of betting or wagering, id. § 5362(1)(D).

The UIGEA looks to the laws of the places both where the bet or wager are placed and received. Unlawful Internet gambling is defined as "to place, receive, or otherwise knowingly transmit a bet or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made." 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (emphasis added); see Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Assn. Inc. v. Attorney General, 580 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2009) (Interactive) (nothing in the UIGEA suggests that Congress meant anything other than the physical location of a bettor or gambling business). Congress recognized that routing is an integral part of the Internet and may be used to avoid the UIGEA; therefore, it included the provision that "intermediate routing of electronic data shall not determine the location or locations in which a bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made." 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(E).

Further showing Congress' view that gambling occurs both where the bet or wager is placed and received, the UIGEA excludes from unlawful Internet gambling purely intrastate betting or wagering – i.e., "initiated and received or otherwise made exclusively within a single State" – subject to certain conditions. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(B). Similarly, the UIGEA excludes from unlawful Internet gambling certain transactions on Indian lands. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(C). For a single tribe to avoid unlawful Internet gambling, it must meet certain requirements, including all the following:

The bet or wager must be initiated and received exclusively "within the a. Indian lands" of the tribe as defined under IGRA, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(C)(i)(1); 12

- b. The method by which the bet or wager is initiated and received must be expressly authorized by and comply with a tribal ordinance approved by the NIGC and, if class III gaming, the applicable tribal-state gaming compact, 31 U.S.C § 5362(10)(C)(ii); and
- c. The applicable tribal ordinance or compact must include age and location verification requirements "reasonably designed to block access to minors and persons located out of the applicable Tribal lands," 31 U.S.C § 5362(10)(C)(iii).

The UIGEA prohibits gambling businesses from knowingly accepting various forms of financial instruments in connection with another person's participation in unlawful Internet gambling, including proceeds from credit cards, electronic fund transfers, and checks. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5363; *United States v. Lyons*, 740 F.3d 702, 729 (1st Cir. 2014). For determining whether the gambling is unlawful, the test is whether it is illegal at the location in which the gambling business is located or the location from which the individual initiated the bet or wager. *Interactive*, 580 F.3d at 116. The Third Circuit succinctly summarized the locational aspects of UIGEA: "Simply put, a gambling business cannot knowingly accept the enumerated financial instruments in connection with a bet that is illegal under any Federal or State law applicable in the jurisdiction in which the bet is initiated or received." *Id.* at 117.

The UIGEA's locational focus is consistent with other authorities that examine betting as occurring in two places – i.e., where the bettor is located and where the wager is received. For example, both the district court in *AT&T Corporation v*. *Coeur d'Alene* and the Eighth Circuit in *State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe* looked to players' locations in examining state law applicability or IGRA preemption. Additionally, the federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, which proscribes transmitting bets or wagers in interstate commerce, contains a safe harbor for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers

from a state or foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a state or foreign country in which such betting is legal. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b). Thus, the Wire Act looks to the parties' locations. *See, e.g., Martin v. United States*, 389 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1968). 15

In sum, the Tribe's Internet gambling occurs off the Tribe's Indian lands when bettors – i.e., Internet users – are not physically on the Tribe's Indian lands.

V. THE TRIBE'S INTERNET GAMBLING IS A FACSIMILE OF BINGO AND THUS IS CLASS III GAMING

IGRA divides tribal gaming into three classifications: class I, which involves traditional forms of tribal gaming and social games solely for minimal prizes; class II, which is bingo meeting certain criteria and some card games; and class III, which is all forms of gaming that are not class I or class II. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6), (7), (8). Class III gaming includes banking card games, electronic facsimiles of any game of chance, and slot machines of any kind. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(B).

The NIGC defines an electronic facsimile to be "a game played in an electronic . . . format that replicates a game of chance by incorporating all of the characteristics of the game, except when, for bingo . . . , the electronic . . . format broadens participation by allowing multiple players to play with or against each other rather than with or against a machine." 25 C.F.R. § 502.8. In discussing what an electronic facsimile is, the NIGC writes: "If, however, a particular aid . . . becomes a necessity, or encompasses all the aspects of a particular game, it ceases to be a technological aid and becomes an electronic facsimile." (Mem. from Penny

Federal courts are divided as to whether the Wire Act reaches Internet wagers and bets that do not involve sporting contests. *Compare In re Mastercard Int'l Inc.*, *Internet Gambling Litig.*, 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 480-81(E.D. La. 2001), aff'd, 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002) (sporting events only), with United States v. Lombardo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279-82 (D. Utah 2007) (all forms of betting). In December 2011, the United States Department of Justice released a memorandum that concluded that the Wire Act's prohibitions relate solely to sports-related gambling activities. (Memorandum Opinion for the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (Sept. 20, 2011).)

Coleman, General Counsel, NIGC, to George Skibine, Chairman, NIGC, re: classification of card games played with technological aids, 8 (Dec. 17, 2009) (available in Appendix A).)

45

that players, who are located off the Tribe's Indian lands, do nothing other than place a bet. (Scott Dec., 3, \P 6, 7.) The Tribe's electronic system does everything

An electronic facsimile of bingo is a class III game. Here, the evidence shows

7

6

else. If the electronic system is removed, the game disappears. Therefore, the electronic system is a necessity of the game.

8

The Tribe's electronic system selects the numbers, purportedly marks the cards, and determines the winner. (Scott Dec., 3, \P 6.) In this way, the Tribe's

Internet gambling is no different from the electronic pull-tab dispenser that the

1112

10

Ninth Circuit held to be an electronic facsimile in Sycuan Band of Mission Indians

13

v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994) (Sycuan). The pull-tab dispenser there, like

14

the Tribe's Internet game here, produced only an electronic reproduction of a paper ticket on a computer screen. Unlike the Tribe's Internet game here in which every

1516

part of the game is played on its electronic system, the player in Sycuan actually did

17

something to reveal numbers. Id. at 541. The court found, as the Court should

18

here, that the pull-tab machine was a class III facsimile because it was a self-

1920

contained computer game played electronically. Id. at 542. Here, like the pull-tab

21

game in *Sycuan*, the game is an exact and detailed copy of a bingo game played electronically. *See id*; *see also Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National*

22

Indian Gaming Comm'n, 14 F.3d 633, 636-37 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (pull-tab game in

23

which multiple players played against each other was class III electronic facsimile);

24

(Scott Dec., 3, \P 7).

25

VI. A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE

2627

The requirements for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction. A party applying for a preliminary injunction "must

28

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Here, the evidence establishes all of these factors.

A. Because the Evidence Shows that the Tribe's Internet Gambling Breaches the Compact and Violates the UIGEA, the State Is Likely To Succeed on the Merits

The State's first claim for relief is breach of the Compact. A compact is a contract, and is governed by general federal contract law principles. *Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Comm. v. California Gambling Control Comm'n*, 618 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010). In determining federal contract law, courts rely upon both "California contract law and Ninth Circuit decisions interpreting California" contract law. *Id.* The elements for a breach of contract claim are the contract, plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, defendant's breach, and resulting damages to plaintiff. *Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America*, 68 Cal.2d 822, 830 (1968).

In this case, the Tribe's breach of the Compact is clear. The Tribe agreed not to engage in class III gaming that is not expressly authorized in the Compact. (Compact, 7, § 3.0.) The only Internet gambling expressly allowed by the Compact is "devices and games that are authorized . . . to the California State Lottery" that others in the State are permitted to offer through the Internet under state and federal law. (Compact, 8, § 4.1(c).) No one is permitted to offer any California State Lottery game through the Internet. (Dhillon Dec., 3, ¶ 8.) Consequently, the Tribe's offering its class III facsimile of bingo over the Internet breaches its duties under the Compact. The State is likely to succeed on its first claim for relief on the merits.

The State's second claim for relief is under the UIGEA. Under the facts here, the Tribe is engaging in unlawful Internet gambling. The betting, which is initiated in California off of Indian lands, is illegal under State law. California statutes make

setting up and drawing a lottery, selling or furnishing a chance in a lottery, and aiding or assisting those acts, crimes. Cal. Penal Code §§ 320, 321, 322. The Tribe's electronic facsimile of bingo is a form of lottery as it is a game played for a prize determined by chance for consideration. *See* Cal. Penal Code § 319; *see also People v. Shira*, 62 Cal.App.3d 442, 462-63 (1976).

Additionally, California Penal Code section 337a broadly prohibits keeping a place with devices for the purpose of recording any bets or wagers, receiving anything of value bet or wagered, recording bets or wagers, or offering or accepting any bets or wagers. The Tribe's Internet gambling system violates California Penal Code section 337a, which is a predicate for UIGEA relief.

Finally, California law requires that bingo participants be physically present at the time and place where the game is being conducted, Cal. Penal Code § 326.5(m), and prohibits using electronic or video displays in connection with bingo, *id.* § 326.5(o). The Tribe's Internet gambling violates these California Penal Code provisions. That too provides a predicate for UIGEA relief.

Through its unlawful Internet gambling, the Tribe is engaged in the business of betting or wagering. It provides the electronic system (1) by which customers bet or wager or purchase an opportunity to win a lottery and (2) which includes instructions or information pertaining to moving funds in, to, or from an account with the Tribe. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1), (2). The Tribe knowingly accepts credit and other transfers in connection with the unlawful Internet gambling. 31 U.S.C. § 5363. The State is likely to succeed on its second claim for relief on the merits.

B. Because the Tribe's Internet Gambling Offends the State's Public Policies and Potentially Has Far-Reaching Impact, the State Is Likely To Suffer Irreparable Harm in the Absence of Relief

The State has no adequate remedy at law. Under the Compact, IGRA, and the UIGEA, it can seek only injunctive relief. Moreover, even if damages were recoverable, they could not adequately compensate the State for the harm done to

its interests by illegal gambling and the possibility of unregulated Internet gambling by many tribes, both within and outside the State's borders.

The State has an interest in ensuring compliance with the Compact. (Dhillon Dec., 3, ¶ 9.) Additionally, the State's public policy against unlawful lotteries is at stake. (*Id.*) That public policy is enunciated in the California Constitution's broad prohibition of lotteries, Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(a), as well as the California Penal Code. The State's public policy regarding tribal gaming also is set forth in the California Constitution, which allows the negotiation and legislative ratification of tribal-state gaming compacts for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and percentage card games. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(f). The Compact establishes the perimeters of the Tribe's class III gaming. Otherwise, class III gaming is unlawful in California. *See* Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(e); *Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int'l v. Davis*, 21 Cal. 4th 585 (1999). The State's interest in protecting its public policy will be harmed irreparably without the requested order. (*See* Dhillon Dec., 3, ¶ 9.)

Additionally, the Tribe's Internet gambling targets California residents age eighteen and older. It allows unlawful gambling anywhere these residents are — albeit at school, work, or home. Even though it targets Californians who are not on its Indian lands, the Tribe seeks to preclude the State from an opportunity to regulate the Internet gambling either through the Compact or otherwise. Unregulated gambling enterprises are inimical to the public health, safety, welfare, and good order. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 19801(d). The State thus will suffer irreparable harm if the Tribe is allowed to continue its Internet gambling.

Moreover, the Tribe's Internet gambling presents issues that potentially affect millions of Californians and, possibly, the United States' gambling policies. The gambling press reports the following with attribution to defendant Santa Ysabel Interactive:

DesertRoseBingo.com, is an experiment of sorts and if the site manages to successfully keep online and doesn't run up against major legal challenges, the move may be a precursor for an online poker offering shortly. Santa Ysabel Interactive Director of Marketing Chris Wrieden explained to the Pokerfuse news source, "Some believe our promise to bring regulated cash poker games to California has all been a great big bluff, for any number of self-serving reasons. I can tell you it hasn't been, it just takes time to put all of the pieces together. When we launch it will put our critics' bluff theory to rest and when we accept our first online bet, we will be on our way to creating change for our industry."

(http://www.online-casinos.com/news/13007-tribal-interests-california-introduce-online-gambling (emphasis added).) The absence of injunctive relief not only will encourage the Tribe to offer additional Internet gambling, but also may encourage other tribes to begin online gambling in California and elsewhere. (*See* Dhillon Dec., 3, \P 9.)

C. The Balance of the Equities Tips in the State's Favor

The equities clearly favor the State and its interests in ensuring compliance with Compact and protecting the public health, safety, welfare, and good order. The Tribe is reaching out to Californians irrespective of whether they are on its Indian lands. IGRA does not allow this. The UIGEA does not allow this. The Compact does not allow this.

The Tribe should not be allowed to benefit by breaching the Compact and violating State and federal law at the expense of Californians and the State's public policy. Additionally, the State has acted expediently once the Tribe launched its Internet gambling.¹⁶ In sum, the balance of the equities tips in the State's favor.

D. An Injunction Is in the Public Interest

The State's interest is the public interest. Here, the public interest is to enforce the Compact, to prevent the Tribe from engaging in unlawful class III gaming that

The State attempted to meet and confer when the Tribe first announced its intentions in July 2014. The Tribe, however, refused to participate in a meet and confer. (See Dhillon Dec., 2-3, ¶¶ 6 & 7.)

targets the State's residents, to prevent violations of state and federal law, and to 1 protect the State's constitutionally stated public policy with respect to lotteries, 2 gambling, and tribal gaming. For these reasons, an injunction here is in the public 3 4 interest. 5 CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that the Court enter a 6 temporary restraining order enjoining the Tribe and the other defendants from 7 offering Internet gambling to residents of, and visitors to, California and from 8 accepting payments or funds in violation of the UIGEA. 9 10 11 Dated: November 18, 2014 Respectfully Submitted, 12 KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California 13 Sara J. Drake Senior Assistant Attorney General 14 15 /s/ WILLIAM P. TORNGREN 16 WILLIAM P. TORNGREN 17 Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Plaintiff State of California 18 SA2014119021 19 11594254.doc 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20

The State of California's Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order