

Yes it is true, there are two citizens

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Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the *Slaughterhouse Cases*, there are now two citizens in the nation of the United States: a citizen of the United States, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and a citizen of the several States, under Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America.

[Footnote 1]

To begin, there is a citizen of the United States [Footnote 2] and a citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States:

“We come to the contention that the citizenship of Edwards was not averred in the complaint or shown by the record, and hence jurisdiction did not appear.

In answering the question, whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the controversy, we must put ourselves in the place of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and decide the question with reference to the transcript of record in that court.

Had the transcript shown nothing more as to the status of Edwards than the averment of the complaint that he was a ‘resident of the State of Delaware,’ as such an averment would not necessarily have imported that Edwards was a citizen of Delaware, a negative answer would have been impelled by prior decisions. *Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Duthie*, 189 U.S. 76; *Horne v. George H. Hammond Co.*, 155 U.S. 393; *Denny v. Pironi*, 141 U.S. 121; *Robertson v. Cease*, 97 U.S. 646. The whole record, however, may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of citizenship, and if the requisite citizenship, is anywhere expressly averred in the record, or facts are therein stated which in legal intendment constitute such allegation, that is sufficient. *Horne v. George H. Hammond Co.*, supra and cases cited.

As this is an action at law, we are bound to assume that the testimony of the plaintiff contained in the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and recited to have been given on the trial, was preserved in a bill of exceptions, which formed part of the transcript of record filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Being a part of the record, and proper to be resorted to in settling a question of the character of that now under consideration, *Robertson v. Cease*, 97 U.S. 648, we come to ascertain what is established by the uncontradicted evidence referred to.

In the first place, it shows that Edwards, prior to his employment on the New York Sun and the New Haven Palladium, was legally domiciled in the State of Delaware.

Next, it demonstrates that he had no intention to abandon such domicile, for he testified under oath as follows: ‘One of the reasons I left the New Haven Palladium was, it was too far away from home. I lived in Delaware, and I had to go back and forth. My family are over in Delaware.’ Now, it is elementary that, to effect a change of one’s legal domicile, two things are indispensable: First, residence in a new domicile, and, second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made, except *facto et animo*. Both are alike necessary. Either without the other is insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change. *Mitchell v. United States*, 21 Wall. 350.

As Delaware must, then, be held to have been the legal domicile of Edwards at the time he commenced this action, ***had it appeared that he was a citizen of the United States, it would have resulted, by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that Edwards was also a citizen of the State of Delaware.*** *Anderson v. Watt*, 138 U.S. 694. Be this as it may, however, Delaware being the legal domicile of Edwards, it was impossible for him to have been a citizen of another State, District, or Territory, and he must then have been either ***a citizen of Delaware*** or a citizen or subject of a foreign State. In either of these contingencies, the Circuit Court would have had jurisdiction over the controversy. But, in the light of the testimony, we are satisfied that the averment in the complaint, that Edwards was a resident ‘of’ the State of Delaware, was intended to mean, and, reasonably construed, must be interpreted as averring, that ***the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Delaware.*** *Jones v. Andrews*, 10 Wall. 327, 331; *Express Company v. Kountze*, 8 Wall. 342.” *Sun Printing & Publishing Association v. Edwards*: 194 U.S. 377, at 381 thru 383 (1904). [\[Footnote 3\]](#)

<http://books.google.com/books?id=tekGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA381#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Also:

“The act was considered in *Johnson v. United States*, 160 U.S. 546, and we there held that a person who was not a citizen of the United States at the time of an alleged appropriation of his property by a tribe of Indians was not entitled to maintain an action in the Court of Claims under the act in question. There was not in that case, however, any assertion that the claimant was a citizen of a State as distinguished from a citizen of the United States. . . . [U]ndoubtedly in a purely technical and abstract sense citizenship of one of the States may not include citizenship of the United States Unquestionably, in the general and common acceptance, ***a citizen of the State is considered as synonymous with citizen of the United States, and the one is therefore treated as expressive of the other. This flows from the fact that the one is normally and usually the other, and where such is not the case, it is purely exceptional and uncommon.***” *United States v. Northwestern Express, Stage & Transportation Company*: 164 U.S. 686, 688 (1897).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=xOQGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA688#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

“ . . . In the Constitution and laws of the United States, the word ‘citizen’ is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the *rights and privileges of a citizen of a State or of the United States*.” Baldwin v. Franks: 120 U.S. 678, at 690 (1887).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=c04GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA690#v=onepage&q&f=false>

And:

“As a man may be a citizen of a State without being a citizen of the United States, and as Section 1428, Revised Statutes, requires all officers of all United States vessels to be citizens of the United States, all officers of the Naval Militia must be male citizens of the United States as well as of the respective States, Territories, of the District of Columbia, of more than 18 and less than 45 years of age.” General Orders of Navy Department (Series of 1913); Orders remaining in force up to January 29, 1918; General Order No. 153, Page 17, Para 73.

<http://books.google.com/books?id=zYEtAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Therefore, there is a citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution and also a citizen of the United States **AND** a citizen of a State, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:

“ . . . There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a *citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States*.” Crowley v. Christensen: 137 U.S. 86, at 91 (1890).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=htIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q&f=false>

“Another objection to the act is that it is in violation of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution of the United States, and of the fourteenth amendment, in that this act discriminates both as to persons and products. Section 2, art. 4, declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states; and the fourteenth amendment declares that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. But we have seen that the supreme court, in *Crowley v. Christensen*, 137 U.S. 91, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15, has declared that there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a *citizen of a state or of a citizen of the United States*.” Cantini v. Tillman: 54 Fed. Rep. 969, at 973 (1893). **[Footnote 4]**

<http://books.google.com/books?id=Ehg4AAAAYAAJ&pg=PA973#v=onepage&q&f=false>

A citizen of a State who is not a citizen of the United States is entitled to privileges and

immunities of a citizen of the several States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America, and is therefore also a citizen of the several States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution [Footnote 5]:

“There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the State of North Carolina, had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to recover the debt which Harris owed him. *Being a citizen of North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States*, one of which is the right to institute actions in the courts of another State.” Harris v. Balk: 198 U.S. 215, at 223 (1905).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=ceIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA223#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

“. . . So, a State may, by rule uniform in its operation as to citizens of the several States, require residence within its limits for a given time before a citizen of another State who becomes a resident thereof shall exercise the right of suffrage or become eligible to office. It has never been supposed that regulations of that character materially interfered with the enjoyment by *citizens of each State of the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution to citizens of the several States*. The Constitution forbids only such legislation affecting citizens of the respective States as will substantially or practically put a citizen of one State in a condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to another State, or when asserting in another State the rights that commonly appertain to those who are part of the political community known as the People of the United States, by and for whom the Government of the Union was ordained and established. Blake v. McClung: 172 US. 239, at 256 thru 257 (1898).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=G2oUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA256#v=onepage&q&f=false>

“In speaking of the meaning of the phrase ‘*privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States*,’ under section second, article fourth, of the Constitution, it was said by the present Chief Justice, in *Cole v. Cunningham*, 133 U.S. 107, that the intention was ‘to confer on the *citizens of the several States a GENERAL CITIZENSHIP*, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same State would be entitled to under the like circumstances, and this includes the right to institute actions.’ “ Maxwell v. Dow: 176 U.S. 581, at 592 (1900).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=8toGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA592#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Thus, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the *Slaughterhouse Cases*, there are two citizens under the Constitution of the United States of America with privileges and immunities which are not the same. They are a citizen of the United States, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a citizen of the several States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution:

“We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great

weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment), which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks **ONLY** of *privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those (privileges and immunities) of citizens of the several States*. . . . “ Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 74 (1873). **[Footnote 6]**

<http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Footnotes:

1. There is a third citizen recognized in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution; that is, a citizen of a State. However, for purposes of international law (law of nations) such a citizen is not recognized.

<http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html>

2. A citizen of the United States can become also a citizen of a State, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by residing in a State of the Union:

“The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States **AND** the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone. . . .

There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the fourteenth amendment ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof ‘ are expressly declared to be ‘citizens of the United States **AND** of the State wherein they reside.’ “ Minor v. Happersett: 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, at 165 (1874).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=IEsGAAAYAAJ&pg=PA165#v=onepage&q&f=false>

“The Fourteenth Amendment declares that citizens of the United States are citizens of the state within they reside; therefore the plaintiff was at the time of making her application, a citizen of the United States **AND** a citizen of the State of Illinois.

We do not here mean to say that there may not be a temporary residence in one State, with intent to return to another, which will not create citizenship in the former. But the plaintiff states nothing to take her case out of the definition of citizenship of a State as

defined by the first section of the fourteenth amendment.” Bradwell v. the State of Illinois: 83 U.S. 130, at 138 (1873).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA138#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

3. In addition, in a legal proceeding in a federal court between a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, a citizen of the United States is to aver that he or she is a citizen of the United States **AND** a citizen of a State of the Union, a citizen of a State is to state that he or she is a citizen of a State of the Union:

“The bill filed in the Circuit Court by the plaintiff, McQuesten, alleged her to be ‘a citizen of the United States **AND** of the State of Massachusetts, and residing at Turner Falls in said State,’ while the defendants Steigleder and wife were alleged to be ‘citizens of the State of Washington, and residing at the city of Seattle in said State.’ “ *Statement of the Case, Steigleder v. McQuesten*: 198 U.S. 141 (1905).

“The averment in the bill that the parties were citizens of different States was sufficient to make a prima facie case of jurisdiction so far as it depended on citizenship.” *Opinion, Steigleder v. McQuesten*: 198 U.S. 141, at 142 (1905).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=ceIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA141#v=onepage&q&f=false>

On this point see my work, “Diversity of Citizenship and a Citizen of the United States” (online)

4. In line with these cases:

"Resident Aliens. (a) For purposes of any provision of this code that requires an applicant for a license or permit to be a United States citizen **OR** Texas citizen, regardless of whether it applies to an individual, a percentage of stockholders of a corporation, or members of a partnership, firm, or association, an individual who is not a United States citizen but who legally resides in the state is treated as a United States citizen **AND** a citizen of Texas. (Added by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1971, ch. 777, Sec. 18, eff. Aug. 27, 1979.)

Source: Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code; Title 1, Chapter 1, Section 1.07

<http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/>

<http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/AL/htm/AL.1.htm#1.07>

5. It is to be noted that privileges and immunities of a citizen of a State are in the constitution and laws of a particular State:

“. . . Whatever may be the scope of section 2 of article IV -- and we need not, in this case enter upon a consideration of the general question -- the Constitution of the United States does not make the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of one State under the constitution and laws of that State, the measure of the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed, as of right, by a citizen of another State under its constitution and laws.” McKane v. Durston: 153 U.S. 684, at 687 (1894).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=mmkUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA687#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

6. Privileges and immunities of a citizen of the several States are not the same as the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States.

Privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States arise “out of the nature and essential character of the Federal government, and granted or secured by the Constitution” (*Duncan v. State of Missouri*: 152 U.S. 377, at 382 [1894]) or, in other words, “owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.” (*Slaughterhouse Cases*: 83 (16 Wall.) U.S. 38, at 79 [1873]).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=ZGkUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA382#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

<http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA79#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

Privileges and immunities of a citizen of the several States are those described in *Corfield v. Coryell* decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in 1823:

“In the *Slaughter House Cases*, 16 Wall. 36, 76, in defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, this is quoted from the opinion of Mr. Justice Washington in *Corfield v. Coryell*, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct. 371, 380.” Hodges v. United States: 203 U.S. 1, at 15 (1906).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=HuEGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

The location for privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States is Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”

The designation for privileges and immunities of a citizen of the several States is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America:

“Fortunately we are not without judicial construction of this clause of the Constitution (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1). The first and leading case of the subject is that of *Corfield v. Coryell*, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in 1823.

‘The inquiry,’ he says ‘is, what are the *privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States*? . . .

This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States is adopted in the main by this court in the recent case of *Ward v. The State of Maryland*.”
Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 (16 Wall.) 36, at 75 thru 76 (1873).

<http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

“ . . . The *privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States* protected by the fourteenth amendment, are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential character of the federal Government, and granted or secured by the Constitution.’ *Duncan v. Missouri* (1904) 152 U.S. 377, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485; *Slaughter House Cases*, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.

The provisions of section 2, art. 4, of the federal Constitution, that citizens of each state shall be entitled to *privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states*, are held to be synonymous with rights of the citizens. *Corfield v. Coryell*, supra. This section is akin to the provision of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, as respects privileges and immunities, but the former is held not to make the privileges and immunities (the rights) enjoyed by citizens of the several states the measure of the privileges and immunities (the rights) to be enjoyed as of right, by a citizen of another state, under its Constitution and laws. *McKane v. Durston*, 153 U.S. 684, 14 Sup. Ct. 913, 38 L. Ed. 867. This rule necessarily classifies citizens in their rights to the extent that a citizen of one state when in another state must be governed by the same rules which apply to the citizens of that state as to matters which are of the domestic concern of the state. *Cole v. Cunningham*, 133 U.S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538; *People v. Gallagher*, 93 N.Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232; *Butchers’ Union v. Crescent City, Mo.*, 111 U.S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585; *Ex parte Kinney*, 14 Fed. Cas. 602; *Douglas v. Stephens*, 1 Del. Ch. 465.” Strange v. Board of Commission: 91 N.E. 242, at 246 (1910).

http://books.google.com/books?id=T_QKAAAYAAJ&pg=PA246#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Further readings (online), mine

1. “A Citizen of a State is a Citizen of the several States when abroad”, Dan Goodman, 2012.

2. “Yes a citizen of a State is also a citizen of the several States”, Dan Goodman, 2011.
3. The Slaughterhouse Cases Articles; “Mistake in the Syllabus”; Dan Goodman, 2008.