In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court held that an employee need only show “some harm” to maintain a Title VII discrimination claim against an employer for a lateral job transfer.

Background

After nine years as a plainclothes officer in the St. Louis Police Department’s specialized Intelligence Division, Sergeant Jatonya Muldrow was transferred out of the unit against her wishes, pursuant to the new commander’s request, who—as he later testified— wanted to replace Muldrow with a male police officer.

Although her rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not. She no longer worked with high-ranking officials in the Intelligence Division but instead supervised neighborhood patrol officers. Because she no longer served in the Intelligence Division, she lost her FBI status and the car that came with it. She was also placed on a “rotating schedule” that included weekend shifts.

Muldrow sued the City of St. Louis under Title VII, alleging she had suffered sex discrimination with respect to the “terms [or] conditions” of her employment. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, No. 22-193, 2024 WL 1642826, at *4 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2024).

The lower court rejected Muldrow’s claim, reasoning that the transfer did not cause her a “significant” employment disadvantage. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of St. Louis because: (1) Muldrow experienced no change in salary or rank; (2) Muldrow provided no evidence that the alleged loss of networking opportunities available in the Intelligence Division harmed her career prospects; and (3) the new rotating schedule and the loss of a take-home vehicle could not “fill the gap.”

On appeal from the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Muldrow had to, but could not, show that the transfer caused a “materially significant disadvantage.”

Decision

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and rejected the notion that employees must show a “significant” harm to maintain a Title VII claim.

The Court began with the plain language of Title VII, which prohibits an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).

Based on the plain language, the Supreme Court explained that the language of Title VII requires only that plaintiffs show that “the transfer brought about some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition.” In other words, “a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Nowhere does Title VII require a transferee (or any plaintiff) to show that the harm incurred was significant or “serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.”

Accordingly, Muldrow needed only to show that the transfer left her “worse off,” but not “significantly so.” The Court continued that Muldrow’s allegations, if properly supported, met the clarified standard “with room to spare.”

Key Takeaways

• Under Title VII, a discriminatory job transfer is actionable if the transfer resulted in some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment.
• The harm suffered by an employee need not be “significant” to maintain a Title VII claim.
• Although Muldrow involved a job transfer, the Court did not limit the holding to job transfers.
• The lower threshold of harm required should apply to any claims asserting a change to a condition or term of employment.
• The Court will likely apply this lowered threshold of harm to claims of reverse discrimination challenging an employer’s Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion program.